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Preface
The following study report is based on a contract Statement of Work (SOW) between Boeing Commercial
Airplane Group (BCAG) and the Federal Aviation Administration Technical Center (FAATC), for the investi-
gation of "disbenefits" to a commercial jet aircraft created by the incorporation of a cabin water spray
(CWS) system. The study required, but was not limited to, investigation of effects resulting from the com-
manded and uncommanded operation of a CWS system in several scenarios: airborne, takeoff, and landing
approach without the presence of fire (inadvertent activation), and in the presence of fire while the aircraft
is on the ground (design case). For the case of inadvertent operation, the contract also required estimates of
cost associated with returning an aircraft to revenue service following water discharge.
During the course of the study, several issues which were "out-of-scope" of the original contract, but of
significant concern to the study team, were identified. Those issues are presented in this preface and
represent the views of the Boeing Commercial Airplane Group developed over the course of this year-long
study program. While the regulatory bodies have accomplished a great deal in their research into the
theoretical workings of cabin water spray systems, it is our view that there exist many practical consider-
ations which must be addressed before water spray systems, in their current form, could be safely integrat-
ed into the commercial aircraft environment.
This report will discuss, in considerable detail, the idea of common cause failure, i.e., an abnormal failure
mechanism that causes the simultaneous failure of redundant systems intended to provide appropriate
safety margins in the event of normal system or component failure. Given the impact of water on sensitive
electronics, and the increasingly sophisticated electronic environment in current commercial aircraft, the
incorporation of a water spray system introduces a potential common cause failure source. The remedy for
this is straightforward but costly: components and systems in present day aircraft must be redesigned and/
or relocated to eliminate water as a common cause failure source. Various types of protective measures are
certainly possible. In order to provide adequate protection to critical components and systems, however,
the cost would be considerable.
A recent Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) paper, titled "Air safety regulation and its commercial impact"
(Reference 11), published in the Aeronautical Journal, March, 1991, quoted figures of between £77,000
($147,500) and £106,000 ($203,000) per aircraft for the installed cost of a cabin water spray system, and
weight penalties of 650 to 1100 lb. What was not clear was the type of aircraft included in these analyses,
whether they address new designs or retrofit, and what will be required to "waterprooff critical systems to
make them invulnerable to common cause failure. Not included in these CAA figures is the cost impact to
the aircraft operator for both operational and maintenance costs, all of which are ultimately passed on to
the flying passenger.
In order to fully understand the impact of installation of a cabin water spray system, Boeing has prepared
detailed design and cost analyses for the "SAVE" system installed in a new 777 aircraft. We believe the unit
cost, based on 1992 dollars, to be $1.2 million for design and installation, exclusive of the protection
required for other, water-sensitive systems. Using this analysis as a baseline, estimates for the other aircraft
in the Boeing family range from $1.7 million for the 747-400, to $530 thousand for the 737, for new con-
struction aircraft. These figures do not consider the case of retrofit installations in existing aircraft, which
would be higher. (Additional detail is available in the Aerospace Industries Association report on "Cabin
Water Spray Systems for Post Crash Fire Protection", dated December, 1992). Weight estimates for each of
the study aircraft incorporating a water spray system have also been prepared, based on the same design
analysis. Unlike the optimistic CAA figures, these weight estimates range from 766 Ib for a 737-300, to an
extreme penalty of 3612 lb for a 747-400. All of these weight figures are based upon the SAVE system
precipitation rate of 0.03-inches per minute for 3-minutes, and the net wetted cabin area of each aircraft.
Preface Table 1 provides a summary of these figures.
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Preface Table 1. System Weight Impact.
737-300
54
747-400
247
757-200
75
767-300
120
777
148.3
1238Water (Ib) 451 2062 626 1002
Estimated system weight 315 1550 470 750 930
Total weight 766 3612 1096 1752 2168
Note: Precipitation rate of O.034nches _erminute for maximum of 3-minutes
One gallon ,, 8.35 Ib
In recognition of this severe weight penalty that the system specified by the SOW imposes on the airplane
and its operator, recent efforts by the CAA and FAA have concentrated on possible methods of redudng
system weight. Since the weight of the onboard water is the largest po_on of the total system weight, the
most promising approach is the creation of a =smart" system, by reducing the total time of spray and/or
spraying only that zone where a heat or fire sensor determines that water is required. Studies conducted by
the CAA indicate that a reduction in onboard stored water of _/_might still provide 45-seconds of extra
protection. This type of reduction would allow weights approximately 1Aof those indicated in Preface
Table 1, but the potential for saving lives with these revised amounts is unclear. Also, a =smart" system
implies a level of system complexity that the SAVE system did not have, and requires that the design
incorporate, at significant expense, the very high system reliability required of other safety systems and
critical electronics.
Estimates of the costs per potential life saved by a number of safety improvements, both current and
proposed, were presented for comparison purposes in the aforementioned paper. Using the CAA figures,
the cost per (UK) life saved by a functional cabin water spray system is £9 million, or $18 million, for UK
registered aircraft. When compared to other standards used to judge the value of safety improvements,
these figures appear to be high. However, as we have outlined, the CAA system weight and complexity
figures seem to be very optimistic, which would make the true cost per potential life saved significantly
higher than that $18 million.
The current regulatory activity to establish Net Safety and Cost Benefit Analyses for justification of a cabin
water spray system is based on a total of 88 "survivable" accidents between 1966 and 1991. A substantial
portion of this group of 88 accidents involved 1st and 2nd generation commercial jet transports with
documented accident rates an order of magnitude higher than those for newer generation aircraft intro-
duced during the last 10 to 15 years (Preface Figure 1). This is significant in two respects; first, it demon-
strates the tremendous improvements in accident avoidance and passenger safety achieved by newer
aircraft types, and second, as the accident rate decreases, the true cost of a cabin water spray system to the
airlines and the flying public again increases substantially beyond the $18 million per (UK) life saved
currently estimated. With this in mind, and with many of these early commercial jets either out of service or
due to be retired before any regulation requiring the incorporation of water spray systems is mandated, it
would seem appropriate to include only those recently manufactured aircraft, that would be affected by a
potential rule, in the cost and safety benefit analyses. This would be the only proper course of action to
determine the true relative worth of cabin water spray systems to both the current and future jet fleets.
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Laboratory testing has demonstrated, in selected scenarios, that water spray systems can be effective in
removing heat, delaying the onset of combustion of interior materials, and scrubbing smoke particulates
from the air. However, the potential for catastrophic loss caused by inadvertent discharge, and a common
cause type failure inflight, could more than offset the life saving potential of such systems. In the case of a
commanded activation, in the presence of fire, the potential for slippery conditions, reduced visibility, loss
of communication and potential disorientation could also create a negative safety benefit.
The net safety benefit analysis is ultimately the tool which will be used to evaluate the benefits of cabin
water spray systems versus the disbenefits discussed in this report. We strongly believe that there exists a
number of issues that must be addressed, either as part of that safety benefit analysis, or in further studies
which should support the system evaluation programs conducted to date. These include; recent improve-
ments in heat release and fire blocking materials which have already contributed to an increase in the time
available for emergency evacuation; the impact of water on sensitive electronics, and how that impact
might be minimized to assure required levels of system reliability after an inadvertent discharge; the psy-
chological effect of water on passengers, without a fire threat; an activation sequence that is sensible and
reliable without increasing pilot workload during critical segments of the flight; and the operational and
logistical aspects of such systems, such as the need for freeze protection, any water quality requirements,
and procedures for system test without wetting the interior of a serviceable aircraft. Only by addressing
these items, and more which are certain to appear, will the true net benefits of cabin water spray systems
become clear.
Theoutstanding, and improving, safety record achieved by the commercial jet aircraft industry over the past
35 years is a direct result of the significant strides made in aircraft and equipment design promoted by the
regulatory bodies, aircraft manufacturers, and the airlines. It further indicates, in our view, that it is far more
cost effective to spend limited research money on systems and procedures which keep accidents from
happening, enhancing the safety of the flying public and the health of the industry in the process.
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Executive Summary
A _proof of concept" on-board cabin water spray system has been developed that has demonstrated the
ability to suppress aircraft cabin fires. The motivation for this development was the 1985 British Airtours,
Manchester accident. This accident resulted in the loss of 55 lives following an uncontained engine failure
that punctured a wing fuel tank while the aircraft was on its takeoff roll.
The successful demonstration prompted the Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) to conduct further testing
that was documented in CAA paper 88014 "Aircraft cabin fire suppression by means of an interior water
spray system." Subsequent full-scale fire tests conducted by the Federal Aviation Administration Technical
Center (FAATC) and various CAA facilities at Teeside and Cardington have demonstrated that a cabin water
spray mist system is effective in preventing the early onset of combustion of cabin interior materials, and
removing heat and smoke particulates from the passenger cabin in fire test scenarios.
In order to obtain a balanced opinion on the benefits of cabin water spray systems (CWSS), the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and the Federal Aviation Administration requested Boeing
Commercial Airplane Group (BCAG) to investigate the potential disadvantages or Udisbenefits" of CWSS and
its effect on the aircraft. This study is part of a cost sharing contract agreement between BCAG, FAATC,
Atlantic City, New Jersey, and NASA-Langley Research Center, Hampton, Virginia to investigate the "disben-
efits" of installing a "SAVE" Ltd. cabin water spray system in current in-service and new design Boeing
commercial jet aircraft.
The primary objective of the Boeing study was to investigate the implications of the activation (commanded
and uncommanded) of a CWSS on various models of Boeing aircraft, and to identify and quantify the
potential "disbenefits" that might exist under various operating conditions. All key aircraft functional areas
have been reviewed for potential damage and consequences. Significant concerns regarding overall aircraft
safety and the basic economics of cabin water spray (CWS) systems have been identified and discussed
within the body of this report. The cost of returning an aircraft to service following an inadvertent discharge
was investigated with assistance from Delta Air Lines.
Summarizing our key conclusions from this study:
• CWS is a safety system that can negatively affect other key safety of flight systems, by creating a
common cause failure source;
• Flight and evacuation critical systems will require detail review and potential major redesign to
mitigate water damage;
• CWS may increase evacuation time;
• Evacuation into and prolonged exposure to a cold climate following discharge may
be hazardous;
• All aircraft systems susceptible to water damage require detail review to minimize damage and
return to service costs;
• The cost of returning an aircraft to revenue service following discharge is high;
• Passenger reactions to activation of water spray are unknown.
xiii
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All key aircraft functional areas have been reviewed and appropriate recommendations presented for
further study. The overall system reliability will require further assessment with the introduction of water as
a possible failure mechanism on redundant systems. A net safety benefit analysis should include the
potential effects of slowing passenger egress during evacuation.
xiv
. INTRODUCTION
The potential for improved survivability of a serious aircraft accident involving ftre may be realized by the
incorporation of a proposed cabin water spray safety system that has been tested by regulatory agencies in the
United States (US) and the United Kingdom (UK). A prototype aircraft cabin water spray has demonstrated the
ability to suppress fire in the passenger cabin which can result from a post-inodent fuel-fed fire spreading
rapidly to interior furnishings. The promising results of early testing have been published by the Civil Aviation
Authority (CAA) (Reference 1), resulting in the pursuit of joint research programs by the CAA and the Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA). A second, more thorough round of testing has now been completed by those
agencies, and has confirmed the positive aspects of such a system.
In order to obtain a balanced opinion of the advantages versus disbenefits (disadvantages) of an onboard
water spray system, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and the FAA requested the
Boeing Commercial Airplane Group (BCAG) to investigate the potential disbenefits of this type of system, from
the perspective of the aircraft manufacturer and the operator. The effects on a modem commercial jet aircraft
that might result from a water spray discharge have been evaluated for the following cases: the case of inad-
vertent operation in taxi, takeoff, cruise, and landing modes, and the case of intentional operation while the
aircraft is on the ground, including possible effects on passenger evacuation. The difficulties and costs associat-
ed with returning an aircraft to service following discharge, without the presence of fire, have been addressed.
2. BACKGROUND
The concept of utilizing a cabin water spray system (CWSS) as a means of increasing passenger survivability
following an accident involving an external fire has its roots in the British Airtours Manchester, UK disaster of
1985. This accident, resulting in the loss of 55 lives, was caused when fragments from an uncontained engine
failure pierced a fuel tank while the aircraft was on its takeoff roll. Fuel spilled onto the hot engine, ignited,
and produced thick black smoke which rapidly entered the passenger cabin through the right rear door, which
had been opened by a flight attendant before the aircraft stopped. Fire subsequently entered the cabin, with
furnishings becoming rapidly involved, creating an environment of thick smoke, toxic gases, and intense heat.
This accident was witnessed by the late Jim Steel, founder of SAVE Ltd., who theorized that an onboard water
spray system, similar to that used in commercial buildings, might have provided enough protection to passen-
gers to allow extra evacuation time and prevent an accident like this from turning into a disaster. The cabin
water spray system conceived by SAVE Ltd. was In'st demonstrated to the CAA in 1987, in a VC-10 fuselage.
This demonstration was successful enough that a test program was authorized.
As a result of the initial demonstration of the SAVE Ltd. system, and subsequent testing by the CAA, the airwor-
thiness authorities in both North America and Europe initiated a collaborative research and development
program involving aircraft manufacturers and industry. System testing was conducted by the Federal Aviation
Administration Technical Center (FAATC), located in Atlantic City, New Jersey, and by the C__AAat the Fire
Research Station in Borehamwood, and at its Cranfield and Cardington facilities. The objective of these testing
programs was to determine scientifically the benefits provided by a cabin water spray system, and how a sys-
tem might be best configured to provide the maximum benefit. Laboratory testing preceded the full scale
testing, with efforts concentrating on three effects: atmospheric treatment, where the products of combustion
are washed from the air; surface cooling, which delays combustion and the production of smoke and toxic gas;
and cabin cooling, which keeps the temperatures in the cabin to a survivable level. Full scale testing followed,
with both the CAA and FAA using fuselage sections of production aircraft for a series of fire tests, where jet fuel
"pan type" fires were lit under controlled conditions. These sections were equipped with production materials
andfurnishings,andtheinteriorswereinstrumentedfortemperatureandgasreadings.Initialresultsfromthis
roundof testingindicatedthatwatersprayinhibitstheabilityof thefurnishingstobecomeinvolvedinthefire
earlyin itsdevelopment,andreducesthecabintemperatureto asurvivablevel.Thisalone,in thecritical
stagesof afire,providesadditionalcriticalminutesforpassengervacuation.Asasecondbenefit,manyofthe
productsof combustionarewashedfromtheair,andthelevelofwatersolublegasesisreduced.
FollowingtheinitialcapabilitydemonstrationsbySAVELtd.andtheCAA,severalcompaniesin theUKbegan
programsaimedatthedevelopmentofwaterspraysystemsandcomponentsthatcouldbeintegratedinto,and
functionin,anaircraftenviromnent.Thesecompanieshaveevaluatedmultiplecombinationsof nozzlegeome-
tryandlocationtoestablishsystemconfigurationsthatwouldmaximizetheeffectivenessofwaterapplication
(quantiW and rate), and minimize the amount of water required to be carried on board each type of aircraft.
Additional tests considered different system types: British Petroleum's "water curtain" approach, and MM Avia-
tion's modular system, designed to assure maximum survivability in a crash, and provide for easy retrofit of
existing aircraft. Both Darchem Engineering Ltd. and Walter-Kidde (Fire and Safety International) have concen-
trated on improvement and optimization of the original SAVE Ltd. system. While each of these approaches
have their respective advantages, none have been evaluated by an industry or regulatory standard.
During early 1988, following the initial demonstration of the SAVE Ltd. "proof-of-concept" cabin water spray
system to the CAA, and its report on BBC Television, BCAG, responding to a request from a major European
airline customer, initiated a preliminary concept design study of a cabin water spray system for a 737 aircraft.
After several high level management discussions with this customer, it was determined that the best approach
to establish a net safety benefit of water spray systems was for BCAG to support the collaborative study effort
being defined and initiated by the airworthiness authorities in both Europe and North America. This study is
the result of a cost sharing contract agreement between BCAG, the FAATC, and the NASA-Langley Research
Center, to investigate the "disbenefits" or disadvantages of installing a SAVE Ltd. type cabin water spray system
in Boeing built commercial jet aircraft.
,
SYSTEM OVERVIEW
As originally conceived, the SAVE system used a two tiered approach to cabin water spray (Figure 3-1). For the
first tier, a dedicated water supply is carried aboard the aircraft, in tanks located strategically to ensure water is
available even in the case of aircraft break-up. Pipes run the length of the aircraft (behind trim panels), con-
necting the water tanks to multiple spray nozzles located in the overhead. In its original configuration, only
centerline "l_sting" nozzles were proposed, the water fed to these nozzles being pumped from tanks
mounted remotely.
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Figure 3-1. Cabin Water Spray System Isometric.
In the second tiel; additional rows of nozzles, located outboard at the bin/sidewall interface, were reserved for
use as a "deluge" system. This portion of the system was intended for use only upon connection of an outside,
tender canied water supply, whereupon large quantities of water at very high flow rates could be pumped into
the aircraft quickly. The key to this tender system was a series of external connections in the aircraft's skin,
wl:tich would accept a nozzle of internationally standardized design, and would accept this high water flow
upon tender arrival. Thus the onboard water supply would serve to provide several critical minutes of protec-
tion until the tender could arrive at the scene.
Following prelilninary system definition, it became apparent that, in oMer to achieve the proper wetted area
and gain the maximum time advantage for evacuation of a burning aircraft, all nozzles should acconmaodate
both flow rates. The tender idea was retained, but all nozzles would be used for the 3-minute misting of the
cabin for evacuation, followed by tender hook-up and deluge.
The original "pumping" of water from the onboard tanks was superseded by later concepts which appear more
promising. These involve either a nitrogen bottle mounted alongside the water tank, pressurized to 3000 psi,
which would in mm pressurize the water tank when activated, or a pyro-teclmic device that would pressurize
the water tank not unlike an automotive air bag. Both systems would include a dump valve that could be
energized to depressurize the entire system in the event of inadvertent activation.
All system concepts would utilize flexible piping to connect the overhead piping to the spray nozzle array. Ml
piping would be dry in the inactive condition, with light blow-off caps on the spray nozzles to prevent accu-
mt,lation of debris and dust which might decrease nozzle efficiency upon system activation.
Various arming and activation schemes have been suggested, with current thinking centered around the idea of
the system being armed by the flight crew, probably as a pre-flight checklist item, and disarmed after climb
out, to prevent inflight activation. System activation could be initiated in a number of ways. It must be recog-
nized that the an_/disarm/activation/dunap scheme is a significant consideration in the design of a "real" sys-
tem, such that the possibili W of inadvertent activation is "highly improbable".
. SCOPE OF THE STUDY
The study was designed as a broad, wide-ranging investigation into the potential disadvantages of water spray
on aircraft systems and emergency evacuation of a wetted aircraft. The investigation considered the implica-
tions of the activation of a cabin water spray system on various models of its Boeing jetliner aircraft, with the
757-200 serving as the baseline/focus airplane.
A 757-200 was "configured" with the "SAVE" cabin water spray system specified in the contract Statement of
Work (SOW) to assess the impact of installation, and is included for reference in Appendix D. This configura-
tion was established to estimate approximate sizing criteria and does not consider the installation impact of
CWS on other aircraft systems, furnishings, interiors, wiring, etc.
Early in the study, it was decided that the 727 would not be included in the scope. This decision was made for
two reasons. First, since the 727 is not currently in production, all infonnation regarding its systems and con-
stmction details would have to be pursued through a small, post-production engineering organization. This
would have made any investigation into water paths, materials, and protective measures much more difficult
than for current production aircraft. Second, and perhaps more importantly, considering time required for the
issuance of a Federal Aviation Regulation (FAR), the 727 would likely be nearing the end of its useful life due
to Phase III noise standards, and might not be included in any regulatory action. A similar reasoning was used
with the 707, which is also excluded fl'om this study.
4.1 AIRCRAFT
All currentproductionmodelswereconsideredin theinvestigationa dinclude737,747,757(4-DooD,767,
and777whereappropriate.AlthoughtheSOWcalledforattentiontoindividualdashnumbers(e.g.737-200,
etc.),oncethestudybegan,it becameclearthatnoparticularadvantagewastobegainedbythisapproach.As
will bediscussedingreaterdetailaterin thisreport,adashnumberspecificapproachimpliesamuchfiner
"resolution"of predictedwaterpathsthanwasfoundpossible.Dimensiondrawingsforeachtypeaircraftcon-
sicleredareincludedin thisreportasAppendixA.
4.2 FLIGHTSCENARIOS
TheStatementofWorkrequiredthefollowingscenarioslx_usedtofacilitatetheidentificationof
thedisbenefits:
Inthegroundactivationscenariothestudyaircraftwereinvestigatedtoestablisht edisbenefitsfortwodis-
tinctlydifferentcases:
* Case1: (DesignCase)istheco_mnandedactivationof theCWSSin thepresenceofaseverefire
externaltotheaircraft;
• CaseIf: Theinadvertentor tmcommandedactivationof theCWSSwhiletheaircraftisonthe
groundbutin ataxi,takeoff,or landingmode.
Intheairborneactivationscenariotheaircraftsystemsandcontrolswereinvestigatedtoestablisht oseparam-
etersandconditionsthatwouldadverselyaffectsafew-of-flightandpassengersafetyingeneral.Levelflightat
cruisealtitude,takeoff,climb,andlandingapproach(highflightcrewworkload)wereconsidered.
Thestudyalsoaddressedthecostofreturningtheaircrafttoservicefollowingtheprecautionaryuseoruncom-
mandedactivationoftheCWSSin thecircumstancewheretheaircrafthasnotbeendamagedbyfire.DeltaAir
Lineswasbroughtintothestudyteamasasubcontractort developtheprimarycostdataforthispartofthe
study,andhasprovidedvaluableinsightin thepreparationofthisreport.Boeingpersonnelassistedthesub-
contractorindevelopingbaselinedata,andprovidedconsultationasrequireduringthecourseofthisstudy.
4.3 BASELINE STUDY REQUIREMENTS
The cabin water spray system used as the baseline for this study was based on the SAVE Ltd. system developed
and initially tested in the UK. The system concept specified assumes a uniform spray distribution pattern over
the passenger cabin floor area, and a precipitation rate of 0.8 nml (0.03-inches) per minute for a maximum of
3-minutes. The use of additives, biocides and freeze protection chemicals was not considered part of the study.
The study concentrated on the spraying of the passenger comparmlent, including galley areas and above ceil-
ing panels (Section 4.4). Three areas were specifically identified in the SOW as "non-spray" areas following
irdtial technical discussions with the Payloads, Structures and Product Development organizations within
BCAG. These areas are the cargo compartment, underfloor, and cheek areas, and were specifically excluded
from consideration due to the design of the structures, attachment of cargo liners and insulation, and the small
likelihood that any water spray could be directed into these areas.
4.4 APPROACHAND METHODOLOGY
The757-200(4-Door)model,Figure4.4-1andAppendixA,wasselectedtoestablish"baseline"disbenefitshat
wereto bestudiedin furtherdetail.All othermodelswouldbestudied,withonlythosespecificdifferencesto
thebaselinereported.
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Figure 4.4-1. 757-200 Passenger Configuratio_
Dunng early study team discussions, and in preliminary investigative work, it became apparent that water
paths, tbllowing spray activation, would be extremely difficult to predict reliably. Water paths, it was conclud-
ed, would be subject to too many variables, including airline specific configuration, envirorm_ental control
system (ECS) status during discharge, absorptive characteristics of cabin materials, passenger count, airplane
attitude, and even, to a degree, on random probability. This conclusion does not affect that part of the water
that finds its way to the electrical/electronic (E/E) bay via the E/E cooling system, which is discussed in Sec-
tion 5.2. This approach acknowledges that water paths and quantities for that portion of the total water sprayed
in the passenger cabin that leaks through floor panels into the lower areas of the airplane is impossible to
predict analytically. This fact forced the study into a much more "generic" direction, equipment being studied
for the presence of water, rather than a specific quantity. It also meant that many equipment items that might in
reality see no water following the spray event would be reviewed, at least in a broad sense, for any damage
that water might create.
Consideration given to spraying above ceiling panels was also approached generically. This spray requirement
would prove particularly difficult, as demonstrated by Figures 4.4-2 and 4.4-3. Space above the ceiling panels
on the standard body airplanes (737, 757) is extremely limited, and it would be very difficult to install the
piping and nozzles required for cabin water spray. Also, this space lin-dtation would not allow a proper spray
pattern to develop, and would expose overhead mounted components to direct spray, with little absorbent
material for protection. As a result, overhead mounted components were also studied for behavior in the pres-
ence of water, but not a specific amount. The value of spray in these areas should be reviewed.
Figure 44-2. 757 Overhead (Attic).
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Figure 4.4-3. 757 Cross SectiorL
The ingestion of water mist by the ECS was the only portion of this study for wl'tich a truly analytical method
could be used. While assumptions must still be made for this analysis, a specific water quantity that arrives in
the E/E bay via the blow-through equipment cooling was established analytically. The evaluation of selected
electronics was made on a worst case basis; that is, all equipment in the bay was considered at risk of damage,
and the assessment of failure potential evaluated accordingly. Only an extensive test program, with a fully
equipped airplane, will allow more definitive information for separating areas of greater damage potential from
lesser ones.
° FUNCTIONAL ORGANIZATION EVALUATIONS
In order to assess the implications of a cabin water spray discharge within the pressurized fuselage, and to
identify the disbenefits that such a discharge creates, the baseline aircraft (757-200) was evaluated according
to the responsil)ilities of the major functional organizations, guided by the affected Air Transport Association
(ATA) system designators. Representatives from each of the BCAG functional engineering groups (Payloads,
Environmental Controls, Electrical Systems, etc.) were tasked with evaluating the magnitude of the damage
or "disbenefits" that might be incurred, and identifying design solutions or approaches that might mitigate
these disbenefits.
Product Safety and Reliability Groups (Section 5.9 and 5.10) provided evaluations that considered the relation-
ships between functional specific systems, and the overall effects of cabin water spray on the safety of the
airplane and its occupants.
Study activity was initiated according to the parameters and requirements specified in the SOW. Each of the
other organizations assessed the expected consequences of the CWSS discharge and conducted their investiga-
tions as conditions were identified. Summaries of these investigations were collected for Delta Air Lines cost
analysis and am presented in the following sections.
5.1 PAYLOAD SYSTEMS
The design and integration of cabin water spray systems is under the functional responsibility of Payloads
Systems. This portion of the study was conducted to quantify the water/mist effects on traditional Payloads
components for the quantity of water that might be expected to be applied during a system discharge. Consid-
eration has been given to both co_rmmnded and uncommanded events, with the commanded or design event
considering effects of water on passenger emergency egress only. All items considered in this evaluation apply
to all models, as specific differences in the Payloads components are subtle, and will generally not affect over-
all conclusions, except as noted.
5.1.1 Assumptions
In order to be assured of a conservative approach, and to satisfy contractual obligations, certain assumptions
we,'e required to be made.
First, the full duration of water spray was required to be 3-minutes. This time corresponds to an International
Civil Aviation O,'ganization (ICAO) agreement for fire and rescue vehicles to respond to an on field accident.
For inadvertent or uncommanded operation, consideration was given to artificially limiting the spray duration,
to 30-seconds or so, as it was thought that a manual shutoff could be performed within that time period. Ser-
vice experience has shown that 30-seconds to be very optimistic, as several past lavatory spills have taken
considerably longer to effect a shutoff. It has to be further assumed that whatever caused the system to dis-
charge inadvertently might also prevent its early shutoff.
Second,forPayloads,theworstcaseoccurswhentheleftrecirculationfanisoffwhenwaterisfirstdischarged.
Thisassuresl_nimalingestionofwaterbyECS,thusallwaterisassumedtobesprayedoncabinfurnishings
andpassengers.Tl_samountstoapproximately80USgallonsina757,basedonthespecifiedprecipitation
rateof0.03-inchesperminutefor3-minutes,waterbeingsprayedindropletsof approximately8%150microns
indiameter.
Third,"some"quantityofwaterisassumedtobesprayedirectlyintotheairplanesoverhead,abovetheceil-
ingpanels.Thisrequirementwasspecifiedaspartofthesystemdesignin thecontractSOW.It became
apparentveryearlyin thestudythat,forthestandardbodyairplanes,thiswasnotonlyimpracticalbutphysi-
callyimpossiblegiventhelin_tedspaceabovetheceilingpanels.Someconsiderationwasgiventothiscase,
butspecificonclusionscannotbedrawnaswaterpathswouldbeverydifficulto predictwithanydegree
ofcertainty.
Fourth,inorderto defineamanageableproblem,woolcarpetingwasassumedtobeinstalledonthecabin
floor.TherationaleforthiscomesfromBoeinginteriorstandards.Currently,onlywoolcarpetsareinstalledin
newproductionaircraft.TestsperformedbyDarchemEngineeringLtd.,Stocton-on-Tees,UKhaveshownthat
woolisaveryabsorbentmaterial(Figure5.1-1).Theabsorptionofwaterbysyntheticsi lessclear,however,
theycanbecountedonforlittleornoabsorbency.ThismakestheimpactofCWSin theretrofitmarketvery
difficulto assess,althoughseveralairlineshaveindicatedthattheyinstallonlywoolcarpetswhenrefitting
followingoverhaul(discussedindetailinSection5.1.3.1).
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Lastly, the stored water used by the system is assumed to be clean and additive free, with demineralized
water being preferable. This will in all probability minimize stain damage to furnishings following drying,
and allow these items to be re-used, but would not prevent freezing or the growth of microorganisms in the
storage system.
5.1.2 PastWaterEventExpe_ience
Anumberofwaterrelatedeventswerereviewedtoprovidesomedegreeofinformationastowhatdamage
mightbecreatedbywaterbeingsprayedoveritemsnotdesignedor intendedtoIx:wet.These"events"have
beenreportedto Boeingin theformof operationalserviceproblemreportsand,althoughnotusuallyvery
detailed,aresufficienttoprovideaflavorofthetypesof dlingsthatmightbeexpecteduringandimmediately
afteractivationof awaterspraysystem.
Severalcasesof leakinglavatoriesonthe747upperdeckhavebeenreported,withatleastonecaseresulting
in thedischargeofapproximately45gallonsofwater(airlineestimate)thatsubsequentlysoakedcarpetand
mnintotheoverheadpassengerserviceunits(PSUs)onthemaindeck.Effectsfromthesespillsincluded
localizedlossof lightingandentertaimnentsystems,floorproximityemergencylighting,PSUfunctions,over-
heatedpassengerseatwiring,wetceilingpanelsandcarpets,andunhappypassengers.Nolongtenndatais
availableonthesespills,butit isassumedthatsufficientreconditioningwasperformedthatwill preventfuture
corrosionproblems.
Co_Tosionproblemsonairplanes are not new and many service reports deal with this issue. Galley and
lavatory areas are traditional corrosion problem areas. Even though the amount of liquid spilled there is minor
compared to what a water spray system would deposit its contribution to corrosion is still significant. Door
areas which might experience rain water accumulations during airplane servicing or passenger ingress/egress
are also problem areas, and indicate the type of damage that might be done by water that is left and allowed
to evaporate. These reports provide strong incentive for prompt refurbishment following water spray discharge.
Time could be a critical factor in preventing the initial start of corrosion if the water is contaminated.
Other types of problems that have been reported from water "events" include mold growth on door mounted
slide rafts, thlse cargo fire indications (even from excessive hulnidity), and condensation accumulation that
drained out of the overhead causing electrical and instrumentation anomalies. Bacterial contamination of the
water is a serious concern due to the lack of standards and control in various parts of the world. This would
dictate an aggressive prevention program, requiring frequent system draining and cleaning and, in all likeli-
hood, some fornl of biocide in the water. Effects from this type of additive on the clean-up process (staining,
electrical component corrosion, etc.) following inadvertent discharge is unknown (additional discussion on this
subject is found in Section 5.7).
5.1.3 Component Evaluation
5.1.3.1 Absorption Characteristics
Following initiation of a water spray event, water will begin to be absorbed by cabin furnishings, seats and
carpets, and by passenger clotl_ng. A certain amount of shedding is expected from seats and passengers, as
seats are normally treated (Scotchgard, etc.) to prevent spill damage, and passenger clothing will be entirely
dependent on season and fabric type (natural or synthetic). The degree of shedding from the seats is also
variable, dependent on the age of the treatment. In any event, most water will most certainly find its way to the
floor, and a very absorbent wool carpet.
A water absorption test was performed by Darchem Engineering Ltd., to quantify the amount of water which
might be absorbed following a 3-minute water spray. Worn wool carpeting used in the test was provided to
Darchem by British Airways. This carpet was tested in their cabin water spray test chamber (no seats installed),
equipped with a steel grid floor, and under floor drains and collection points, over which the carpeting was
installed. The water spray system was set-up to spray at specified application rates, and allowed to run for
3-minutes. Water was collected over the next eight hours.
Fortile flowrateof 1.05liter/minute,only1@/0ofthesprayedwaterwascollectedin thattimeperiod
(Figure5.1-1).Assuminganadditional10%trappedin thecollectionpiping,it isclearthatthecarpetwill
entrapavewlargepercentage(upto80%).Forconservatism,a7@/0absorptionwasconsideredforthisstudy(Section5.2.1).Thisnumberissignificant,andindicatesahighprobabilitythatwater"flooding"throughtile
floorpanelsintothelowerlobe,andtowardsthefrontofthecabinontotheflightdeckwillnotoccur,al-
thoughacertainamountcanbeexpectedtobe"squeezedout"of thecarpetbypassengertraffic,ultimately
drippingthroughseamsin floorpanels.Whilecertainlynotdefinitivedata,theseresultsdoseemto indicate
thatwaterpassingbeyondthepassengercabinmightbemanageable,andshouldbeverifiedbyfurthertesting.
Howwaterin thecarpetmightaffectanemergencyevacuationisdiscussedinSection5.1.3.2.
5.1.3.2 EvacuationConsideration
Significantquantitiesof waterinandonthecabincarpetingt_ght have the effect of slowing down evacuation
(leather soles on wet wool = no traction), however, no information is available to accurately gauge the effect.
The evacuation difficulties would be further compounded if the aircraft was not in a level condition, i.e., a
collapsed landing gear.
Delay in the evacuation can have an adverse effect on the net safety benefits of CWS. If the fire penetrates the
cabin, passenger's will be exposed to a rapid buildup of toxic gases, smoke and high temperatures. An external
fire that does not penetrate the cabin can affect evacuation in other ways. The incident involving a Continental
DC-10 at Los Angeles in Marcia of 1978 is a good example. In this accident, the external fire did not immediate-
ly threaten occupants, but the radiant heat from the fire rendered the available escape slides unusable before
the evacuation was completed. The resulting two fatalities (and another two some months later) would most
certainly have been greater had the evacuation taken any longer than it did.
5.1.3.3 Overhead Crown ka'ea Spray Nozzles
For the case where nozzles are installed above the ceiling panels, the exact water paths would be very difficult
to predict, as water will flow over the back side of these ceiling panels. Panels constructed with open, crushed-
core honeycomb type backs would entrap and hold some water. Sidewall insulation blankets would likely be
soaked, and water (most likely as large droplets or rivulets) would run into and around PSUs, past fluorescent
lighting f'Lxtures, reading lights and speakers in the PSUs. As currently configured, fluorescent fLXt-ures and
reading lights would likely experience electrical shorting. Halogen type lamps may explode, although these are
contained and should pose no hazard. NO SMOKING/FASTEN SEAT BELT signs would likely stop working, as
would the PA system, including the cabin interphone. This would obviously make emergency instructions
difficult to conmaunicate, and cabin attendant/flight crew communication virtually impossible at a time when
this is vital. Tim emergency oxygen system is not considered to be particularly vulnerable, although those
models with electrically unlatched mask drop doors (on at least all models with chemical oxygen) might be
compromised. All the items listed here are also somewhat vulnerable from the in-cabin misting, but the direct
spray above the ceiling would most certainly exacerbate ties problem.
5.1.3.4 Cabin Lighting
The failure of electrical equipment in the passenger cabin (discussed in Section 5.3) will have several ramifica-
tions from a passenger perspective. First, loss of lighting would be very alarming under the best of circum-
stances, that being the case of inadvertent (no fire hazard) discharge. In an actual fire emergency, it could be
life threatening. Even a partial lighting loss, combined with at least a partial loss of PA system, could result in
longer evacuation times than would be required otherwise, and the full benefits of water spray would not be
realized. In the very best of circumstances, only a few lights might be lost due to redundant circuitry, but there
would in all likelihood be visible smoke from the shorted units. Service experience has shown that floor prox-
imity lights (Figure 5.1-2), required for emergency evacuation, would likely not work very long after water
spray, as galley spills have demonstrated. Emergency lights and exit signs are better protected, but are not
currently constructed for exposure to a water-laden atmosphere.
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Later model airplanes, especially the wide body type, have electric controls in their armrests, and seat to seat
wiring bundles for control of reading lights and entertaimnent systems. There is the danger of a potential shock
for passengers, and local overheating of electrical cables before circuit breaker trip. This is not considered a
significant safety hazard, but is one more item warranting additional consideration. Video systems will most
certainly short if in operation at the time of spray. While these are certainly not essential systems, their damage
in the inadvertent discharge case would have a substantial impact on the cost of refurbishment. Also, a cathode
ray tube (CRT) type display operating at high voltage is of concern for its potential to produce electrical shock
to passenger and crew.
5.1.4 Return to Service
Coilnnanded discharge of the system is intended for a serious on-ground fire situation. Thus, the issues associ-
ated with the return of an aircraft to service will only be considered for the inadvertent discharge case. Once
the aircraft is safely back on the ground, the refurbishment process should begin immediately to prevent the
start of long term problems, such as corrosion. This section of the report addresses Payloads issues, but an
integrated approach, not unlike a "D" check, must be utilized to mitigate further damage.
In a refurbishment program, all seats, carpeting, ceiling and sidewall panels, lavatory modules, bins, closets
and partitions should be removed from the airplane, cleaned, and allowed to dry. Hot air drying of carpets
should be avoided as that will result in carpets that shrink too much to be re-used. As long as no additives
have been used in the water, any staining should be temporary and the cleaning process should produce
components which are technically re-usable. The carpeting panels might also be acceptable, however, airline
experience may prove otherwise (Section 5.11). Seat cover considerations are similar, but the airline's image
requirements may dictate that these be replaced as well. The degree of replacement will certainly depend on
the degree of damage.
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All lights and other electrical equipment which have not failed should be removed, dried, cleaned, and tested.
The potential for moisture contamination in some of these units dictates a conservative approach. Manufactu>
ers of this type of equipment have suggested this procedure as being in the best interests of the airline, mini-
mizing the number of "repeat visits" to remedy a condition that might not have occurred at all. Shorted units
will need to be replaced at this time as well. In most cases, units that were not "on" at the time they were wet
will function properly following reconditioning, while those that were may need to be replaced. Note that,
while the next generation components of onboard video systems of at least one manufacturer are provided
with a conformal coating, the current generation are not. This is acceptable since video systems am not a "criti-
cal" item, but certainly contributes to the cost of refurbishment.
To prevent structural problems resulting from corrosion, all insulation blankets should be removed from the
airplane to d W out any moisture trapped behind them. This is especially true when considering the case of
additional nozzles being placed in the ovedmad for spraying water up into the crown area of the airplane. As
previously discussed, water spray in the oved_ead could be expected to run past the blankets and be trapped
by the stringers and frames.
5.1.5 Mitigation of Disbenefits
In order to prevent major damage to the interior electrical components such as sidewall lighting and reading
lights from water spray, certain steps could be taken to "harden" these items to prevent water damage. Many of
the reconmlended steps included here will |_e discussed in detail in the Electrical section of this report. Briefly,
conformal coatings on all circuit cards, waterproof connectors, and drip pans in appropriate places will provide
some degree of additional water resistance to that currently available. A fundamental conflict exists wherein the
components that are most sensitive to water also require a means to dissipate heat, thus dictating cooling vents
and ducts. This type of unit cannot be sealed, and alternate "water hardening" and enwapment techniques
would be required.
Specific suggestions for assuring continuous operation of certain key Payloads/Electrical units include:
• Spray above ceiling - eliminate from consideration in small body aircraft due to lack of adequate
access or spray areas;
• Fluorescent lights - waterproof connectors and sealed electronic ballasts;
• Reading lights - waterproof terminals, bulb holders, and sealed housings;
• PA speakers - drip shields and waterproof connectors or sealed housing;
• Entertainment systems - conformal coatings, waterproof connectors, interconnect to switch off
system when water spray is activated.
5.2 ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL SYSTEMS
The ECS, Figure 5.2-1, was reviewed and analyzed to assess the quantity of water mist that might be expected
to be ingested by the return air grilles in the passenger cabin during activation of water spray. The quantity of
water ingested is significant, as water laden air is eventually routed to the E/E bay, as part of the cooling for
the electronic equipment (Figure 5.2-2). Water that is ingested into the electronics components in the E/E bay
may create safety-of-flight considerations as a result of the inadvertent discharge (Section 5.3 and 5.9).
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5.2.1 757 Water Mist Distribution
Test data and analysis indicate that the ECS will circulate water mist within the passenger cabin as well as
draw n-fist from the passenger cabin into the lower lobe. A majority of the moisture is expected to impinge on
surfaces within the passenger cabin, however,, some will be drawn through the return air grilles and be distrib-
uted in the lower lobe. Figure 5.2-3 depicts the distribution and associated quantities of water expected to be
drawn from the passenger cabin and into the lower lobe for the 757 baseline. Water mist will not migrate to the
flight deck, due to the positive pressure differential that is maintained between flight deck and passenger cabin,
when the flight deck door is kept closed as required by FAR 121.587. Regulatory agencies that allow or require
that the door be left open will need to revise regulations accordingly should CWS be required on aircraft.
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Figure 5.2-3. 757 Water Mist Paths and Quantities.
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ECSassessmentof mistdistributionwithintheairplane(757-200)wasbasedonthefollowingconditions
andassumptions:
• Mistimpingementonlowerlobesurfaces( tructure,cables,wire,etc.)wasneglectedwhenquanti-
fyingmistmigrationtoelectricalequipmentin theE/Ebay;
• Passengerimpactonmistdistributionwasneglected;
• Averagecabinairflowvelocityof 75ft/min(basedontestdata);
• Minimumdropletsizeof 80microns,anddropletsdonotcoalesce;
• A mistdisbursementra eof80gallonsover3-minutes;
• Airplaneconfigurationwasperdrawing(i.e.,nobrokenlines);
• 39,000footcruisewithtwoair-conditioningpacksandtworecirculationfansoperatingatthetime
ofdischarge;
• Nolnistwasactivelydistributedtoflightdeck,lavatories,andgalleys;
• Aircraft is carrying revenue passengers, hence flight deck door is closed as required by
FAR 121.587.
Typical cabin airflow patterns are shown in Figure 5.2-4. Analysis shows that cabin airflow velocities are high
enough to overcome the affects of gravity, and thus the potential for drawing mist into the lower lobe via the
ECS does exist. Based on the geometry of the cabin, it was estimated that 30% of the mist would be drawn
through the return air grilles.
1"1 :returnair grille
Figure 5.2-4. Typical Passenger Cabin Airflow Patterns.
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Cabin air, during normal cruise operation, is drawn from the passenger cabin into the lower lobe by the right-
hand recirculation fan, left-hand recirculation fan, forward equipment cooling supply fans, lavatory/gaUey fan,
and by the pressure differential at the aft outflow valve. Air in the aft portion of the cabin is blown overboard
through the aft outflow valve. A small amount of air in the aft portion of the passenger cabin is drawn through
the aft bay electronics (E6 rack) by the lavatory/galley fan prior to discharge over-board via the aft outflow
valve. Air in the forward section of the passenger cabin is drawn to the lower lobe by the right-hand and
left-hand recirculation fans, and the forward equipment cooling supply fans. A majority of air drawn by the
left-hand recirculation fan provides draw through cooling to the electronics prior to being drawn through the
fan and into the mix bay. Air drawn by the forward equipment cooling supply fans provide cooling to the
blow-through cooled electronics prior to being recirculated by the left-hand recirculation fan. Air drawn by the
right-hand recirculation fan is used for cabin ventilation purposes only and is directly drawn from the cabin to
the mix bay for reconditioning. Figure 5.2-5 depicts the test data airflow distribution for the entire airplane.
Figure 5.2-6 shows airflow distribution in the E/E bay for equipment cooling.
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Figure 5.2-5. Aircraft Airflow Distribution.
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Figure 5.2-6 757-200 Equipment Cooling Airflow Distributiom
Water mist drawn from the passenger cabin by the forward equipment cooling supply fans will be drawn
through a centrifugal particle separator prior to reaching the fan. The purpose of this air cleaner is to remove
solid particulates from the airstream to provide clean air for equipment cooling. A swirling motion is induced
on the air/particulate mixture as it passes through the cleaner. Solid particulates are thrown radially outward by
centrifugal force to the walls of the cleaner and are then removed by the purge system. Thus, clean air is deliv-
ered for equipment cooling and solid particulates are continuously removed. Although the cleaner has been
tested for solid particulate removal only, the vendor/supplier has determined, but not guaranteed, that water
droplets will be removed in the same fashion as solid particulates entering the cleaner. For purposes of this
analysis it has been assumed that the cleaner will perform as expected, however, future testing would be
required to verify- the cleaner's performance. Following vendor/supplier recommendation, droplet size was
reduced by 50% for determining cleaner effectiveness at removing mist. Based on a droplet size of 40 microns,
it is expected that 96% of the mist entering the cleaner will be removed.
Should the cleaner not perform as expected, there are other filters that are designed for moisture removal and
would be adequate for this application. Addition of a mist removal filter may require an upgrade to the current
fans in order to overcome the increased pressure losses associated with an additional filter. This type of filter is
susceptible to clogging and would require periodic maintenance to clean. Mist that passes through the air
cleaner will be evaporated in the air as it passes through the equipment cooling supply fans, where the air-
stream experiences a 10°F temperature rise. Mist that is captured by the cleaner is expected to puddle in the
ducting and would require removal as part of the refurbishment process. Puddled water is not expected to be
drawn into any electronics.
Mist drawn from the passenger cabin by the left-hand recirculation fan is expected to pass through some of the
draw through cooled electronics prior to reaching the fan.
Table 5.2-1 lists airflow humidity, temperature, and mist rates that are expected to be ingested and/or distribut-
ed to 757 electronics. Also listed is the mechanism by which mist is delivered to the electronics.
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Table 5.2-1. Mist Distribution Summary for 757 Electronics.
Unit No.
Humidity of
Ingested Air
(%)
P33 100
P54 100
P51
P50
100
100
Temperature
of Ingested
Air (°F)
Mist Ingestion
Rate
(Ibm/min)
75 0
75 0.231
75 0.1155
75
P37 100 75
P32 100 75
P31 100 75
P34
P70
P36
E1
E2
100 75
100 75
Mechanism
Causing E/E Mist
Ingestion
LH recirc fan
LH recirc fan
LH recirc fan
LH recirc fan0.1542
0.2246 LH recirc fan
0 LH recirc tan
0 LH recirc fan
0 LH recirc fan
0.2738 LH recirc fan
100 75 0 LH recirc fan
100 85 0 E/E supply fan
100 85 0 E/E supply fan
E3 100
E4 100
E5 100
P5
85 0
85 0
85 0
85
85
85
85
85
100
Pll 100
P8 100
P9 100
P1-1 100
E/E supply fan
E/E supply fan
E/E supply fan
E/E supply fan
E/E supply fan
E/E supply fan
E/E supply fan
E/E supply fan
HSI-L 100 85 0 E/E supply fan
ADI-L 100 85 0 E/E supply fan
P1-3 100 85 0 E/E supply fan
85
85
85
85
85
85
85
100
100
P7-L E/E supply fan
85 0
85 0
75 0
75 0
0 E/E supply fan
0 EJE supply fan
0 E/E supply fan
EICAS-T
EICAS-B 100
P7-C 100
P7-R 100
P3-1
ADI-R
HSI-R
100
100
100
P3-3 100
LH glare shield Nom cabin
RH glare sheld Nom cabin
INV Nom cabin
Nom cabin
75
75Battery charger
Weather radar Nom cabin 75
E6 1 O0 75
E/E supply fan
E/E supply fan
E/E supply fan
E/E supply fan
EJE supply fan
LH recirc fan
LH recirc fan
0 LH recirc fan
0 LH recirc fan
0
1.9
LH recirc fan
Lay/Galley ex fan
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Mist drawn from the passenger cabin by the light-hand recirculation fan will reach a filter upstream of the fan.
This filter is a paper-WPe filter and is expected to block all mist and thus eventually clog, and may subsequent-
ly stall the right-hand recirculation fan. This Wpe filter is not reusable and will require replacement. The fan is
not expected to be damaged as a result of stalling. No impact on electronics cooling is expected, since air
drown by this fan is sent directly to the mix bay for cabin ventilation purposes.
The lavatory/galley fan will draw lnist from the passenger cabin through the E6 rock near the aft cargo bay.
The expected quantity of mist ingested by electronics on the E6 rock is shown in Figure 5.2-3.
Passenger cabin/flight deck air distribution has been designed such that a positive pressure differential be-
tween the crew cabin and the passenger cabin is maintained (i.e., flight crew cabin is at a higher pressure than
the passenger cabin) when the flight deck door is kept closed as required by FAR 121.587. This pressure differ-
ential will prevent airborne lnist in the passenger cabin from migrating to the crew" cabin. FAR 121.587 applies
to aircraft carrying passengers only, therefore, aircraft inflight for other purposes could be susceptible to mist
migation into the crew cabin if the flight deck door is open.
Mist is expected to condense on all exposed surfaces in the pressurized region of the lower lobe (i.e., struc-
ture, cabling, insulation blankets, wiring, etc.), except cargo compartment interior surfaces (liners, etc.).
5.2.2 Proposed Design Changes to Minimize Water Ingestion
Main electronic equipment bay ingestion of mist can be eliminated by the following actions at the time of
water spray activation:
• Left-hand recirculation fan power is shut off;
• E/E supply fans power is shut off (changes to instrumentation controls may be required);
• Overboard exhaust valve is closed.
It should be noted that this action may conflict with current smoke removal procedures and requirements. A
procedure to incorporate the above actions would require analysis to verify that aircraft smoke removal would
not be jeopardized, in the unlikely event of accidental inflight activation of water spray with the presence of
smoke. Appropriate manual overrides to the valve positions may be necessary.
Aft electronic equipment bay ingestion of nlist can be eliminated by the following action at the time of water
spray activation:
• Lavatory/galley fan power is shut off.
Damage to the right-l-_and recirculation filter can be eliminated by the following action at the time of water
spray activation:
• Right-hand recirculation fan power is shut off.
In the event that mist is ingested by the electronics, continued air flow through the draw through and blow-
through cooling systems would tend to "dry out" any moisture present, since these systems ate capable of
providing warm air continually. Corrosion potential and reliabilit T concerns would, however, dictate a more
"active" approach to drying and refurbishment (Section 5.3 and 5.10).
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5.2.3 737 Mist Distribution Analysis
Mist distribution and electronics ingestion of mist within the 737 aircraft is expected to be similar to the 757.
Blow-tllrough cooled electronics are expected to ingest negligible amounts of mist since the same type of
cleaner exists on the 737 as on the 757. Quantities of mist expected to be ingested by draw through cooling
and applied to electronics are shown in Table 5.2-2,
Table 5.2-2. Mist Distribution Summa_ for 737-300 Electronics.
Component Mist Rate
Number Gallon/Minute*
E1 -P 0.19
E1-1 0.05
E1-2 0.1
E2-P 0.19
E2-1 0.13
E2-3 0.09
E3-P 0.18
E3-1 0.04
E3-2 0.04
P6-D** 0
IP-1 ** 0
IP-2** 0
IP-3** 0
IP-4** 0
IP-5** 0
IP-6** 0
IP-7** 0
IP-8** 0
CDU No. 1"* 0
CDU No. 2** 0
IRU No. 1 0.13
IRU No. 2 0.13
* 3-minute duration
** Located on the flight deck
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5.2.4 747/767 Mist Disuibution Analysis
A n'fist distribution analysis was performed on the 747-400 and the 767-200 airplanes in addition to the 757 mist
distribution analysis. The analysis focused on the inadvertent discharge of the cabin water spray and its effects
on the E/E cooling system for these large body aircraft.
The environmental control system was assumed to be in the normal flow mode with three packs operating.
The airplane was at a cruise altitude of 35,000 ft. The E/E cooling system was in normal flow mode and the
water spray was evenly distributed.
After discharge of the water (2,409 ll)/3-min for 747-400), analysis indicated that all but about 430 lbs would
either be absorbed by the cabin interior, exit via the outflow valve as saturated vapor, or remain in the cabin
air as saturated vapor. After further analysis, is was determined that approximately 36 lbs of free liquid (0.132
Ibm free liquid/Ibm saturated air) could be ingested by the forward E/E supply fan (assuming no moisture
coalesces into bigger droplets and separates out or impinges on the return air exit grills). After filtration of
approximately 95% of the free liquid, the quanti W of water discharged into the forward E/E bay was estimated
to be approximately 1.8 Ibm free liquid. The aft E/E bay has no filtration and could expect to see about the
same quanti W of water as the forward E/E equipment cooling supply fan. Even though similar results were
found l-or the 767 through the same Wpe of analysis, this scenario represents an "artificial worst case", since the
767 E/E bay is cooled in cruise via a skin heat exchanger, and does not receive any mist-laden air. Potential to
ingest mist would still exist for the condition where skin temperature rises above 45°F, most likely during
ground operations or takeoff, where equipment cooling reverts to forced air.
5.3 ELECTRICAL SYSTEMS
A cabin water spray damage assessment was performed to assess the impact of such a system on airplane
operation following inadvertent, inflight operation and commanded operation on the ground. This part of the
study was a high level investigation into the performance of 757 airplane electrical systems during and after
water spray activation. Of primary concern is the continued safe flight and landing of the airplane, without
exceptional pilot skill or strength, following inadvertent, inflight activation. The long term effects of corrosion
were also addressed.
The results of the Electrical Systems study are based, in part, on prior in-service incidents involving fluid con-
tamination of electrical systems, vendor qualification data and/or prior testing of specific electrical components,
and review of failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA) reports on specific systems.
5.3.1 Ground Rules and Assumptions
Specific assumptions made for Electrical Systems evaluation are as follows:
• Water electrical conductivi W is minimized by the use of water with low salini W and mineral content;
• Water that might affect electrical components is relatively free of dry contaminants (dust,
minerals, etc.)
Water is introduced to the E/E bay equipment via mist laden air from the equipment cooling sys-
tem, as well as drippage from the cabin area through the air vents, carpet and floor panels, onto the
E/E racks and panels;
Equipment cooling system is assumed to remain operative during and after the water spray inci-
dent, which raises some concern about fan stalling due to water quantiW, and loss of blow-through
cooling to specific rack mounted equipment, increasing the potential for malfunction.
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5.3.2 Existing Contamination Protection Measures
Tile current layout of the E/E bay includes protective measures designed to prevent component damage to all
E/E equipment. Drip shields in the E/E bay a,'e installed above each of the rocks (Figure 5.3-1). Each shield
consists of an aluminum pan (or canvas shield in tile case of the 737), with a drain to the keel area. The en-
closed panels are installed to allow water runoff from the nicks to drain down into tile fuselage. The racks and
equipment enclosures are anodized for corrosion resistance. These protective measures currently allow the
rocks to tolerate any dripping or condensation that might be encountered in normal service, and assume a
maintenance schedule/'or verifying drain function is followed. It is important to emphasize fllat these protective
measures described refer to the "as-delivered" condition of the airplane. Evidence from inspection of older
airplanes suggests that these measures may be compromised during their service life if maintenance procedures
are neglected. Increased maintenance might be required to maintain even "as-delivered" levels of protection.
Potential consequences of improperly maintained drip shields include water that might normally Ixe collected
and directed away from electronics impinging directly on electronics, if the shield is missing or torn, and col-
lected water splashing over rack mounted equipment at aircraft rotation, for cases where tile drain might be
restricted (Section 5.3.3.5).
Figure 5.3-1. Forward E/E Bay.
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Electricalequipment(relays,switches,connectors,circuitboards,wire,etc.)andtheirinstallationswerere-
viewedforwaterspraysusceptibility.Connectorscurrentlyincommonuseincludegrommetsealsdesignedto
preventwateringress,andshouldnotbeaffectedbythepresenceofmoisture.Relaysarehermeticallysealed
withgronmletsontherelaysockets,andcircuitboardsareoftenfabricatedwithaconfom_alcoating,both
treatmentsforthespecificpurposeofpreventingcontaminationbymoisture.Nodeleteriouseffectsareexpect-
edfi'omtheestimatedvv'aterquantitiesappliedtothesecomponents.Plug-inintegratedcircuitsandboard
connectorsarecurrentlyopentomoisture.Theingressofwateratthesepointscouldcauseatleastemporary
system alfunction,componentloss,potentialsystemloss,andanysubsequentramificationsduetoacombi-
nationof thesefailures.Spuriousor inconsistentsignalsto theflightdeckmayalsocausethecrewtorespond
improperlyandcreateamoreseriouscondition.
Currently,electricalcircuitseparationisrequiredforredundantsystemsaspartof theaircraft'safetyphiloso-
phy.Theairplanewiringdesignandinstallationmustincorporateappropriatemeasurestominimizetheeffect
ofelectricalwiringfaults,includingthoseinducedbywater,andtoisolatefaultdamageandpropagationbe-
_veenredundantsystems.Wetarc"trackingtestshavebeenconductedongeneralpurposewireinsulationused
byTheBoeingCompany.Treatedtapwaterhasnotcausedinsulationarctrackingonanyof thesewireswhen
testedaccordingtoBoeingSpecificationSupportStandardBSS7324.In-servicedamagetowireinsulationhas
notbeenconsideredin thetestprocedures.
Aircraftmaintenance,modifications,andequipmentrepaircouldincreasetheriskofwaterspraycontamination
byunintentionalcompromiseofexistingprotectivemeasures.Designrequirementsaimedatminimizingcon-
taminationsusceptil)ilityorexposureamalreadyutilizedinaircraftsystems,uchaswireseparationrequire-
ments,wireinstallationsincorporatingdriploopsinwaterproneareas,andsystemfunctionredundancy.Fur-
thertesting of electrical components, such as printed circuit card connectors, is recommended to determine if
additional "waterproofing" measures would be needed. It should be noted that these requirements would
probal)ly be limited to only those systems deemed necessa W for the continued safe flight and landing of the
aircraft follov,,ing an inadvertent discharge of a water spray system.
5.3.3 Electrical Systems Susceptibility to Water Spray
Several 757 electrical systems (power system, high lift control system, proximity switch system) were reviewed
for expected system degradation, if any, due to water spray. A general description of each of these systems is
given to show that the existing design features are somewhat tolerant of the effects of water spray. These fea-
tures include system redundancy, physical and functional separation, and system fault protection. Some specific
components of these systems were then reviewed and commented on regarding the effects of water spray, if
any. The 737 has similarly functioning systems, and any conclusions drawn for the 757 would apply.
5.3.3.1 757 Electrical Power System
5.3.3.1.1 Prima W AC System
The prima W ac system is a three-phase, four wire, wye-connected system that operates at a nominal voltage of
115/200V and at a nominal frequency of 400-Hz. The generator neutral point is grounded to the airplane struc-
ture and the airframe acts as the fourth wire. The system is divided into _o main ac channels: the left channel
and right channel. Each channel consists of a main ac bus supplied by an associated integrated drive generator
(IDG). The re, o-channel system is designed for isolated operation (Figure 5.3-2).
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Figure 5.3-2. Electrical Power System.
An auxiliary power unit (APU) driven generator provides dispatch capability if one primary source 1DG is
inoperative, and, in addition, provides a self-sufficient power source for ground operation. This generator can
supply electrical power to all main buses when the auxiliary power breaker (APB) and the bus tie breakers
(BTB) are closed.
The system is designed for automatic operation to nlinimize flight crew workload. Manual override capability is
provided for all automatic features except for automatic dc tie control.
Both main ac buses can be supplied concurrently from any one of four isolated power sources (left and right
engine generators, auxiliary APU generator and external power source) by means of the interconnecting ac tie
bus when the appropriate generator control bus (GCB), APB, BTBs and external power contactors (EPC) are
closed. Operation of these contactors is controlled automatically by the three generator
control units (GCU), and the bus power control unit (BPCU) to maintain power on the buses from any avail-
able SOLlrce.
Considering water spray through the equipment cooling system, the potential impact to a GCU located on the
E5 rack is as follows:
Based on field experience with GCUs similar in construction to the 757/767 control units, when
these units ingest fluids they may fail, resulting in a trip and transfer of the ac bus. In one reported
case, the fault continued long enough to experience excessive heat, resulting in a scrapped unit.
Because of the extent of the failure, the unit also did not transfer the ac bus, resulting in the loss of
that bus.
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5.3.3.1.2 PrimaryDC System
A nominal28V-dcpowersystemisprovidedtosupplyloadsrequitingdcpower(Figure5.3-2).
Thedcmainsystemisa2-wiresystemwhichusestheairframestructureasthegroundreturncircuit.It is
dividedintotileleftandrightchannels.Powerissuppliedtothedcloadsbytwo120ampunregulatedtmns-
_brmerrectifierunits(TRU),thatareenergizedfromtheleftandright115Vmainacbuses,respectively,
throughtlmrmalcircuitbreakers.EachTRUpowersanassociatedmain28V-dcloadbus.Undernormalsystem
operation,thedcbatteWbus,tiledcstandbybusandthedccenterI)usaresuppliedfromtheleftmaindc
distributionbus.TheTRUsarenormallyoperatedisolatedtosupplytheirrespectiveloadbuses.
A dctiebusandanautomaticdctiecontrolunitandcontactorareprovidedtopermitasingleTRUtosupply
alldcbusesif required.Tiledcsystemisnotdesigned,however,fordispatchwithaninoperativeTRU.The
inherentdemonstratedreliabiliW of the TRU makes this requirement unnecessary.
No switching relays or contactors are provided in the ac input or dc output of the main TRUs, and the three-
phase input wiring to each TRU is protected by a three-phase thermal circuit breaker. No protection devices
are installed on the dc output feeder between the TRU and the dc bus. This feeder is adequately sized to carry
dc fault currents up to a level that will cause the three-phase input breakers to trip. Each TRU is designed to
deliver a short circuit current to clear the largest size thermal circuit breaker (100 amps) in the dc distribution
system without damage to the unit, and without tripping the three-phase input breakers.
Several components, listed in Appendix B as standby powered systems, and defined by Product Safe W as
required for safe flight and landing, were reviewed for the implications of water ingress based on a worst case
scenario of the failure of the centrifugal separator used to eliminate particulates from the E/E cooling air (Sec-
tion 5.2.1). This failure would result in increased quantities of moisture directed at these key components. This
analysis was prepared by tile ECS group, and summarized in Table 5.3-1, and results were used in several of
tile following sections.
Table 5.3-1. Electronics Misting Summa_ (Assume No Filtration).
Component Name Mist Ingestion Rate(Ibm/min)
Flap/slat electronic unit (FSEU) 0.14
Transformer rectifier unit (TRU) 0.61
Control system electronic unit
(CSEU)
Power supply
Spoiler
Yaw damp
Stabilizer/aileron
Rudder ratio
0.11
0.02
0.04
0.03
0.01
Proximity switch electronics unit 0.123
(PSEU)
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Considering a water spray that deposits 0.61 Ibm per minute for 3-minutes (Table 5.3-1) at the TRU, the poten-
tial impact is as follows:
There are no "bathtub" type water collection features in the design. Therefore, the substantial ma-
jority of the water would immediately drain, leaving no collections of water except what surface
tension alone would support. While operating, the unit is very warm and it is thought would tend
to dry itself out.
In general, the components contained within the TRU are not moisture failure susceptible. The
magnetics are varnish impregnated, the rectifier diodes hermetically sealed and the output capaci-
tors are sealed. There are no circuit boards in this unit.
The TRU is a low impedance unit. A water bridge across terminals (or other electrical potentials)
would create a relatively high impedance parallel path and thus have little performance or damag-
ing affect on the unit.
In stm_'nary, the unit would operate without noticeable performance effects. The unit would tend to dry itself
out quickly (especially while operating). No permanent damage would likely result. The unit should be fl_or-
oughly examined and tested after a system discharge and be repaired or replaced as required.
5.3.3.1.3 Standby Electrical System
A standby power system is provided to supply 28V-dc and single phase 115V-ac power to essential instrument,
conmmnication and navigation equipment in the event of complete loss of primary ac power (Appendix B).
This system is supplied by a 40 amp-hour nickel-cadmium battery, and consists of the standby battery and
battery charger, battery current monitor, a single phase 115V-ac, 400-Hz, 1000 volt-amp static inverter, various
control relays, the hot battery bus, battery bus and ac and dc standby buses. A functional diagram of the stand-
by system is shown in Figure 5.3-3. The static inverter functions to convert nominal 28V-dc power from the hot
battery bus (or the dc left main bus) to single phase, 115V, 400-Hz ac power.
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Battery re`/ , diSa'__ c_a_gl_r I A,_
_1_ I charger I I _1 Main
-_ I , t ,I, ,1, _ batter
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Figure 5.3-3. Electrical Standby Power System.
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Consideringwatermistof0.1gallonsin theforwardE/Ebay(Figure5.2-3),thepotentialimpacton thestatic
inverterlocatedin thisareaanddrawthroughcooledisasfollows:
• Basedonraintestswithsilnilarequipment,confonualcoating,saltsprayandhumidiW test restllts,
the supplier speculated there would be no effect on the units performance.
5.3.3.1.4 Equipment and Installation for the 757 Electrical Power System
Equipment associated with the electrical power system is installed in the 757 airplane at the various locations
shown in Figure 5.3-4. This equipment is connected with different wire and connector Wpes, each suited to the
installation location. Wire routing and installation practices follow the wire separation cliteria developed for the
757 airplane.
cabin floor
Forward equipment area
. _ x-- Pasis¢_ger
.__ P51P31_ ._.. P507
P34 __..... Aft equipment center (E6)%
Access "-.r:>*_''
Main equipment center
Figure 5.3-4. Equipment Centers.
The wire types used in the 757 airplane comply with the applicable Boeing/Vlaterial Specifications (BMS). The
wire types are compatible with the electrical and enviromnental requirements of the area in which they are
installed.
Wires are grouped into bundles in accordance with the functional separation categories defined in Boeing
separation requirements. The major separation categories are left channel, right channel, and standby system
channel. Further separation be_,een redundant circuits, and for electromagnetic compatibility reasons is also
observed. Separation in consideration of a water threat is not currently considered, except in immediate prox-
imity to current aircraft water systems (potable water and sanitary systems).
Generator feeders are installed such as to provide separation of at least 3-inches from lines carrying fuel, hy-
draulic fluid or oxygen. To prevent mechanical strain on feeders and their terminations and supports, slack is
provided in the cables, and feeder clamps and guides are designed to allow axial movement of the feeders.
Major feeders, such as the generator feeder wires and the tie bus, am separated from all other wire bundles.
27
Power distribution wiring associated with the right, left and standby channels is separated from each other. The
power wiring interconnecting the standby battery and inverter, the hot battery, dc standby, ac standby, ac
center, and dc center buses is separated from all other power wiring.
5.3.3.1.5 System Fault Protection
The 757 airplane wiring and equipment installation practices incorporate appropriate measures to miniInize the
effect of electrical faults, and to isolate fault damage and propagation [mtween redundant systems. The main
wire bundles in the 757 electrical system are physically isolated so that damage in any single wire bundle will
not result in disabling wiring in other wire bundles.
MI flight essential electrical equipment on the 757 airplane is provided in dual or triple redundancy, and redun-
dant units are connected to separate power sources (left and right ac and dc buses). Triple redundant systems
are connected to left, fight, and center isolated buses.
Battery and standby buses ale normally powered by the left ac and dc channels, but will transfer automatically
to the battery/inverter system in the event of a left channel failure.
Non-essential loads such as galleys, passenger entertaim_aent, etc., are connected to special bus sections which
can be de-energized (shed) automatically or manually, thus providing added assurance of adequate power [br
essential loads during abnormal operating conditions.
5.3.3.2 757 High Lift Control System
The 757 high lift system includes double slotted inboard and outboard trailing edge flaps, and one inboard and
four outboard three position leading edge slats on each wing. The hydro-mechanical control/drive system
provides normal flap/slat control, with an electrical control/power system providing alternate (back-up) con-
trol. Both modes are monitored for proper operation.
Flaps and slats are normally controlled by a single detected flap control lever. Cormnands are mechanically
transmitted to a single trailing edge power drive unit (PDU) that drives a torque robe system. Each flap is driv-
en by two ball-screw actuators fi'om the torque tube. "No-back" devices maintain flap position with loss of
power. Slat commands are mechanically transmitted from the trailing edge flap PDU output to a single slat
PDU that also drives a torque tube system. "No-back" devices maintain slat position wifla loss of power. Alter-
nate control is from a rotary selector switch and separate flap/slat arming switches. Alternate control is closed
loop. Flaps and slats are powered by electric motors that drive the flap and slat torque tubes. The high lift
system is normally depressurized at flaps up conditions. Flap/slat position indication is provided by a single
indicator. Electrical control and monitoring functions are implemented in a flap/slat electronics unit (FSEU)
using digital technology.
The FSEU (Figure 5.3-5) installed in the E/E bay consists of three physically and functionally isolated,
identical channels.
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Electrical and electronic systems provide alternate drive power, alternate control functions, system position
indication, failure detection, failure annunciation, failure protection, autoslat and flap load alleviation control,
and high lift system information to order airplane systems. All three electrical power sources (main, APU, stand-
by) are used to power various high lift system components. The power sources are distributed in such a way
that no single electrical failure will prevent deployment of the high lift system.
The high lift system failure analysis presents the system hazard assessment of the effects of any single failure,
multiple failures, and critical failure combinations with their associated probabilities. Failures of high lift system
components are analyzed for their effects on the system and, if necessary, verified on the flight controls test rig
and in avionics laboratory testing. Effects on airplane controllability are deternlined using piloted simulator
studies. Significant failure mode effects are verified during flight testing. Individual system component failures
are analyzed where possible, on a general failure basis, rather than analyzing each part of each component.
Failure mode effects on systems that interface with the high lift system are also considered on a generic level.
The high lift device system is required for dispatch. Loss of this function inflight would require flight envelope
restrictions. Certain combinations of failure must be shown to be extremely improbable to ensure continued
sale fight and landing without exceptional pilot skill or strength. Loss of normal and alternate high lift control
will require flaps up landing. Flap or slat asynunetry will require use of the alternate control system and
abnormal operation procedures. The level of criticality of the 757 high lift system is commensurate with FAR
25.1309b (2) since inflight loss of function will permit continued safe flight and landing.
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Consideringawaterspraythatdeposits0.14Ibmperminutefor3-minutes(Table5.3-1)attheFSEU,thepoten-
tialimpactisasfollows:it isassumedthatwaterwillsprayordripintoallthreeFSEUs(Section5.9.2).The
effectof waterontheFSEUsi unpredictable.Watermaycauseshortingbetweenpinsontheconnectorsin the
FSEU,causingunpredictablecircuitfunction.Erraticoutputsto usersystems,puriousflightdeckindications,
shutdownof theleadingandtrailingedgedevicesorpossiblyuncontrolledflap/slatmovementsarepossible
effectsof thisinternalshorting.Aworstcasescenariowouldbetheshutdownof allthreeunits.Whileit is
possiblethattheflapsandslatswouldbeshutdowninplace,dueto FSEUcommand,it islikelythatprimary
controlof theflaps/slatswouldberetained.It ishighlyimprobablethatuncolrnnandedflap/slatmotionwould
occurdueto FSEUshutdown.AstheFSEUsprovideprimaryflap/slatpositionindication,alternate(electric)
flap/slatcontrolandpositionindicationanduncommandedmotion(UCM)andasymmetryprotection,primary
conu'olwouldlikelyberetained.Continuedsafeflightandlandingwouldbepossibleasprimarycontrolofthe
flaps/slatswouldlikelybeintact,albeitwithoutUCMorasymmetryprotection.Othersystemsdependenton
FSEUoutputsmayalsobedisabled.
In ordertoreturntheFSEUtoserviceit shouldonlybenecessarytodrytheunitandperformacomponent
functionaltesttoverifyproperperformance.DesignchangesnecessarytoprecludeFSEUfailureduetowater
sprayincludeenvironmentallysealedconnectorsandpossiblyanenviromnentallysealedchassis,whichwould
haveasignificanteffectonthemlalmanagement.
5.3.3.3 757ProximitySwitchElectronicUnit (PSEU)System
Theproximityswitchsystemisprimarilyusedforpositionsensingof itemsuchaslanding ear,thrustrevers-
ersanddoors.Thesystemconsistsofposition(proximity)sensorsinstalledonthelanding ear,thrustreversers
anddoorsandanelectronicunit(thePSEU)installedin theE/Ebay(Figure5.3-6).Thesensorssensethe
proximityoftargetsinstalledsuchthatswitchingisaccomplishedwithoutphysicalcontactbetweenthesensor
andtarget.ThePSEUsensestargetnearor targetfar,andoutputsignalsthatinterfacewithairplanesystems.
ThePSEUhasBITEforidentifyingfaultycomponents.
See (_)
Electronic access dool --
Landing gear t
system proximity
sensors
Thrust rev rser
proximity sensors
I Door system t--pr ximity sensors
E3-4 shell
Main electronic equipment center
® ©
PSEU(E3_)
Figure 5.3-6 Proximity Switch System.
F Built-in test
equipment
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Within the PSEU are eight separate subsystems, each having its own power supply. No components in any
subsystem are used by any of the other subsystems. Tile eight subsystems in the PSEU are:
• Cargo door control;
• Door warning indication;
• Thrust reverser indication - left;
• Thrust reverser indication - light;
• Tilrust reverser auto restow - left;
• Thrust reverser auto restow - right;
• Landing gear position No. 1;
• Landing gear position No. 2.
Failures in the PSEU may cause either an output to conduct when it shouldn't or not conduct when it should.
This is equivalent to short (to ground) or open circuits at the respective output connector pins of the PSEU.
Considering a water spray that deposits 0.123 Ibm per minute for 3-minutes (Table 5.3-1) at the PSEU, the
potential impact is as follows: circuit boards inside the PSEU are all equipped with a confonnal coating and
thus are unaffected by moisture. Card edge connectors for these cards are not water tight, and thus may pro-
duce sporadic results. A subsequent fire is unlikely, as the circuit breakers will open before this occurs.
Two types of p,'oblems may result fl'om water exposure:
• Sporadic/wrong flight deck indications (e.g., landing gear unsafe, doors open, every engine indica-
tion and crew alerting system (EICAS) message imaginable).
This first type of problem is somewhat unlikely as the same shorts would have to occur to both System 1 and
System 2 (located on different cards), but it is possible. The morn likely result will be EICAS messages an-
nouncing a difference between the two systems.
Sporadic/wrong air-ground data: (e.g., it thinks it's in the air when actually on the ground or vice
velsa). This failure is ,nuch less likely as more of the same shorts would have to occur to both
systems, thus allowing, but not causing, certain systems to operate when not intended, or prevent-
ing certain systems from operating when needed, e.g., preventing the pilot from deploying the
thrust reversers on the ground or allowing the pilot to retract the landing gear while on the ground,
or inhibiting certain equipment cooling or autobrake operations. It is important to mention that no
system connected to the air-ground system is safety-of-flight critical, however, loss of this system
will allow, but not cause, activation of systems in situations which could jeopardize safety-of-flight,
e.g., flight deck conunanded deployment of thrust reversers inflight, and is a significant degradation
in aircr'aft safety.
The longer term effects of water is undetermined, as any liquids would bring impurities into the unit and pro-
mote corrosion. It is therefore recommended that the PSEU be cleaned, inspected, serviced and an acceptance
test proceclure (ATP) performed before readmittance to the airplane.
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5.3.3.4 Interior PayloadsSysterns
Theeffectontheinteriorlighting system is difficult to assess. Water from the spray system may be contaminat-
ed by dust or other ionic species deposited on the equipment. These contanzinants are conductive and capable
of sustaining an arc.
If the spray is accidently activated when the interior lighting is on then:
LavatolT, galley, ceiling and sidewall fluorescent lights may fail. Contaminated water may form an
arc at the lamp holders until they dry out. Whether circuit breakem open or not depends on the
duration of arc path. It would I>e advisable to shed utility bus power upon inadvertent water spray
activation, to lessen the possibility of electrical arcing from equipment.
Reading lights may explode or break depending on the intensity of the thermal shock generated by
the difference between water and the bulb temperature when reading lights are on. An arc may
occur at the lamp terminal.
• Information signs may short;
• Emergency light battew packs, emergency lights and exit signs may be soaked with water and may
become inoperative;
• Emergency lighting systems may be lost, in whole or part, due to electrical shorts, and may result in
a slowing down of an evacuation. Tile emergency lighting system may require recertification and
modification as required for use with a cabin water spray system.
5.3.3.5 Avionics
There is an extensive history of fluid contamination in avionics. The most notable was a case where fluid
flowed into tile digital/analog adapters (DAA) from dripshields on a 737. Both DAAs failed upon takeoff rota-
tion when water flowed onto the motherboard connectors and shorted out tile components. All primary atti-
tude indication was lost due to loss of DAA data, a supposedly "extremely improbable" event. This event high-
lights the potential effects of fluid contamination with avionics.
In this analysis there are two paths of fluid ingress:
• Flowing in by gravity from above shelves, and;
• Blown humidity or mist into actively cooled components.
The primm T l:_tilure mechanism will most likely be loss of dielectric strength between exposed conductors and
printed circuit (PC) traces and loss of dielectric strength in ambient air.
The loss of air dielectric strength is probably not likely unless there is a high voltage power supply (HVPS)
present in the line-replaceable units (LRU). Arc over may occur in these LRUs with HVPS during high concen-
trations of moisture contan-tination. These LRUs are the electronic flight instrument system (EFIS), weather radar
(WXR), and control display unit (CDU) displays and inertial reference unit (IRU). All of these are actively
cooled. If arc over does occur, the unit will most likely fail completely causing master warnings to tim pilot.
The majority of avionics may experience some degree of condensation or accumulation of droplets on tile PC
cards. Since the cards are provided with a contbnnal coating, this condensation probably will not cause erratic
behavior or failure. Condensation occurs naturally and frequently due to the thermal cycling of units in and out
of humid conditions.
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A concernwouldariseif thedropletsconglomerateanddripintoboardconnectors.Thiswouldcauseshorting
likethe DAA failures. LRUs with connectors perpendicular to the LRU tx)ttom (vertical) would be less suscepti-
ble to this failure mode.
In newly delivered aircraft, tile avionics are protected from overhead dripping by shields placed above tile
electronic racks. However, if these shields are not maintained properly water may drip into the equipment.
Numerous instances of LRU corrosion and fluid ingress have been reported by airlines from this cause.
If the units continue to operate even if Contaminated, a secondary failure mode may become predon'tinant.
This failure mode typically manifests itself as corrosion within tile LRU. "llle corrosion would be compounded
by any existing dry contamination within avionics.
The following are recommendations if CWS is to be implemented:
• Either the cooling system or the avionics design of critical systems and their power sources must be
changed to preclude avionics failure during flight given an accidental deployment of the system;
• Qualification tests must be designed and conducted to prove avionics immunity to
moisture contamination;
• It is recommended that LRUs are cleaned and dried thoroughly after a discharge of the CWS system;
• Proper maintenance of the dripshields must be emphasized.
5.3.4 Return to Service Issues
Following an inadvertent discharge of a cabin water spray system, certain steps would be necessary in a return
to service program. Since the long term enemy of equipment fl'om water impurities is COITOSiOn, the electrical
equipment determined to have been sprayed or affected by water must be thoroughly examined. Equipment
must be inspected, cleaned, serviced, and repaired or replaced as required. A thorough component and system
functional test must be performed. Wire bundles must be inspected for water contamination, evidence of wire
oveflmating, or arc tracking, and repaired or replaced as required. Modification of the affected installation as
required, such as re-orienting disconnects, adding drip loops, etc., will help preclude occurrence of water
spray contamination.
5.3.5 747/767 Airplanes
An assessment of the other airplanes in the Boeing family was made to establish specific differences from the
study baseline 757. Since the direction of the study I)ecame relatively generic, the conclusions drawn regarding
electrical equipment and systems in tile 757 can be applied to the other airplanes as well. However, m_o items
which are unique to tile 747/767 airplanes were specifically evaluated, and scenarios considering their damage
or failure are presented here.
The flight management computer (FMC) is a navigation and guidance system designed to allow the pilots to
pre-program the desired flight plan, including routes, waypoints, and optimum efficiency flight profiles into a
central data base which provides direction to the autopilot flight director system (AFDS). These systems are
similar on 747 and 767 airplanes. Intent of these systems is to reduce pilot workload, and provide maximum
fuel economy for a given flight. Design and construction of these system components is consistent with other
electrical components previously described. Failure of the FMC or AFDS due to water ingress would require
the flight crew to take manual control of the airplane, including all navigation and position calculations, throttle
functions, etc. In short, the airplane would need to be flown by the flight crew, who would lose the conve-
nience of automated flight guidance. This is not a "continued safety-of-flight" issue, but would most certainly
require thorough checkout after a water spray discharge to prevent future anomalies.
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Theflightcontrolelectronicsystem(FCES),whichisfoundonthe747only,providescontrolindicationand
faultreportingfortheairplane'scontrolsurfaces,aswellassignalsforflightcontrolsurfacemovementduring
autopilotflightregimes.In addition,controlsurfacetrimfunctionsandflappositioning(leadingandtrailing
edge)iscontrolledthroughtheflapcontrolunit(FCU)moduleswithintheFCES.Onceagain,thesemodule's
constructionisconsistentwithotherelectricalcomponents,andarerelativelymoistureresistantduetodesign
requirementsimposedbystandard100%humiditytestrequirements.However,extrememoistureconditions
coulddamagetheelectronicardsbyshortingconnectorpins.Sinceprimaryflightcontrolisbymechanical
means,lossoftheFCESwouldnotcompromisemajorflightcontrols.Asaworstpossiblecaseexample,lossof
allthreeFCUsdueto shortingfromwaterdamagewouldrequireuseofthealternatelectricmode,withthe
flightcrewoperatingflapsbybypassingtheFCUs.Lossof theFCESwouldnotcompromisethe"continuedsafe
flight"of theairplane.
5.3.6 Summary
Study results conclude that the electrical equipment as presently manufactured and installed is somewhat resis-
tant to a water spray system. The components are currently designed and qualified to meet similar specific
requirements (e.g., humidity, salt water spray). One of the identified concerns from a system performance
standpoint are the printed circuit card connectors within the equipment boxes (LRUs) and card files. These
exposed contacts are vulnerable to shorting/arcing depending upon, but not limited to, such factors as the
voltage levels present, the electrical conductivity of the water, and the installation/orientation of the part.
Boeing manufacturing processes are designed and implemented with an objective of minimizing the suscepti-
bility of fluid contamination to the aircraft systems. The possibility exists, however, that a system electrical
malfunction could occur if contaminated by water spray, resulting in erratic system behavior. The extent of the
malfunction would need to be determined by testing (both laboratory and flight), and failure analysis. The
electrical conductivity of the water spray is a factor of concern and should be minimized (e.g., use distilled
water or chemical additives). The specific electrical systems discussed in this study were chosen because of
their affect or inter-relationship on other aircraft systems. The efforts of this study resulted in the conclusion
that some electrical system degradation or failures from water spray is likely, even with current or proposed
protective measures, and do not necessarily preclude the continued safe flight and landing of the airplane,
however, these failures can adversely affect current levels of safety. Rigorous testing is warranted to determine
the modes and degrees of failure which might be expected following a water spray discharge, and to identify
protective measures which will make this type of degradation "highly improbable".
5.4 PROPULSION SYSTEMS
This section presents a study of the effects of cabin water spray discharge on 757 propulsion system compo-
nents. The purpose of this study is to determine the potential failures in the propulsion system that would
affect safety-of-flight. The potential failures that are common to other current production airplanes are also
briefly discussed.
5.4.1 Introduction
No component of the propulsion system is located in the defined spray area, however, certain propulsion
system controls and indicators could be subjected to mist absorbed by the ECS and/or to water spills or drip-
ping of water through the floor panels. These components are located in the forward and aft E/E bays and
the cockpit.
Based on the Electrical Systems group's findings (Section 5.3), only the plug-in integrated circuits and board
connectors in the E/E bays are particularly susceptible to moisture. Connectors and relays are protected by
grommet sealing and circuit boards are provided with a conformal coating. E/E racks are equipped with drip
shields and drains installed above each rack, and the E/E panels are fully enclosed and installed to channel
water runoff down the back of the panel. It must be emphasized these findings are based on the delivered
configuration only and they may not hold true throughout the life of the airplane, e.g., the drip pans may be
removed and not replaced, become torn or clogged, or seals broken as a result of maintenance actions.
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Duringtheseevaluations,it becameclearthatpredictionof modesanddegreesof failureisdifficultwithout
actualtestingofspecificases.Thissectionofthereportcontainspeculationsofworstcasefailures.Section
5.4.2containsabriefoverviewofeachoftheidentifiedcomponents'functions,andmodesandeffectsofthe
worstcastfailure.
5.4.2 Discussion
5.4.2.1 E/EFolward Bay Equipment
ThePropulsionSystemitemsin theelectronicequipmentforwardbayinclude:
5.4.2.1.1 PropulsionDiscreteInterfaceUnit (PDIU) For757Pratt& Whitney (PW2000)
InstallationOnly
ThePI)IU,locatedin theE/Ebay,isadigitalprocessorthatcollects,processesandconvertsairframeanalog
discretedatasignalstoanARINC429digitalbusdataformatforusebyelectronicenginecontrol(EEC),and
providesdatafrornoneenginefortheotherenginestarting.Intheeventhattheunitfails,theEECreplaces
theinputswithdefaultvalues,andthestartershavetobeoperatedmanually.Intheeventof erroneousoutputs
fl'omthePDIU,theEECisunabletodetecterrors,thustheEECmayreduce nginethrustslightly.Noneof
theserrorswouldresultinanengineshutdown.
5.4.2.1.2 EECFor 757Rolls-RoyceInstallationOnly
TheEECfortheRolls-Royce,RB211-535mainengineprovideslimiterandsupervisorycontrol.Thesupervisory
controlprovidesautomaticratingprotectionandcontrolsthefuelflowtorque motor to match the engine
pressure ratio (EPR) set by EEC. The limiter control drives the torque motor to maintain the engine N_ (low
rotor speed).
If the superviso W control detects a failure, the limiter freezes cun'ent to the torque motor and the pilot is
warned by a lamp. There is no need for immediate action from the pilot, but he must eventually revert to
limiter control. To do this, the pilot must first back off the throttle and then press the supervisory control INOP
reversion switch located on the overhead panel.
In the event that the limiter should fail, the fail-fix solenoid hydraulically freezes the trim existing prior to the
failure. Again, there is no need for immediate action from the pilot, but he must eventually revert to hydrome-
chanical control. To do this, the pilot must first back off" the throttle and then press the limiter control INOP
reversion switch located on the overhead panel.
The two EEC units are located in the E/E bay. Present operating policies allow the airplane to be dispatched
with one inoperative EEC, per minimum equipment list (MEL).
5.4.2.1.3 Engine Indication and Crew Merting System
The EICAS system includes two CRT display units located on the flight deck, and two independent computers.
The purpose of this system is to provide the flight crew with primary engine parameters (full time) and with
seconda W engine parameters and warning/caution/advisory' messages (as required).
The two EICAS computers are co-located in the same rack. Therefore, in the event of water spray activation,
the potential for common cause failure from spray contamination (Section 5.9) exists with the current configu-
ration. Section 5.3 outlines likely effects from water ingress into sophisticated electronic components, such as
the EICAS computers.
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TheEICAScomputemareconsiderede_entialsafety-of-flightsystems.Presentoperatingpoliciesallowthe
airplaneto bedispatchedwithoneofthedisplayunits,oroneofthecomputersinoperative(i.e.,oneof four
componentsinoperative).A standbyengineindicatorisathirdback-upsystemthatdisplaystheprimaryengine
parametersnecessaryforcontinuedsafeflight.
5.4.2.1.4 ElectricalRelays,ConnectorsandWiring For EEC Channel Select and Fuel Shutoff
The fuel shutoff circuitry controls the fuel flow to the engines. Circuitry malfunctions could, in a worst case
scenario, cause a fuel shutoff and eventually de-power an engine, resulting in uncommanded loss of power.
The EEC channel select circuitry (for PW installations only) allows the pilot to switch the PW EEC to the sec-
ondary channel. The secondary channel, however, may not be operational at all times, specifically because it is
acceptable under present policy to dispatch an airplane with one channel inoperative. Therefore, in it's cun'ent
configuration, it is possible to have an engine shutdown if the EEC fails into the secondary channel mode, and
the secondary channel is inoperative.
5.4.2.1.5 Fuel Quantity Indicating System (FQIS)
The FQIS displays the fuel quantity, and alert,s the flight crew to low fuel quantity, fuel imbalance, and fuel
system component failures. In the event of a FQIS unit failure, as might be expected with water damage, it is
possible for E1CAS to display an en'oneous LOW FUEL caution alert and/or for the FUEL CONFIG light to fail
to illuminate. A LOW FUEL caution indication is taken very seriously, with the airplane diverted to the
nearest airport.
5.4.2.2 E/E Aft Bay Equipment
The propulsion system item of concern in the E/E aft bay is:
5.4.2.2.1 Auxiliary Power Unit Full Authority Digital Electronic Conu'ol (APU FADEC)
The APU FADEC is an integral component of the APU control system, providing speed control, surge and
inlet guide vane (IGV) control, and shutdown protection. A malfunction in the unit, such as have been de-
scribed in Section 5.3, could result in an uncommanded shutdown of the APU, if running when required by
ETOPS procedures.
The APU is a small auxiliary engine that provides pneumatic flow for main engine starts, environmental condi-
tioning, and shaft power to drive an electrical generator. It is generally used on ground prior to main engine
start. Inflight, it is used as a backup system only, and an aircraft may be dispatched without an operational
APU, unless tlmt airplane is flying on extended-range twin operation (ETOPS). For ETOPS airplanes, the APU is
considered a necessary backup system, should there be a main engine failure. The APU for 737 and 757 (as
required) ETOPS airplanes must be running at altitudes greater titan or equal to 25,000 ft, when the airplane is
flying in extended range operation.
5.4.2.3 Flight Deck Equipment
The flight deck area is not in the defined spray area, and the presence of water there is unlikely. However, the
propulsion system components on the flight deck include:
5.4.2.3.1 Resolvers For Thrust Controls For Pratt & Whitney Installation
Resolvers supply electrically isolated thrust command signals (thrust lever resolver angle) to the engine fan case
mounted EEC. These angles are provided by the thrust levers. Each resolver has two inputs, one per each
channel of the EEC. The resolvers are hermetically sealed and rubber inserts in their connectors prevent mois-
ture penetration.
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Thesystemisvulnerabletofailuresresultingfromwaterdamage,how'ever,atwiringandconnectorsthatcon-
necttileresolverswiththeEEC.Thiswiringrunsthroughthepressurehull,andissubjecttomanyofthespray
concernsaddressedinSection5.3.Additionalconcern,asstatedinSection5.2.1,is thatmeasuresdesignedto
isolatetheflightdeckfromthreatsuchasthisarecompromisedin-service,thusincreasingthepotentialfor
wateringressontheflightdeckandthefailureofcriticalsystemsthenbeingveWhigh.Whileit isunlikelythat
atraceofmoisturewouldhaveanynegativeffectswithcurrentlyin-placeprotectivemeasures,inaworstcase
scenario,theenginecouldrevertto idlethrust.
5.4.2.3.2 Fuel Control Switch
This switch controls the fuel flow to the main engines, and a malfunction such as an electrical short could lead
to a main engine shutdown. As stated previously, the definition of the spray area should preclude any such
event as long as the proper flight deck isolation measures are not compron_sed.
5.4.3 747/767 Airplanes
The previous discussions regarding the fuel shutoff circuitry in the E/E bay, the resolver signals, and the fuel
control switch in the flight deck are applicable to all 747/767 models. Therefore, a re-evaluation of the current
protective measures for all of these airplanes is required to assure safety'.
5.4.4 Sun-mm W
Additional moisture-proofing protective measures may be required for the components in the EEC channel
select, fuel shutoff" and resolver circuit, and fuel control switches because a failure in one or more of these
components could possibly result in a loss of main engine power. Considering the possibility of conmlon cause
failure (Section 5.9.2), it is not unreasonable to project to the potential for loss of all engines, and the possi-
bility for an un-powered, off-airport landing. Past incidents of this nature have resulted in fatal accidents.
In the aircraft's delivered configuration, these components are protected from moisture in various ways (Sec-
tion 5.3.2), but it is possible for these protective measures to be unintentionally compromised as a result of
aircraft maintenance and repair. The belief, based on available data, is that any malfunction in the remainder of
the identified propulsion components that would affect the continued safe operation of the engines is highly
improbal)le. Some of these malfunctions could slightly degrade engine perfonnance, while other malfunctions
might lm considered tolerable because of existing system redundancies. Propulsion recommends extensive
testing to verify the adequacy of all current protective and backup measures. Furthennore, all the recommen-
dations for minimizing water ingress made in the electrical section are endorsed here.
5.5 FLIGHT CONTROL SYSTEMS
5.5.1 Introduction
This portion of the study was conducted to determine the potentially negative effects that an activation of a
cabin water spray could have on flight controls of the 757. Inadvertent activation was studied for its effect on
continued control of the airplane; for taxi back to the ramp in the on-ground case, or the continued safe flight
and landing for the inflight case. Suggested methods by which the negative effects could Ixe reduced are in-
cluded herein. Because of system design similarity, disbenefits described for the 757 will also apply to 737, 747,
and 767, in the broad sense. The fly-by-wire a,'chitecture for the 777, however, will be addressed separately.
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5.5.2 Assumptions
Waterfromthecabinwaterspraysystemwasconsideredtobeconfinedtothepressurizedfuselageofthe
airplane,excludingtheflightdeck(Section5.2.1).Therefore,quipmentlocatedin thewings,fin,orstabilizer,
isnotexpectedtobeaffected.Sinceit isimpossibletopredictprecisewaterpathsfollowingdischarge,the
assumptionwasmadethatif acomponentcouldbeeffectedbywater,it would.Cabinwatersprayisassumed
tobeaone-timeventonly,and,repeatedspraysleadingtopartcorrosionarenotconsidered.Inadvertent
inflightwatersprayinconjunctionwithothersystemfailureswasnotconsideredin thisanalysis,butmultiple
failureshave,inpastincidents,beenthecauseof numerousfatalaccidents,andshouldnotbetrivialized.
5.5.3 Background
Theflightcontrolsystemsonthe757consistof thefollowing:ailerons,configurationwarning,elevator,hy-
draulics,leading-edged vices,rudder,spoilers,tabilizer,andtrailing-edgedevices.Primarycontrolsurfaces
arehydraulicallypowered,andcontrolledbycablesforairplanesotherthanthe777.
Theflightcontrolsystemismadeupof acomplexinteractionbetweenelectronic,hydraulic,mechanicalnd
avionicsequipment.Switchesandmechanicalleversontheflightdeckcommunicatetopulleycablesand
avionicscomponentssuchastheflightcontrolcomputers.These,in turn,communicateelectricallyormechani-
callywithhydraulicactuators,valves,reservoirs,pumpsandotherequipment.Electronicsalsoperformsystem
monitoringandfaultanalysis,monitorinputsforairspeedandcontrolsurfaceposition,andprovideflight
deckwarnings.
Afailureinonepieceofequipment,duetocabinwaterspray,mayaffectnotonlytheoperationof thatpart,
butcanalsoimpactotherequipment.Thisisespeciallytrueinthecaseof electronicequipment.Predictionof
allpossibleffectsof watersprayonequipmentisnotpossiblewhentheconfigurationofthecabinwater
spraysystemisnotknown.However,somegeneralizationsandpredictionsoffailurearepossible,andtheir
implicationscanbeassessed.
5.5.4 FailurePrediction
Allflightcontrolequipmentin thepressurizedareawasreviewedtoassessthepossibilityofmalfunctionwhen
exposedtowater.Mostlnechanicalndhydraulicequipment,suchastheramairturbineorhydraulicreser-
voirs,arewater-resistantbydesign.Howevm,therearetwotypesoffailureswt-fichpotentiallycouldoccurif
theflightcontrolsequipmentisexposedtowater.Theseare:
• Waterfreezingoncablespreventingmovementoftheconu'olsurfacehydraulicactuator;
• Electronicpartfailureormalfunction.
Freezingwaterwouldmostp_obablybefoundonlyonthepulleycablesatthepointswherethecablestravel
fromthepressurizedareatotheunpressurizedarea.In theseareas,mallamountsofmoisturecouldfreeze.
Thisshouldnotrestricttheuseofthecablesfortworeasons:1)it isunlikelythattheicewillbeinsucha
quantityastoinhibitprimaWcablemovement;2)if primarycablemovementis inhibitedby ice,thenbackup
cables,breakouts,etc.will protectagainstcablejams.
Iceforlnationisnotexpectedtooccurinothersectionsof thepressurizedarea.Outsidethepressurizedarea,
partsaredesignedtowithstandiceformation.
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Thesecondtypeof failurewhichcouldoccurisfailureofelectronicpartswhenexposedtowater.Someelec-
tronicequipmentismoisturetolerantandwouldmostlikelynotbeaffected.Otherequipmentmaybeaffected,
butisnotconsideredtobecriticaltothesystem.However,severalpartscouldpossiblymalfunctionif exposed
towater.Mostoftheelectronicequipmentwhichmightbeexpectedto failis locatedineithertileelectronics
bay,or theflightdeck,wl-fichisoutofthedefinedsprayarea.Failureofequipmentintheelectronicsbay,due
toaninflightcabinwaterspray,couldcausesituationsthataredifficultocontrolorareconfusingto theflight
crew.Severalmodulesmaybesensitivetoacabinwatersprayduringflight.Abriefdiscussionofthesemod-
ules,andtileimplicationsofmalfunction,arediscussedhere:
• Flap/slatelectronicsunit- in theworstcase(allthreeunitsfail)unpredictablecircuitfunctioncould
occur,possiblyresultinginerraticflightdeckindication(Section5.3.3.2).
• Proximityswitchelectronicsunit- failurecouldcausesporadic/wrongflightdeckindicationsor
sporadic/wrongair-groundata(Section5.3.3.3).
Stallwarningmodule- failureofbothmodulescouldresultinafailureof thecontrolcolunmto
warnthepilotbyvibratingwhenastallconditionisbeingapproached.Otherflightdeckindicators,
however,alsowarnof astallconditionandfailureof thismodulewill notaffectcontinuedsafe
flightoftheaircraft,howevm,overalllevelsofsaferTwill bereduced.
Controlsystemselectronicsunit- thesetwounitscontainmodulesuchastheyawdamper,udder
ratiochangerandtilespoilercontrol.Theairplanecanbecontrolledsafelywithoutheuseofthese
modt,les.Failureof thespoilercontrolmoduleresultsinspoilershutdown,thuspreventinguncon-
trolledspoilermovement.Failureofthesemodulescouldresultin sporadicflightdeckmessages
andcouldresultinahigherworkloadforthepilot.
Stabilizert im/elevatorasymmetrymodule(SAM)- failureofSAMwouldresultin tilepilothaving
tocontrolthestabilizermanually,throughback-upcables.SAMalsoprovidesairspeedinputstothe
redderatiochangermodulesandelevatorasynmletrymodules.It ishighlyunlikelythatSAM
wouldprovideincorrectdatatothese,nodules,butthispossibilitymustbeconsidered.
• Flightcontrolcomputers- failureoftheflightcontrolcomputerswouldpreventauto-pilotcontrol
of thestabilizerandelevator.However,manualoperationwouldnotbehampered.
Engineindicationandcrewalertingsystem(EICAS)- EICASisasystemwl-fichalertsthecrewto
faultsandfailuresin tileaircraftsystems,includingflightcontrolsystems.Failureof EICAScould
resultinerroneoussignalsoftheflightdeckEICASdisplay.
Configurationwarningmodules- Thesetwomodulesprocessinputsignalsfromairplanesensors,
avionicsystems,andpilotstodetenrdneif theairplaneis in thecorrectconfigurationfortakeoff
andlanding.Auralandvisualwarningsappearontheflightdeckif theairplaneisincorrectlycon-
figured.It isunlikelythatthesemoduleswouldgiveafalsewarningof aconfigurationerror.Failure
of thesemoduleswillnotpreventthepilotfromsafelyflying the aircraft, but could cause confu-
sion, or may not warn the pilot of a configuration error. Other indicators on the flight deck, howev-
er, would also warn the pilot that the airplane was not configured correctly.
A f:tilure in any one of these modules is not expected to create a situation wl'fich tile pilot cannot control.
However, tile workload of the pilot would almost certainly be increased, and levels of safety reduced. Failure
of more than one unit could have greater effects than are predicted here, and could, in a worst case scenario,
cause uncontrolled movement of some surfaces.
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5.5.5 Mitigation of Disbenefits
The electronic components in the flight controls systems that are at risk from a water spray system can be
protected from part failure by sealing the electronic parts against water, ensuring that electronics bay units
cannot be damaged by water sprays. These steps are discussed in Section 5.3, however, as outlined there,
absolute water proofing measures could affect overall thermal management within the bay. To offset this prob-
lem requires knowledge of the installation of the cabin water spray system. Once the system configuration is
known, testing must be performed to determine where the water is likely to collect and the total amounts of
water involved. This will allow for a more detailed look at how parts could fail, and those that ale more likely
to fail. From these tests, design practices can be modified to prevent ice build up or water collecting near
sensitive equipment in such a way as to avoid negative effects on other aspects of systems design.
5.5.6 777 Fly-by-Wh'e System
Unlike the other Boeing aircraft covered in this study, the 777 uses a fly-by-wire system to command the pri-
mary control surfaces, and includes minimal mechanical back-up. One pair of spoilers and the horizontal stabi-
lizer do have pulley cable back-ups. However, in calculating probability of system failure, no credit has been
taken for these mechanical back-ups.
Operation of primary flight controls is accomplished through the actuator control electronics (ACE) equipment.
This equipment consists of LRUs, mounted on racks in the aircraft's E/E bay. Construction is similar to other
electronic components described in Section 5.3, and is subject to many of the same concerns. Connectors have
been identified as the vulnerable element in any electronic component, and remain so here. Clean, contami-
nant free water, as might be experienced in component testing programs, carries a relatively minor threat po-
tential. For an in-service aircraft, the threat from contaminant laden water is significant. Contamination of con-
tacts by debris transported in water deposited on these metal contacts can rest, It in undesired bridging across
pins, with degraded signals and cross-talk the likely results. Also, as described in Section 5.9, the potential for
con_non cause failure is introduced, and the layout of the E/E bay equipment must take this threat into consid-
eration, to assure the proper levels of redundan¢ T among the system's components, and to assure functionality
for continued safe flight.
In sunm_aw, it is inappropriate to discuss the susceptibility of the fly-by-wire electronics to damage from water
spray, since incorporation of this system will require substantial design effort to incorporate the appropriate
protective measures already discussed in Section 5.3 into vulnerable components to avoid a loss-of-control
accident.
5.5.7 Sumal_a W
Inadvertent inflight activation of a water spray system can cause malfunctions to the airplane's flight control
systems. A further system review will be required if a detailed water spray system is to be configured. As with
any new system added to an already complicated aircraft, each change and its effects will have to be analyzed
on an individual component basis, and for the effects that any one failure might have on other systems and
their impact on continued safe flight.
5.6 STRUCTURES
This section of the report presents the disbenefits to the airplane from a structures perspective, and covers 737,
747, 757, 767, and 777 models. All items discussed are irrespective of the water spray activation scenario, since,
from a purely structures point of view, the only real point of concern is the time allowed to pass before a
complete teardown for drying, elimination of the potential for corrosion as quickly as possible being the goal.
40
5.6.1 Assumptions
Water used in the spraying process is considered to be of low salinity and acidity and free of compounds that
would have a significant impact on the speed of any corrosive process. Second, the reconditioning process
following a water spray event would begin immediately, and not be delayed for attention during subsequent
periodic structural examinations. Finally, an unwarranted water spray activation would be treated as a serious
event, and not a minor inconvenience. Corrosion damage caused by "minor" liquid spills and lavatory over-
flows has been shown to be a significant problem for airline maintenance programs, and the subject of numer-
ous "fixes" by airframe manufacturers. It is therefore assumed that the reconditioning following a water spray
discharge would be an aggressive program aimed at eliminating any long term effects.
5.6.2 Structural Considerations
5.6.2.1 Fuselage Structures
There are no significant, near term structural problems which might occur due to a water spray deployment,
inadvertent or otherwise. The long term concern is water trapped in the structure that could result in increased
corrosion potential. Elaborate protective measures have been developed and implemented over the years to
protect areas below doors, galleys, and lavatories from the effects of seemingly "minor" liquid spills. On later
model 737s and 747s, all 757s, 767s and future 777s the majority of the upper and lower lobe structure is pro-
tected by corrosion inhibiting compound (ClC) such as LPS3, that is applied during construction and needs to
be re-applied every 2 to 5 years, depending on location. Re-application of this CIC is usually done with nomaal
preventative maintenance and overhauls.
As described in Section 5.1, an unknown quantity of water is expected to leak through floor panels, after satu-
ration of the passenger cabin carpeting. Although the main deck floor panels are sealed (with RTV com-
pounds) for approximately one-third of the aircraft (around doors, galleys and lavatories), water will eventually
seep through the joints, especially where panels are not properly re-sealed after periodic inspections. MI un-
sealed sections over the remaining two-thirds of the aircraft are assumed to leak immediately. Water would
then run down into the lower lobe, but would leave some trapped between panels on top of the floor beams.
This trapped moisture would become a significant corrosion concern if no cleanup or drying were effected.
In addition to the water leaking through the floor, the proposed spraying of water directly into the overhead
would result in runoff past and over the sidewall panels and into the insulation blankets, and stringers.
Existing drain paths in the fuselage consist of 3/8-inch dia drain holes spaced at regular intervals along the
stringers, eventually zigzagging down to 3/8-inch dia pressurized drain valves in the belly of the aircraft. These
drain holes and valves are designed to remove condensation accumulations from the airplane. The valves are
open on the ground when the airplane is depressurized. Following a water spray event, these drain paths
could become clogged from dust and debris washed through with collected water spray, causing trapped water
and a potential corrosion problem. This situation is certainly realistic from an operational point of view. Figures
5.6-1 and 5.6-2 show dust and debris accumulations in the lower areas of a recent vintage 757. The "washing"
effect that significant quantities of water would have on this type of accumulation would almost certainly result
in trapped moisture, and clogged drain paths. Increased maintenance to eliminate this type of build-up might
be necessary.
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Figure 5. 6-1. 757 Lower Lobe Dust Accumulations.
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Figure 5.6-2. 757Lower Lobe Dust Accumulations.
5.6.2.2 Doors
No potential structural or mechanical problems due to water are anticipated on the aircraft doors, since they
are self contained and are not part of the stringer flow system previously described. Little water would enter
the door structure through the internal liner or slide bustle cover, as these items provide a continuous cover
over the inner door structure. Any stray water that did penetrate would be able to drain straight through and
exit the bottom of the door. Water spray has not been considered to pose any significant threat to dae aircraft's
doors or door structure latching mechanisms.
Initially, some concern was expressed over the effects of water on the door mechanism. Freezing of condensa-
tion in the bottom of the lower gate has been a concern in the past, with difficulties opening the door after
extended flights being reported. The additional water expected to drain into the vicini W of the escape slide girt
bar fl'om the passenger cabin following water spray could add to this problem. HoweveL as demonstrated by
the earlier reports, the emergent T operation of the doors would not Ixe affected.
5.6.3 Return to Service
In order to minimize long term corrosion effects to the airplane structure, any reconditioning program should
begin immediately following the water spray event. The interior should be stripped, including all insulation
blankets and floor panels, and the fuselage interior dried and inspected for clogged drain holes. The ClC appli-
cation should be inspected and, if necessaw, re-applied. The tops of the floor beams should also be inspected,
and special attention paid to any areas that might collect water. The drain valves in the belly of the airplane
will require inspection for clogging, and replacement as required. These valves (_,enty-nine on a 757) are
readily accessible fi'om the outside of the airplane. The magnitude of the reconditioning process might be
minimized by taking advantage of the "down" time and performing a complete "D" check at that time.
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5.6.4 Mitigationof Disbenefits
Givencurrentaircraftstructuraldesignandconstruction,therearenosimplemethodsbywhichthe
disbenefitsassociatedwiththeinadvertentactivationofawaterspraysystem ightbeeliminated,oreven
minilnized.Theeffectsof waterwillbeinsidious;itwill migratetowhereverit'snotwanted.Someconsider-
ationshouldbegiven,onnewdesigns,toconstructionmethodsthatwill furtherminimizepotentialwater
traps.Amorerealisticrecommendationwouldbetoimprovemaintenancetoensurethatdebrisaccumulations,
similarto thoseshowninFigures5.6-1and5.6-2,arenotpresent,allowingtheexistingdrainpathsto function
asdesigned.Tiffswouldcertainlyresultingreatlyincreasedmaintenanceoststo theaircraftoperators,but
mightbetheonlyl'ea_sonablealt rnativetosignificantchangestocurrentdesignshouldawaterspraysystem
beimplemented.
5.7 HUMAN FACTORS
The Human Factors aspects of cabin water spray discharge, both in the intentional and unintentional cases,
were reviewed for potential disbenefits. Unlike quantifiable analyses reported elsewhere in this document,
there is very little objective dam that can be used to evaluate the impact of water spray on passenger behavior
aloft or on the ground. Human factors considered everything of a behavioral, physiological, medical and psy-
chological nature relevant to this concept. This section then, includes a great deal of speculation based on
professional expe_ience, and projections based on a review of the scientific and anecdotal literature of actual
emergencies/accidents for clues as to the probable behavior in such situations.
5.7.1 Introduction
The installation of a cabin water spray system in a commercial jet aircraft is intended to provide additional
evacuation time for the passengers, delay the combustion of cabin materials, and thus the toxic products of
combustion, in the event of an external fire situation. Inadvertent activation of a water spray system, w'hether
intlight or on the ground, poses potentially serious consequences to passengers and crew. A "won T list" of
human factors concerns in the event of water spray deployment is presented in this document. This list is not
necessarily complete and it is certainly speculative; most of these factors cannot be objectively quantified.
Among the factors we have identified as of most concern are:
• Enviroranental conditions, wNch may cause slips, falls, obscured vision, etc. These items must also
be considered in the inadvertent activation case, with the potential for injury they introduce.
Potential for inhalation of water droplets after the "wasl'fing" effect has caused them to absorb the
constituents of toxic gases, and the effect this will cause when taken straight into the lungs
(Reference 3).
Physiological stress, such as hypothermia and physical exertion, which may be too high for debifi-
tated passengers ff forced to evacuate in a cold climate.
Disease caused postflight by environmental conditions and/or organisms which could proliferate in
stored water. (The same microorganisms have potential for causing fouling and corrosion of the
storage/distribution system).
Psychological stress cuhninating in collapse, fainting, undesirable behavior or even medical
conditions in susceptible individuals (e.g., heart attacks), if confronted with an inadvertent
discharge inflight.
Behavior of people upon activation of a water spray system. Will this system create a "panic" situa-
tion following inadvertent or ill-advised precautionmT use, causing injuries where there should have
been none?
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5.7.2 Assumptions
Bycontractualgreement,onlydisbenefitsofacabinwaterspraysystemwereconsidered.Thestudydeals
withaconcept,notasystem,sincenooperationalhardwarehasbeendevelopedtodateforinflightuse.This
was,bydefinition,apaperanalysisonly--noinflightor laboratorytestingwasauthorized.
5.7.3 Consequencesof WaterSprayActivation
5.7.3.1 Evacuationin EmergencySituations
Whenconsideringtheadditionofacabinwaterspraysystemtoacommercialircraft,herearetwodesign
requirementstoconsider:theeffecthatthewaterspraywillhavewithinadvertentactivation,andtheresultant
exitoftheaircraft,and,theeffectonanevacuationi arealfireemergency.
Many"precautionary"evacuationsofcommercialircrafttakeplaceonayearlybasis.Cabinsmoke,engine
firesandotherincidentsdictateacautiousapproachtopassengersafety,whichoftenmeanstreatingtheinci-
dentaspotentiallylifethreatening,andexitingtheaircraftasquicklyaspossible,oftenbytheescapeslides.
Thereisapotentialforinjuryin theseevacuations,butit isconsideredanacceptablerisk,since,inmostcases
theyarepurelyprecautionary,andtakeplaceinclosetoidealconditions.
Thewettingofthecabininteriorbyacabinwaterspraysystem,however,addsanewelementtothistypeof
evacuation.Slipperyconditions,asmightbeexpectedfollowingwaterspray,will likelyincreasevacuation
time.Leathersoledshoesandothertypesoffootwearmaybeespeciallysusceptibletoslippingonwetcarpet.
Sinceit isentirelylikelyit couldbeimpossibleto "disassociate"awaterspraydischargefromafireemergency
in themindsofthepassengers,thepushing,shovingandcrowdingattheexits,combinedwithslipperycondi-
tions,n_ghtwellincreasetheinjurypotentialoverwhatmightcurrentlybeexpected.Reducedvision,both
fromthewatersprayitselfmakingemergencylightingdifficultosee,andfromthepotentialofweteyeglasses,
isanotherfactorthatwill tendtoslowdownanyevacuation.Whencombinedwiththepotentialforatleast
partiallossoflightingandpassengeraddresssystems,asmightbeexpectedfromwaterdamage(Section5.3),
a"precautionary"evacuationtakesonanewlevelof passengerrisk.Thisresultsinanegativesafetygainover
currentaircraftconfigurations,andmustbeconsideredinanynetsafetybenefitanalysis.
Inthecaseof theactualfireemergency,alloftheabovelistedconcernsarestillappropriate,withonesignifi-
cantdifference.All thesefactorsmayslowtheevacuationprocess,which,in thiscase,couldresultinagreater
lossof life(informationfromliteraturerelatedtoemergencyevacuationislocatedinAppendixE).
5.7.3.2 Physiologicaland MedicalConsequencesof WaterSprayActuation
Reducedinternalbodytemperature(hypothermia)canpotentiallyoccurunderawidevarietyof circumstances,
bothinflightandon theground.Hypothermiasalikelyconsequenceofuseof acabinwaterspraysystem,
evenif thesystemisactivatedonpurposewhenambientconditionsarecold.If theoutsidegroundenviron-
mentfollowingevacuationisverycold,theshiveringandhighmetabolicloadimposedbyhypothermiacan
leadtocollapse,syncope,inaction,and,if persistent,death.Agedandinfirmpeoplemayhaveinadequateor
non-functionalthermoregulatoryreflexes.Reducedinternalbodycoretemperatureismostlikelyto occur from
cold outside air temperature, ambient wind chill, and inadequate clothing, but may also occur with substance
abuse (alcohol, illicit drugs), fatigue, fear and other forms of debility. Obviously, soaking/wetting by the water
spray system will aggravate the cold injury problem (Reference 4 and 5).
Cold injury is more rapid when convection is high as in cold conditions with a stiff wind. This carries heat
away from the body more rapidly than in calm conditions and can rapidly lead to the signs and symptoms of
hypothermia, including frostbite, frostnip, chilblains, etc. The well-known, readily available Sipple wind chill
chart quantitates the physiological effects of temperature versus wind speed.
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Diseaseisdefinedasaberrationstotheinternalenvironment(homeostasis)ofanindividual,i.e.,deviation
fromhealth.Anunplannedwatersprayeventcouldtriggeravarietyofimmediateandlongtermeffectson
passengers.Immediatepsychologicalstresscouldleadtomedicalemergenciessuchasmyocardialinfarction(heartattacks),collapseand/orvasovagalsyncope(fainting),etc.Post-flighteffectsofunwantedwaterspray
mightincludecolds,flu,pneumonia,etc.,developingafteranappropriateincubationperiod(dependingon
theorganismandhostresistance)afterexposure to the stressful, cold, damp conditions water spray might
provide. Healthy people may miss time from work, etc., whereas infirm people may contract potentially life-
threatening disease.
The long term storage of water aboard the aircraft that water spray might demand creates additional concerns.
Microorganisms growing in a stored water supply and/or in the distribution system could transmit disease if
sprayed on people. For example, ],.¢.gig.IIRgtlit_. (bacterium which causes Legionnaire's disease) has been
reported in the humidifier reservoirs of some aircraft. Colonies of bacteria will grow in enclosed water storage
systems, especially when the water is not circulated or replenished.
Biofilm growth poses potentially serious corrosion risks to the storage tanks which in turn could adversely
affect personnel. Choice of materials for storage and distribution of water must include evaluation of the
potential for microbial influenced corrosion and contamination (Reference 6 and 7). Various biocidal agents
may prevent or at least delay this problem but may in themselves prove toxic to humans and/or corrosive to
materials. This may necessitate frequent system water change-outs and/or sampling of the stored water for
the presence of microorganisms. Microbial biofilms have the following potential consequences in a water-
storage system:
• Disease in susceptible people (pathogenesis);
• Corrosion of containers, pipes, spray jets, etc., and;
• Fouling of the system.
Microbial fihns are known to thrive even in nutrient-deficient "pure water" in metal containers(Reference 8).
Some species are resistant to biocides such as iodine and become more resistant with time to biocides
(Reference 9).
Given the modern aircraft cabin, the possibility of electric shock is something which should not be overlooked.
Severity of symptoms depends upon many factors including type of current (ac/dc), level, grounding, duration
of exposure, physical conditions of human, etc. Its effects include startle, muscle spasms, muscle contraction
leading sometimes to fractures or dislocations, respiratory paralysis, cardiac arrest, and loss of consciousness.
Severe levels of electric shock, although not likely here, can cause death, especially in debilitated people
(Reference 10).
5.7.3.3 Psychological Aspects of Emergency Evacuation
Hysteria can be caused by real or imagined life-threatening situations such as could occur in inadvertent water
spray activation. Hysteria can be precipitated by feelings of helplessness, what-to-do feelings, and claustropho-
bia from the rapidly changing cabin environment brought on by the sudden surge of water. "False alarm"
emergencies have caused passengers in some aircraft to initiate evacuation when not specifically directed by
the flight crew (Section 5.8.1.3). The severity of this reaction could be lessened by strong leadership on the part
of the flight crew and/or passengers. It could be worse in, for example, a night inflight activation situation
when the lighting system fails. Water spray jets may also cause a high-frequency, high-decibel sound which
could cause the startle reaction, disorientation and possibly temporary hearing shift (deafness).
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5.7.4 Mitigationof Disbenefits
If acabinwaterspraysystemtosuppressfireflashoveristobeinstalledincommercialirlinersthefollowing
humanfactorshouldbeconsidered:
• Assureaugnmntedandthoroughtrainingforflightattendantandflightdeckcrew(Section5.8)
asfollows:
- "Crowdcontrol"trainingtopreventpanicandhystericalreactionswhenthesystemist,sedinten-
tionallyor inadvel_ently;
- Realistictrainingandpersonallyexperiencedeffectsofwaterspraysystemdeployment;
- Completeknowledgeof thecabinwaterspraysystem;
- Frequentrefreshertrainingre:cabinwaterspraysystem(frequencyperiod- TBD);
Preventmicro-foulingbymicroorganis,nsi thestorageanddistributionsystemsthroughuseof
frequentsampleanalyses,electionofappropriatebiocidalagents,andmaintenance/replenishment
ofwater;
Considertypeof materialsfor t:abrication of the storage/distribution system regarding biofihn
growth, corrosion, resistance to biocides, etc.;
Consider source of water when replenishing water in storage tanks. In some parts of the world
local water supplies may be so contaminated as to be not suitable for this pmf)ose (or the potable
water and humidifier reservoir).
5.7.5 Sununat T
A cabin water spray system is, by design, a safety enhancement for the protection of the aircraft's occupants in
a fire situation. It is a human factors solution to the problem of fatalities due to a serious external fire scenario,
and affords passive protection during the critical few moments of evacuation.
There are, howevm, some serious deficiencies in thc work clone to date in support of this system, and its effect
on the occupants it is designed to protect. Any slowing of the evacuation process in a fire emergency, for
reasons described in this section, will result in a system that is less valuable to the aircraft's occupants than the
net safe W benefit analysis claims it to be.
Concerns exist for the non-fire situation also. No component is 100% reliable, as evidenced by the redundancy
required of all components critical to flight..&s presented here, an inadvertent deployment of a cabin water
spray system can cause serious problems for passengers. Hypothermia, post-flight disease from contaminated
watel, and the psychological stress from the unexpected discharge of water all demand attention and study to
determine and quantify the effects on both the passengers and the net safety benefit analysis. As the CAA
concluded when considering the use of passenger slnokehoods (Reference 2), the addition of a safety system
that may cause more fatalities than the system's ability to save is unacceptable. All factors must be investigated
and tested to ensure that this is not also the case with cabin water spray.
There is a tendency to overlook the negative aspects of a system in the conceptual stages of design when early
testing shows promise. This study was contracted for the purpose of exposing any "disbenefits" that a cabin
water spray system creates that the controlled laboratory testing did not consider. As outlined, substantial hu-
man factors qt, estions must be answered before this system is able to claim a positive net safety benefit.
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5.8 FLIGHTDECKOPERATIONS
Thedeterminationf disbenefitsin flightdeck(andcabin)operationsandproceduresdueto acabinwater
spraysystemisaproblematicalendeavoratbest.Thisisbaseduponthefactthat:1)thereisnocomplete
systemdesignavailableforanalysis,testing,andevaluation;and2)therehasnotbeenextensivet stingof
theeffectsofcabinwatersprayontheavionicsandothersystemsof afunctionalcommercialircraft.Inthis
regard,conjectureorpaperanalysisof thelikelyeffectsimplyisnotsufficienttoformabasisforthedetermi-
nationof the"fly-ability"of thesubjectaircraft.Untilsuchtestsareperformed,theconclusionsofthis,andany
otheranalyticalreviewofthearea,shouldbeconsideredashypotheses.
5.8.1 Inadvertent Activation
Inadvertent activation during flight is one of the most important, and potentially dangerous, scenarios for a
cabin water spray system. The CWS system that has been proposed as the baseline for this study is not intend-
ed, nor designed, for use in fighting inflight fires. In view of the potential consequences if a cabin water spray
system is activated inflight, there must be "fail, locked out" protection against inadvertent activation while air-
borne. The probability that this level of protection would fail and result in an inadvertent activation of the CWS
system must, in combination with the probability that activation of the CWS system would cause failure of any
c_itical components or systems, be no more than 10 .9 in order to meet FAA requirements for protection against
catastrophic failures.
5.8.1.1 Aircraft Diversion
Inadvertent activation of a cabin water system while the aircraft is inflight will most likely result in a diversion
to a suitable alternate airport unless the destination airport is closer. The rationale for this is twofold:
Even though it may be shown that there is only a small probability that the water/moisture from a
CWS activation would cause failure of any flight-critical components or instrumentation, it is very
likely that standard procedures for dealing with such an event would call for a flight diversion to
the nearest airport. This view is based upon the potential catastrophic outcome of any common
cause failure of redundant components, and given that the probability of such an occurrence would
increase over time;
It may be difficult, if not impossible, to determine immediately what caused the inadvertent activa-
tion. There would probably be at least an initial tendency of the passengers to believe that a fire
had broken out. Even if the cabin crew can dissuade them of this fear, it is likely that the passen-
gers will be anxious to get on the ground as quickly as possible, given their somewhat "damp"
condition after exposure to the CWS system.
5.8.1.2 Loss of Flight Instruments
Willie loss of any flight instruments might be considered to be a disbenefit, it is the potential for loss of flight-
critical instruments that is of serious concern. The analysis reported in Section 5.3 suggests that there is a low
probability that any flight instruments will fail with a single activation of the CWS system. It should be noted,
that while the probability of significant amounts of moisture reaching the E/E bay may be quite low, the FAR
requirement for the reliability of flight-critical component functions is one-in-a-billion, or 10 -9.
In current designs, this level of reliability is reached by designs in which triple redundancy of many of the
components reduces the probability of multiple failures of these redundant components to extremely low
levels, assuming there is no basis for a common-cause failure source (Section 5.9). Cabin water spray systems
appear to introduce such a source into the failure equation. It could certainly be hypothesized that if a mois-
ture source resulting from activation of the CWS system acted to fail a certain component, it would have a fairly
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highprobabilityofsimilarlyaffectingadjacentornearbycomponentshatareidenticalorof similarconstruc-
tion.In manycases,redundantcomponentsarepositionedside-by-side,oratleastlocatedinnearproximity.It
iscertainlycrediblethattheprobabilityofmultiplefailuresofredundantcomponentscouldbequitehigh
tinderthisscenario,assumingtheinitialfailuretakesplace.
AnexampleofthisoccurredinOctoberof 1988tothecrewof atwo-enginemedium-largetransport.Quoting
fromthecrew'sreport:
"Justafterlift-off(fromYakutat,Alaska),thefirebellsoundedandallthreefirelights(enginesNo.1andNo.2andAPU)illuminated.Ceilingswerevariable600'to 1500'
withvisibility2_milesin fogandrainanda10-15knotwindoutofthenortheast.We
inmmdiatelyturneddownwind,remaininginVMC,andlandeduneventfully.Theprob-
lemprovedtoberainwaterenteringvariouscontrolelectronicsboxesin theE/Ebay.
Thewatermostlikelyenteredthroughtheforwardentriesandmaincargodoorarea
duringturnaroundsatstationswhereit wasraining.Thewaterseepsintothesmoke
vent/grilleintheforwardgalleyareaandthendowntotheelectronicsbay.Wateraccu-
mulatesinadrainpanespeciallydesignedforisolatingwaterintrudingintotheE/Ebay,
butthedrainswerepluggedwithdirtanddebris,allowingthedrainpanto fill (and
ovmglowataircraftrotation)."
Thiswasacasewherethreelikecomponentsfailedduetoaconunon-causeinvasionofmoistureintotheE/E
bay.Fortunately,theitemsthatfailedwerenotflight-critical.It isworthnotingthateventhesefailurescaused
animmediateturn-backto theairport.
5.8.1.3 FlightCrew Operations
TheinadvertentactivationoftheCWSsystemwhileineitherthetakeoffor landingphasesofflightwould
bethemostimportant,andpotentiallythemostdisastrous,typeof inadvertentactivation,duetothehigh
workloadandcriticaltinringofthetakeoffor landingprocedures.Anydisruptionordistractionfromthese
proceduresmightresultin serious,if notdisastrous,consequencesfortheflightcrew,thepassengers,andthe
aircraftitself.
Becauseof thepotentialconsequencesof uchdistractions,manyoftheaircraftsystems'cautionandwarning
indicationsareinhibited uringthesephasesof flight.Thus,evenwithfairlyseveresystemfailures,theflight
crewisprotectedfromtheintrusionofthealertingindicationsof thesefailuresduringthecriticalsegmentsof
eitheratakeoffor landing.Onlythosefailureswhichmightaffecthedecisiontocontinueoraborta takeoffor
landingarepresentedto the flight crew.
Of paramount importance during these phases of flight would be the protection against the inadvertent activa-
tion of the CWS system. These phases are also the most difficult to provide with this protection, since the
system must be "atoned" at these times. As with the inflight phase, the design of the system must protect
against inadvertent discharge to a probability" of 10 9. It will most likely require extensive simulator testing to
determine what the procedural effects of a CWS activation during takeoff or landing would be.
An inadvertent activation of the CWS system would probably be dealt with in the same manner as many other
system faults, i.e., the system failure indication would be inhibited during these two phases of flight, consistent
with how other indications are likewise inhibited. It is likely that the event itself would not escape the attention
of the flight crew, regardless of whether an indication is presented on the flight deck. The release of water
spray, and the resulting reactions of the passengers and cabin attendants, may be impossible to hide from the
crew. Thus, a very' real thi-eat to flight safety would remain if activation distracts or disrupts the crew during
these critical phases.
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Evenaninadvertentactivationof theCWSsystemonthegroundposesomeratherdifficultdecisionsforthe
flightcrewandcabinattendants.Tiffsstemsfromthefacthatactivationonthegroundisanacceptablemode
of operation,assumingthereisafire.Theproblemisoneofdeterminingwhethertheactivationisduetoa
legitimatecause(file)or isaninadvertentactivation.Thismightnotbesodifficultif onecouldassumethat
sometypeof collisionorotherimpactorobviouseventwouldalwaysbeprecedenttoafireeventhatwould
activatethesystem.Twodecisionsordutiesresultingfromtheincorporationofcabinwatersprayare:
5.8.1.3.1 Decisionto Evacuate
If it cannotbedetemlinedreliablythata"valid"fireconditiondoesnotexist,theactivationwouldhavetobe
treatedasalegitimatevent.Basically,thismeanstheorderlyevacuationofthepassengersf omtheaircraft.
This,in itself,mustbeconsideredadisbenefitif thecauseisa"non-event",becausevacuationsveryoften
resultin injuriesto passengers(Section5.7).
Sometimes,thedecisionto evacuatecanbetakenoutofthehandsof thecabinattendantsorcrew.Thefol-
lowingincidentalsoillustratestheoccasionalpanicthatmaybeexhibitedbysomepassengersinsituationsthat
,nayappearto belife-threatening,butareactuallyquitebenign.QuotingNellSantanielloof theFortLauder-
daleNewsandSun-Sentinel,asreportedin theSeattleTimes(September11,1990):
"Thefirstshoutof"fire"camefromapassengersittingbytherightwingoftheBoeing
727,shortlyafterTWAflight194fromFortLauderdale,Florida,touchedownatNew
York'sLaGuardiaairport.Otherpassengersquicklyjoined in, yelling and pointing to
flames shooting from an auxiliary power unit on the wing as the aircraft taxied toward
the terminal Sunday night.
What happened next caught everyone by surprise: panicked passengers flung open
emergency exits and bailed out. A few jumped from a wing onto the tarmac while the
plane was moving, said passenger Lauren Rubel, 44, a New Yorker with a home west of
Boca Raton, Florida... "everybody started to scream. Everybody went crazy," said
another passenger, Jotln Fontana, 60,... passengers said the captain left the cockpit
briefly to tetl passengers to sit down and not to panic. But "the people didn't give a
damn anymore," Fontana said.
TWA officials called the evacuation an overreaction on the part of the passengers. The
flames came from an auxiliary power unit that backfired, they said. "The passengers
thought there was a fire, and they overreacted," TWA spokesman Jim Faulkner said from
St. Louis. "The captain did try to comanunicate to them it was not a fire, but they had
already headed for the doors."... A wave of "organized panic" then took over as other
passengers left the plane, most of them sliding down four emergency chutes that were
deployed. At least three passengers were injured."
5.8.1.3.2 Deactivation or Shut-off of CWS
If it can be determined immediately that the activation is inadvertent and unnecessary, provisions might be
provided to manually shut-off the CWSS before it has completely exhausted itself. This would reduce passen-
ger initation and also reduce the cost of returning the aircraft to service.
5.8.1.4 Cabin Attendant Operations
Mthough there will be some routine activities required of the cabin attendants in case of an inflight activation
of the CWS system, the potentially most demanding action will be to control the reactions of the passengers to
the spray, to minin-fize behavior which might be disruptive or pose a threat to other passengers, the flight
attendants, or the flight itself (Section 5.7). To the extent that an inadvertent activation of the CWS system dis-
rupts the duties of the flight attendants, it would be considered a disbenefit to normal flight operations. The
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degreeofdisbenefitwouldcorrespondtotheseriousnessorcriticalityoftheproceduresor functionsthatare
disruptedbytheCWSevent.Mostflightattendantfunctionsaredirectedtowardspassengercomfortratherthan
safew-of-flight.Suchdisruptionswouldusuallybeatamuchlowerlevelofcriticality-thanthataffectingthe
flightcrew.
Comnmnicationsproblemsmightbeconsidereddisbenefitsof aninadvertentactivation.A directimpactwould
resultfi'omfailureof intercomorcommunicationssystemsbywateringressfromsystemdischarge.Thedisben-
efitwouldstemfromtheresultingincreasein timeandeffortforthecabincrewtocon_nunicatewitheither
theflightcreworwiththepassengers.Anindirectcommunicationdisbenefitmightresultfrorntheincreased
difficultyinallWpes of communications due to confusion following a system discharge. This could vary fi'om a
minor annoyance to a fairly serious disruption of normal conmmnications. The last Wpe of communications
disbenefit is pedmps more hypothetical, but could be expected to occur with at least a small percentage of the
flight attendants. This would be a consequent over communication with the flight crew in the afternmth of a
CWSS event. Since the event is unexpected, and because the cabin attendants may not be prepared either
procedurally or psychologically for dealing with such an event, it is likely that some attendants would fall back
on the flight crew to provide guidance and instructions On subsequent actions. While this would affect the
actions and effectiveness of the cabin attendants, the more serious disbenefit would likely be to the flight crew
who is distracted and interrupted by the calls from file cabin attendant(s).
5.8.2 Commanded Activation
"Conm_anded activation" means the CWS system has been intentionally activated for its designed purpose. This
activation could be either via an automatic system which senses the conditions that are necessa W and sufficient
to activate the system and then acts through pneumatics, electronics, hydraulics, or a combination thereof to
activate the system, or it could be through the manual activation of the system by the flight crew, or perhaps
by the cabin attendants. The pros and cons of these various types of activation methods, and their potential
disbenefit effects on crew operations and cabin attendant procedures, are discussed in the following section.
5.8.2.1 Flight Crew Operations
Disbenefits to the flight crew will be dependent upon the arming/activation/operation scheme that is chosen.
Various manual and automatic sequences have been suggested, but it is clear that the least disbenefits to the
flight crew will come from the system that requires the least action on their part. It is inappropriate to comment
on the various sequences that have been mentioned to date other than to reiterate that operation of any poten-
tial system must be fool-proof, working as intended only when intended, and invisible to the flight crew.
The success of a post-crash or fire event evacuation might depend upon successful communications between
the flight deck and cabin crew. At the least, the evacuation could be delayed somewhat by any breakdown in
communications due to water effects, as outlined earlier in this report. While many things might cause such a
disruption, including CWSS activation, it is impossible to estimate its role without extensive testing in a func-
tional aircraft. Even if comrnunications are disrupted due to CWSS contamination, the disbenefit effect is likely
to be on the order of only a few seconds of delay before the crew discover that they cannot communicate with
each other. This would be a disbenefit only in the less destructive cases, where the airplane is left basically
intact. In more extreme cases, the flight attendants nmy not wait for an evacuation conmmnd from the flight
deck, nor attempt to cormmmicate with the crew prior to initiating a passenger evacuation. Thus, this type of
disbenefit should be considered of minimal importance.
5.8.3 Testing Requirements for Determination of Crew/Cabin Disbenefits
Many of the potential disbenefits to crew or cabin operations or flight integrity can only be ascertained by
extensive testing of the effects of CWS on avionics components and other airplane systems in a fully functional
aircraft. Some tests might be done at the component level to determine susceptibilities, and to isolate the pri-
maw drivers that might result in significant disbenefits. These tests would include such things as susceptibility
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ofvariousLRUstomoisture(invariousforms)andpathwayteststodeterminewherethewaterislikelytorun
undervariousconfigurationsandairplaneattitudes.
Itwouldbeusefultolookforbothimmediateandlong-termeffectsof moisturecontamination avionics
since the latter could have significant return-to-service impact, or, if not reconditioned (dried out and repaired),
n-tight result in serious future failures of these components.
In order to determine the probability of various avionics failures, and what effects these might have on control-
lability of the aircraft, tests need to be performed wl_ich involve a fully functional avionics suite, with the ability
to simulate various airplane attitudes.
Testing of the type described above can determine, to some extent, the likelihood of various avionics compo-
nents or systems failures and false indications after the CWS system has been activated. There is no known
comparable test that could determine what the behavior of passengers, attendants, and crew would be after
such an event. The best indicators are the actual behaviors exhibited in similar situations. To the extent that a
CWS event emulates some or many of these historical events, some relevant indications might be gathered
from these past events. In addition, a "mock-vanilla" evacuation test might be run in which a CWS system was
used without prior warning of the participants. Tests of this type are currently being considered by the CAA
and the Cranfield Institue in the UK and may shed some light on the question of passenger behavior after an
inadvertent activation of the system.
5.8.4 Mitigation of Disbenefits
A reduction in the disbenefits of cabin water spray from the flight deck operations perspective may be
achieved with the following steps. First, flight and cabin crews must be given thorough training in the ratio>
nale, the operation, and the benefits of cabin water spray. Re-training at appropriate intervals must also be
considered, since, in all likelihood, many crews will never see a situation requiring it's use, nor will they expe-
rience an inadvertent activation. Second, flight deck operations, to assure the continued sate flight and landing
of the airplane, even after inflight activation of the system, cannot be compron_sed. This dictates that essential
airplane systems and controls must work, with whatever changes for "water hardening" of components and
systenas being designed and implemented. This also means, that the flight deck crew must not be burdened by
activities outside the flight deck while control of the airplane is paramount, which leaves the cabin crew to
attend to whatever situation the water spray has caused there, including control of the passengers under what
might be very unpleasant conditions. "Lastly, consideration should be given to what, if any, briefing is given
passengers on the water spray system, including what to expect if the system goes off, and to rely on the direc-
tion of the cabin crew for their next step.
5.9 PRODUCT SAFETY
5.9.1 Introduction
Aircraft safety systems are designed to be independent from other aircraft systems, and to not adversely affect
the operation of other systems or the airplane. Older technology aircraft are more mechanical and less elec-
tronically sophisticated. Systems were independent and were monitored by the crew, with interface accom-
plished by means of manual controls. More recent aircraft have sophisticated interfaces between systems that
monitor and control functions without human input, and at very high speeds. The discharge of a cabin water
spray system into this sophisticated electronic environment could, without significant upgrades to other systems
and components, introduce a potential for complex systems malfunction that would jeopardize the continued
safe flight of the aircraft, and put its passengers at an unacceptable level of risk. The following sections de-
scribe the anticipated disbenefits and effects on aircraft safety systems and philosophy.
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5.9.2 Common Cause Failure
The cornmanded or inadvertent activation of a cabin water spray system introduces a potential "con-unon
cause" ]node of failure for which all systems and components must be evaluated. Current system architecture
allows primary and secondary LRUs for many systems to be co-located (Figure 5.9-1 and 5.9-2). Rationale for
this has always been that both units would not be at risk from the same threat. HoweveL the presence of
water, and tile uncertainties of the water paths which would result after discharge, introduces a potential for
both units to be damaged by the same flow of water at ttle same time, since their original location selections
were not made considering this type of threat. This is defined as the possibility' of con_-non cause failure. The
potential for common cause failures, and their implications on the safety' of the aircraft and its occupants, dic-
tate they be made a highly improbable event (< 1 x 10 9) through increased component protection against the
threat of moisture, and through isolation of redundant components by both location separation and increased
compartmentalization. Additional measures would include an enhancement of the moisture protection of cur-
rent designs, decreasing the probability, of moisture reaching critical components by increasing the moisture
absorption capability of the air-conditioning system, cabin carpets, drain tracks, drip pans, etc. The many sce-
narios for multiple failures and tile separation requirements to prevent them will not be addressed in this study,
since any serious consideration of the adoption of cabin water spray must address this problem on a more
global basis, designing the layout of critical equipment accordingly.
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5.9.3 Safety-of-Flight Critical Equipment
Since a cabin water spray system could affect multiple systems concurrently (Section 5.9.2), research was con-
ducted to determine which equipment on current aircraft is critical for continued safe flight and landkqg.
AC 25.1309-1A states the following criteria for continued safe flight and landing:
"The capability for continued controlled flight and landing at a suitable airport, possibly
using emergency procedures, but without requiring exceptional pilot skill or strength.
Some airplane damage may be associated with a failure condition, during flight or upon
landing."
Research involved identifying the systems and equipment that the flight crew would need without requiring
exceptional skills. In order to accomplish this, failure conditions and their severity classifications were re-
viewed. According to AC 25.1309-1A, a failure condition is:
"The effects on the airplane and its occupants, both direct and consequential, caused or
contributed to by one or more failures, considering relevant operational or environmen-
tal conditions."
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Tilefailureconditionseverityclassificationsare:
Minor FailureconditionswhichwouldnotsignificantlyreduceairplanesafetT,andwhich
involvecrewactionsthatarewellwithintheircapabilities.Minorfailureconditions
mayinclude,forexample,aslightreductioninsafetymarginsor functionalcapa-
bilities,aslightincreaseincrewworkload,suchasroutineflightplanchanges,or
someinconvenienceto occupants.
Failureconditionswhichwouldreducethecapabilityoftheairplaneor theability
of thecrewtocopewithadverseoperatingconditionstotheextenthatthere
wouldbe,forexample,--
Asignificantreductioninsafetymarginsorfunctionalcapabilities,asignificant
increaseincrewworkloador inconditionsimpairingcrewefficiency,orsome
disconfforttooccupant.s;or
Inmoreseverecases,a largereductioninsafetymarginsorfunctional
capabilities,higherworkloadorphysicaldistressuchthatthecrewcould
notbereliedontoperfom_itstasksaccuratelyorcompletely,oradverseffects
onoccupants.
Catastrophic - Failure condition which would prevent continued safe flight and landing.
The complete failure of the electrical system is considered to be a major failure in our current aircraft designs.
In order to prevent a catastrophic failure, and comp,'omise continued safe flight and landing, the functionality
provided by the standby power system and the equipment powered by this system is required to remain
operational. This level of criticality must be maintained after inflight discharge of a cabin water spray system.
Tables identifying the equipment currently powered by the standby power systems of the 737, 747-400, 757,
and 767 airplanes are included in AppendLx B. These tables outline the minimum required functionality, of the
electrical power systems for continued safe flight and landing, and help define the equipment which must be
"hardened" to assure that failure which might result from a cabin water spray discharge is a "highly improba-
ble" (< 1 x 10'9 event. This equiplnent is not currently designed or located considering the threat posed by a
water spray system.
5.9.4 Discharge Consequences
For obvious reasons, the worst case for an unintentional discharge of a cabin water spray system is during
takeoff, cruise, or landing. Cruise implies that the aircraft could be a significant distance from a suitable airport,
should a system failure require the aircraft be landed at the first opportuni W. The takeoff and landing phases of
flight produce the highest crew workload, and are the least tolerant of unnecessary distractions or incorrect
information to the flight crew. Any incorrect or improper signals or system failures, or combinations of both,
can have serious repercussions.
The 1989 Kegworth crash of a British Midlands 737 might be used as an example. An engine failure on this
airplane, followed by the inability of the crew to recognize which engine had failed, resulted in a fatal acci-
dent. Section 5.4 indicates that water ingress into the EEC channel select and fuel shut-off circuitry could, in its
worst case, result in a main engine reverting to idle thrust. Elsewhere, in Section 5.3, the predicted results of
water ingress into various other electronic components are incorrect and sporadic cockpit indications. These
two conditions, while unlikely, illustrate the threat to sophisticated electronics posed by water when elaborate
protective measures are not included. The extrapolation to a compromise of the safety of the airplane and its
occupants is not unreasonable.
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5.9.5 Mitigationof Disbenefits
In orderto assureanequivalentlevelof safetywiththeintroductionofacabinwaterspraysystem,anumber
of significantchangestoaircraftdesignwouldberequired.Asmentionedinothersectionsof thisreport,the
incorporationofsuchasystemwouldrequirethereevaluationfallothercriticalsystemsintheairplanein
viewof thethreathatwaterposes.
Currentlayoutofcriticalsystemcomponentsin theelectronicsbayswouldneedtoberevisedtoeliminate
co_mnoncausefailurepotential.ThismightmeanredistributionofLRUsand/orwaterhardeningofallequip-
mentandconnectorstoeliminatethedangerof electricalshortsandequipmentcompromise.Analternate
approach might be to redesign the environmental control system such that moisture laden air flow to the elec-
tronics bays is stopped upon initiation of water spray discharge. In any event, a comprehensive and rigorous
testing program would have to be developed and imposed at the component supplier level to assure that
whichever approach or combination is taken produces the necessary results.
It is not the intent here to outline all changes which might make the incorporation of cabin water spray suit-
able for aircraft use. Rather, it is clear that any work in tltis direction must be undertaken at the global level,
recognizing the environment that is created and in wbAch other systems must continue to operate.
5.9.6 Surmnary
The introduction of a cabin water spray system is not a simple, add-on system. Water spray introduces major
changes to the operating environment of the aircraft's systems, and to the occupant's environment as well.
Wl_le a water spray system can certainly be added to today's sophisticated aircraft, from a technical perspec-
tive, it must be done such that the CWSS achieves the goal of increasing passenger safety and not detracting
fl'om it.
5.10 RELIABIHTY AND MAINTAINABILITY (R&M)
5.10.1 Inu'oduction
This study considered a concept, not a mature system, and no operational hardware has been developed to
date for inflight use, therefore, only limited reliability analysis has been performed. Investigative work per-
formed by R&M is of a very generic nature and describes what would be required during development of a
cabin water spray system. RJ-MVlimpact and program requirements would be different for existing in-design and
production aircraft in relation to future design programs. While new design programs would be significantly
impacted by including the CWSS, any retrofit programs would have a much larger R&IVlimpact.
5.10.2 Reliability
5.10.2.1 New Designs
A comlnercial jet aircraft is certified as the sum of its parts, in recognition of the fact that an anomaly in any of
the systems in the aircraft can have a significant impact on other systems. From a design standpoint, any sys-
tem to be incorporated into the aircraft is better identified sooner than later, since the analyses performed to
satisfy the certification process are lengthy and dependent upon projected failure mechanisms, and the overall
aircraft's ability to tolerate a failure, while maintaining safety-of-flight. These analyses must cover both opera-
tion of the water spray system, to assure it will work when required, and the potential impact to other systems
in the aircraft, for all aircraft attitudes, in both commanded (systems required for safe evacuation must be pro-
tected) and inadvertent (control of the aircraft, inflight and on the ground must be maintained) scenarios. The
following is a basic listing, by no means complete, of the types of analyses which must be performed consider-
ing the effects of a cabin water spray discharge:
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• A comprehensiveFMECAofallsystemsandcomponentsthatwouldbeaffectedbytheC\VSS;
Faultreeanalysisof allsystemsandcomponentshatareconsideredcritical.Inaddition,ahigher
levelfaulttreewouldbeneededtodetermineif systems and components impact or interact in new
ways not previously considered before the water spray concept;
MEL dispatch versus potential failure mode analysis of remaining systems. It cannot be assumed
that all systems are 100°/0 functional, and failure tolerant components, hidden failures, and inopera-
tive or degraded components may no longer provide the required safety margins;
• Degradation analysis;
• Reliability tests and demonstration programs;
• Potential sneak circuit analyses;
• Reliabili W predictions;
• Selected parts review.
5.10.2.2 System Retrofit
Assessing the impact of a CWS system on existing aircraft reliability is a difficult proposition. None of the sys-
tems or components in cun'ent build aircraft were designed, specified, constructed or certified considering a
potential water spray environment. In addition, since cabin water spray is presently only conceptual, and not
designed or used on any aircraft in service, no existing data base for failure rates and in-service impact are
available. We do know that a minimum reliability number is needed to provide the required degree of safety
for all systems, especially safety-of-flight systems and components. There are over 50 critical systems requiring
a 10 '_probability of fhilure, and at least as many essential systems requiring a 10 _probability to be considered.
In order to achieve this required level of reliability and analysis confidence, all components and systems that
may be impacted by water spray will require re-analysis of all previously conducted fault trees, reliability analy-
ses, specification requirements, MEL analyses, and safety analyses, which were used for certification. This in-
cludes all those done by Boeing, as well as those done by the component subcontractors. For example, an
analysis showing system redundancy, which allows dispatch with one component inoperative, may not allow
dispatch with the introduction of a potential water spray system discharge. The additional fault introduced into
the fault tree(s) and FMECAs may show that wifllout system design changes there may lm a criticality impact
that would require a change to the MEL. Similar analyses for all components and systems may also show safety
degradation requiring redesign and/or operating procedural changes. Here also, as with new designs outlined
above, these analyses must cover both operation of the water spray system, to assure it will work when re-
quired, and the potential impact to other systems in the aircraft, for all aircraft attitudes, in both corrnnan(led
and inad,>rtent scenarios.
5.10.3 Maintainability
Given that this is a concept study only, with no proposed system design, only a listing of potential maintain-
ability impacts are presented, and in general temps. The maintenance impact of some in-service water spills
into the aircraft's E/E bay and the passenger cabin have occurred and these can be evaluated for similarity to
an inadvertent CWS discharge (Section 5.1.2).
Additional infomlation regarding inadvertent discharge cost and a detailed return to service analysis is also
found in this report (Section 5.11).
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Airlinein-servicewaterintrusionintotheE/Ebayduetowaterspillsandlavatoryoverflowshaveresultedin
theremowtlofelectronicomponents,dryingofrocksandsurroundingstructure,applicationofwaterdisplace-
mentagent,andreinstallationofreplacementelectroniccomponents.Aircraftlmverequiredacheckflightprior
toreturntorevenueservice.Theremovedcomponentswerereturnedtotheover-haulshopforcleaning,test/
repail,andthenputintospares.Thisairlineprocedure,foranyaccidentalwaterspillsthatresultinwetavion-
icsin theE/Ebay,wouldcel,ainlybenodifferentwithaninadvertentCWSSdischarge.
Thefollowingisapartiallistofstudiesandanalysesthatwouldberequiredfortheincorporationofacabin
waterspraysystem:
• A reevaluationofexistingnxtintainabilityanalysesandstudiesforallsystemsandcomponentshat
maybeaffected;
• Maintenancetasksthatwillberequiredforsafeferrytoanoverhaulbasefromaremotestation;
• Maintenanceimpactof all interiorfurnishingsandequipmentshatarechanged- accessibility,
manuals,training,procedures,checkout,etc.;
Inspections- changes,additions,when,where,testsandtestequipmenteeded,howmany
mechanics,trainingrequirements;forboththeCWSSandchangestoothersystemsandcompo-
nents,etc.;
• Functionalcheckoutprocedurechangesofredesignedsystemsandcomponents;
• Inspectionandmaintenanceosttothecarrier;
• Inadvertentdischargecost;
• CWSSmaintenanceinstallationerrorprobability;
• CWSScomponentaccessibility;
• Potentialincorrectservicing,installation,repaiLtestingof theCWSS;
• Demonstrationrequirementstoassurethesystemworksin-service,aftermaintenance,agingfleet
considerations,duringcertification,etc.
Othertopicsthatariseduringdesigneedto beconsidered,suchascombiaircraftinstallationrequirements.
Furtheranalysiswill bringforthadditionaldesignandoperationalconsiderationsthatwillhavetobeevaluated
inadditionto theabove.
5.10.4 Summaw
Itcannotbeoveremphasizedthatthesystemsandcomponentsofin-serviceaircraftwerenotdesignedto be
faulttolerantofwaterintrusionduetowaterspraysystemdischarge.Thispotentialwasnotincludedinspecifi-
cationrequirements,faulttreeanalyses,ystemandcomponentdesigns;notinanydesignconsiderationr
concept.Inordertoensurethatanyretrofitof theseaircraftdoesnotcompromisesafety-of-flight,t isnew
systemwill requireextensivet stingtoelin_natethepotentialof inadvertentdischarge,andwillalsorequirea
reviewof everyconceivableanddemonstratedwaterflowpaththroughoutfileaircraft,andthesubsequent
impactonallsystemsandcomponentsintheeventof aninadvertentdischarge.It wouldrequireareviewof
notonlyrelevantmaintainability,reliability,andsafetystudiesandanalyses,butalsoaconsiderationfhowa
designmighthaveevolvedhadthedesignerknownthattherewasapossibilitythatwatermaybesprayedinto
thecabin.
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5.11 RETURNTO SERVICE
ThepossibiliW of an inadveltent water spray activation, and it's consequences, have been discussed at length
in many sections of this report. This pmviot, s discussion has addressed tile subject from the functionali W point
of view, i.e., will tile systems in the airplane continue to function and allow" continued safew-of-flight or unin-
terrupted control in the taxi, takeoff, cruise, or landing phases of flight. This section will attempt to quantify the
time and cost to return tile aircraft to service following an inadvertent discharge.
5.11.1 Assumptions
Damage to the airplane is assulned to be limited to that caused by tile water, with no collateral damage from
external sources. This means tile airplane has made a successful landing, and come to a safe stop with no loss-
of-control.
The process of refurbishing the airplane is assumed to begin immediately, thus not allowing corrosion to begin
in places where water might be trapped. The "return to service" refurbishment assumes tile aircraft is returned
to "like-new" condition, since the unintentional discharge has occurred in a new airplane. The refurbishment
process is assumed to take place at tile aircraft's maintenance base, rninimizing any logistics issues that might
require consideration if the aircraft is immobilized elsewhere. Costs to ferry an aircraft to its maintenance base
could be substantial, but these costs, as well as the revenue lost while the aircraft is out of service, are not
included in the refurl)ishment cost estimate.
Finally, all estimates of refi.n'bishment costs include only the time and materials required to repair and checkout
the ai_vmft R)llowing the water spray event, and any parts requiring l'eplacement are assumed to be immediate-
[y available. No consideration has been given to incidental costs such as legal fees, passenger related expenses
such as cleaning bills, damaged luggage, etc., or logistics costs which might be incurred after an aborted flight.
5.11.2 Discussion
The projected refurbishment of a 757 following water spray discharge was begun with a listing of equipment,
systems and fllrnishings by ATA chapter. This listing of chapters and codes was reviewed by the appropriate
Boeing functional organizations for expected damage from water, and fornmd the basis of tile Delta Air Lines
investigation. The ATA chapters and costs associated with refurbishment may be found in Appendix C.
Upon identification of the components/systems expected to be wetted, whether directly or indirectly, each item
was reviewed for tile impact water is expected to have on that item. Mthough the quanti W is not necessarily
comparable, liquid spills on airplanes are not new, and lessons learned from those events have been used for
this review. Where past experience has shown that items exposed to water may be successfully cleaned, only
labor for removal, cleaning, and re-installation are considered. A percentage of those items that are judged to
be susceptible to permanent damage is asst, med to require replacement, and material costs are added for those
items. The Delta estimates are subjective, but represent a best guess estimate, based on operational experience
and the evaluations made by the Boeing functional organizations, especially fiom an electricaVelectronic sys-
tems refurbishnlent standpoint. Those items which might impact the airlines' image requirements, or where
operational experience has demonstrated that chTing and cleaning leaves a less than adequate appearance are
assumed to be replaced, and lklll material costs quoted. Damage is considered to be "worst case", and to have
taken place on a new airplane, tht,s all reconditioning is clone with the intent of bringing the airplane back to
"like-new" condition immediately, for reasons stated in Section 5.11.1.
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In ordertoreturntheairplanebackto"like-new"conditionfollowingasprayevent,therecommendationsf
theBoeingfunctionalorganizationshavebeenfollowed.Theinteriorof theairplanewouldberemoved,in-
cludingfloorpanels,toeliminatetrappedmoistureandpreventthestartof corrosion.Insulationblankets
wouldberemoved,forthesamereason,andthedegreetowhichtheseblanketshavebeenwettedwilldictate
theirdisposition.Seriouslywettedorsaturatedblanketswillbereplaced,asDelta'soperationalexperiencehas
shownthatblanketswhichhavebeendriedoutdonotperformthesameasnewones.(Costsquotedin
AppendixCareforcompleteblanketreplacement,butthiswill beonanasrequiredbasis.)CICswouldbere-
appliedatthisstage,thisbeingthebestwaytodisplaceanyremainingmoisturefromseamsandjoints,and
ensurethatthecorrosionprocessi notallowedtobegin.
Delta'sexperiencewithcleaningcarpetsandseatcovers/cushionshasshownshrinkageandimpactonappear-
ancetobeseverenoughthattheseitemswouldrequirereplacement,andarereflectedin thecostestimates.
Somerelaxationmightbepossiblehereforanolderairplane,but,asstatedinSection5.11.1,the"incident"is
assumedto havetakenplaceinanewairplane.All passengercabincomponentsareexaminedforwater,and
cleanedasrequired.Electricalitelnsaredriedandtested,withthosethathaveshortedbeingreplaced.General
cabinilluminationandpassengerntertainmentsystemsareconsideredvulnerableto failurefromwateringress
andshortcircuiting,andincludematerialcostsforreplacingapercentageoftheexposedunits.Thesematerial
costsareincludedin theAppendixCtables.(Asanexample,the757asconfiguredforDeltaAirLineshas187
passengerreadinglights.Approximately1/3,or62,areassumedtofailduetowateringress,andmustbere-
placed.)Doorbustlemountedslidepacks,thatarewithinthedesignatedsprayarea,arealsoinspectedforthe
presenceofwater.Thisinspectionisperformedonlywhentheslidehasnotbeendeployed,andthetabulated
costsreflecthatinspectiononly.Slidesthathavebeendeployedafterwatersprayactivationwouldrequired
re-packingatacostof $1000USperslide,withatotalof8slidesonthebaseline757.ECSequipmentthathas
ingestedwateris inspectedanddriedasrequired.NomaterialcostsareexpectedforECSequipment.
Thereconditioningof theE/Ebayisbasedonrecognitionofthesafetylevelof thecomponentslocatedthere.
Equipmentlocatedin theE/Ebayissomewhatmoistureresistantduetoflightsafetyconsiderations.Allrack
mountedLRUswouldberemoved,dried,cleanedasrequired,andgivenafunctionaltest.Basedoninputfrom
theElectricalgroupinSection5.3,noLRUfailuresrequiringunitreplacementareexpected,thereforecosts
reflectthelaborforremoval,cleaning,test,andre-installationtasksonly.AsdiscussedinSection5.3.3.5,check-
outandtestin-placeisnotrecommended.Moisturethatisnoteliminatedcanset-updestructivecorrosion
processes,aswellascreateanewmalfunctionsituationwhentheaircraftassumesanattitudethatcauses
dropletstocollectatanundesiredlocation,suchasaterminalconnection.
Theexperiencesof Delta,aswellasofothercarriers,indicatethatacomprehensiveandaggressiverefurbish-
mentprogramfollowingwaterspraydischargeisrequiredtominimizelong-termimpactotheairplane,and
shortertermdegradationofcurrenthighlevelsofsafety.Thisprogramwill beexpensive,however,attemptsto
delayoreliminateanypartwill likelyresultin ashortermsavingsattheexpenseof greaterlongtermmainte-
nancecosts.
5.11.3 Summary
Basedonalaborrateof $50USperhour,theestimatedcostprojectionforreturninga757to likenewcondi-
tionfollowinginadvertentsystemactivationis$881,000US.BreakdownbysubjectandATAcodeissumma-
rizedinTable5.11-1,whiledetailedbackupdocumentation,asreferencedabove,isavailableinAppendixC.
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Table 5.11-1. Labor/Cost Summary.
Subject Labor Cost*
ATA21
ATA23 1,230
ATA25 3,874
ATA33 714
ATA35 93
ATA51 132
ATA53
E1 rack
E2 rack
E3 rack
E4 rack
E5 rack 117
E6 rack 97
Panels 250
143 mhr
mhr
mhr
rnhr
rnhr
rnhr
672 mhr
26 mhr
123 mhr
117 mhr
162 mhr
mhr
mhr
mhr
$ 7,150
142,400
508,140
133,800
4,650
7,300
33,690
1,300
6,175
5,850
8,125
5,850
4,875
12,500
Total 7,750 mhr $881,800
* Totals include material costs md labor rate
of $50 US/hr
From a maintenance perspective, the inadvertent discharge of a cabin water spray system will create a signifi-
cant cost impact. While it is most likely not possible to mitigate the costs associated with a refurbishment after
discharge, the incorporation of this type system would dictate a revised maintenance schedule philosophy. The
level of disassembly required for refurbishment is similar to that required for a scheduled "D" check, and are
similar in cost as well. If close to the regularly scheduled maintenance interval, the "D" check requirements
should be satisfied at this time as well. If the incident occurs shortly after the last check, the complete refur-
bishment will still have to be initiated, and the full cost burden to the airline will be realized.
,
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Water spray systems, in the test scenarios conducted to date, have been effective in removing heat, and sup-
pressing the generation of toxic smoke, by delaying the combustion of cabin furnishings. When examining the
disbenefits created by the adoption of these water spray systems, one must keep in mind that the test vehicles
used for the demonstrations of water spray technology are different in one very important respect from an
operational aircraft so equipped; the operational aircraft must be able to provide continued safe flight and
landing and must not be susceptible to any loss of control in the event of an inadvertent discharge, planned or
unplanned, while on the ground or in the air.
The objective of this study was to determine the disbenefits that may be created by the addition of a cabin
water spray system to a commercial jet aircraft, and what precautions would be necessary to mitigate damage
that would be incurred following both commanded and uncommanded discharge. It is difficult, as many of the
functional groups participating in the subject study have pointed out, to predict the outcome of the deploy-
ment of a system that exists only on paper and has not been fully designed nor tested in an aircraft. Water,
containing ions and impurities, has demonstrated its corrosive and damaging effects in a multitude of in-service
lavatory and galley spills. The very design and structural fabrication of an aircraft serve to trap and collect water
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where it is least desired. Structural junctions at frames and stringers, shear ties, floor beams and intercostals
all become collection points for contaminated water, and sources of corrosion, leading to weakening of the
structure.
Modem commercial aircraft operate with very sophisticated electronic systems and controls. In evaluating the
ramifications of electronic component and system failure that might result from moisture ingress, the individual
functional engineering organizations have identified and descn_ed various situations that would be created by
those failures. Moisture protection measures on existing aircraft are intended to minimize or eliminate the
chance of failure in operational environtr_nts that include 100% humidity and visible moisture (condensation),
but are not designed to prevent against the amounts of moisture that would be expected from a water spray
discharge. Substantial protective measures that do not currently exist (waterproofing all electrical components
and connectors, additional drip shields, increased drip pan capacities, enhanced cleanliness standards, etc.)
would need to be incorporated to deal with this new type of water threat. Extensive testing of entire systems,
possibly in a complete airplane, might be necessary and recommended to verify that the added protective
measures will perform as designed. Reliability requirements for key safety-related components dictate a failure
rate of less than 1 x 10-9 and many of the failures postulated following the discharge of water spray could
jeopardize that reliability, with potentially disasterous results.
But even the protective measures discussed in this report treat the problem of moisture ingress on a localized
component level, whereas the water spray hazard must be addressed on a much larger systems scale. The
Product Safety portion of this report (Section 5.9) discusses the potential for common cause failure, i.e., the
failure of redundant systems designed to provide an additional margin of safety in the event of component or
system failure. Very simply, the incorporation of cabin water spray introduces, in an aircrafts present configura-
tion, a common cause failure source. The remedy for this is straightforward, but cosdy: components and
systems in present day aircraft will need to be redesigned and relocated to eliminate water as a common cause
failure source.
This study had the luxury of considering only new aircraft and was performed by the aircraft manufacturer
who sees his products leave the production line as "factory fresh". While aircraft leave the factory in the as-
designed configuration, the realities of day-to-day service often result in changes or modifications to the origi-
nal design, or design intent. The Structures section (Section 5.6) of this report documented and discussed the
dust and dirt accumulations present after a period of service. These accumulations will tend to entrap moisture
and allow corrosion to begin at structural junctions which were designed to drain any liquid to the lower lobe
and out of the aircraft. The Electrical section (Section 5.3) discusses dust contamination of printed circuit card
connectors, and mineral content present in sprayed water, that may well overcome the safety measures normal-
ly designed to protect against high humidity, leading to electrical shorts and component loss.
This does not imply that aircraft are made less safe by their operators, or become less safe after being
in-service, however, the realities are that drain holes clog, drip shields are tom or discarded, wire insulation
gets abraided, etc. These concerns, and others that will surely present themselves, will require careful consider-
ation before any system that sprays water into an aircraft that experiences diverse operating environments can
be made safe.
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Summarizing,ourconclusionsforthisstudy are as follows:
* CWS is a safety system that can negatively affect other key safety of flight systems, by creating a
common cause failure source:
• Flight and evacuation critical systems will require detail rev/ew and potential major redesign to
mitigate water damage;
• CWS may increase evacuation time;
• Evacuation into and prolonged exposure to a cold climate following discharge may be hazardous;
• All aircraft systems susceptt_ole to water damage require detail review to minimize damage and
return to service costs;
• The cost of returning an aircraft to revenue service following discharge is high;
• Passenger reactions to activation of water spray are unknown.
The remarkable safety record enjoyed by commercial jet transportation is a result of high standards of safety
established by the regulatory bodies, the manufacturers, and the operators over the last 30 years. The incorpo-
ration of cabin water spray systems, though not without potential benefits, has the potential to compromise a
hard-earned, and continuously improving, commercial aviation safety record. Any regulation requiring cabin
water spray systems must be approached cautiously, with open minds to both the potential benefits and, per-
halos, the more obscure dangers.
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Appendix B
Standby Battery
Power Systems
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Boeing 737 Standby Power
With a loss of all generators, the battery is the only
source of electrical power. The following list
identifies the busses and significant equipment that
can be powered from the battery.
BATTERY BUS
Land gear lever latch/pressurization warning
A/C pack valves
A/C overheat
Ram air modulation control
AFDS MCP course 2 - DC
Passenger address amplifier
CSD control
Inverter control
Transfer bus indication
Battery bus volts indication
Captain's & F/O's interphone
APU & engine fire detection
Master warning & control
Standby rudder SOV
Fuel crossfeed valve
Engine hydraulic SOV
Clock display
Aural warning
Flight recorder
Anti-skid failure/parking brake
Anti-skid (outboard)
Landing gear - air/ground relay
Standby flood & compass light
Cockpit dome lights
Master dim, dimming & test
Master caution, (A/C, Fuel, Anti-ice)
Lavatory dome light
Position light (BATT)
Standby horizon
Manual oxy control, oxy indication
Passenger oxygen
APU control
APU fuel boost pump
Engine master caution
Engine 1 & wing anti-ice control
N1 tach indication, eng. 1,2
EGT indication, eng. 1,2
Thrust reverser control, eng. 1,2
Start valves, eng. 1,2
Static inverter
Fwd airstair cont. - standby
HOT BATTERY BUS
Battery overheat
Standby power manual control
Battery bus control
Hot battery bus indication
Standby power indication
External power control
Fire extinguishing bottles
Fuel SOV eng. 1,2
Clock (timer)
Entry lights - dim
Aux. tank fueling valve
SWIT(_HED HQT BATTERY BUS
AFC A & B warning light
APU & engine generator control
Fuel SOV indication
IRS No. 1,2
Digital analog adapter, No. 1
115V-AC STANDBY BUS
Inverter voltage indication
Standby bus indication
Fuel quantity
Pilots standby lights
Instrument transformer 1
Captain's ADI
Digital analog adapter, No. 2
IRS No. 1
Digital analog adapter/FMC-1
Engine 1,2, right ignition
28V-DC STANDBY BUS
DC manual pressurization control
VHF comm. No. 1
DC standby bus indication
Instrument transformer
VOR/ILS (captain)
ADF No. 1
Stby altimeter/airspeed vibrator
pR_CIiDING PAGE
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Boeing 74 7-400 Standby Power
The following list identifies the busses and selected
equipment receiving power from the respective
bus. (This equipment can be powered by the
battery)
APU BATTERY BUS
Auxiliary GCU 2
APU battery overheat protection
APU DC fuel pump
APU fire/bleed duct overheat loops A and B
BCU 2
Cabin interphone
EEC 1-4 fire/overheat detection loops A and B
Engine 1-4 speed sensors 1 and 2
Engine start air control
First officer's interphone
Left VHF
Left radio communication panel
Nacelle anti-ice 1-4
Observer's interphone
Passenger address systems 1-4
Primary landing gear display and control
Service interphone
APU HOT BATTERY BUS
APU duct overheat
APU fire warning horn
APU inlet door
APU primary control
BCU 1
IRS left, center and right DC
Left and right outflow valves
APU STANDBY BUS
(captain's transfer bus unpowered)
Left FMC
Left PFD
Left ND
MAIN BATTERY BUS
Auxiliary GCU 1
APU alternate control
Autoflight warning
BCU 1
E/E cooling smoke override
Engine 1-4 fuel control valves
Engine 104 fuel crossfeed valve
Flight deck dome lights
Flight deck storm lights
Flight deck - captain's indicator lights
Generator drive disconnect 1-4
Hydraulics EDP supply 1-4
Left ILS antenna switch
Left and right manual cabin pressurization\
Left aural warning
Left stabilizer trim/rudder ratio module (DC power)
Left stick shaker
Oxygen reset
Oxygen valve and indication
Parking brake
Primary trailing edge flap control DC
Standby altimeter vibrator
Standby attitude indicator
Upper yaw damper
Appendix B-2
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Boeing 74 7-400 Standby Power (Continued)
MAIN HOT BATTERY BUS
ACARS DC
APU fire extinguisher
APU fuel shutoff valve
BCU 2
Emergency evacuation
Engine 1-4 fire extinguishers A and B
Engine 1-4 fuel shutoff valve
Fire switch unlock
Galley/utility ELCU control bus 1-4
GCUs 1-4
IRS on battery
Lower cargo fire extinguisher
Main battery overheat protection
MAIN STANDBY BUS
Avionics and warning system status assembly
Flight control 1L and 2L AC
Left ADC
Left EFIS control
Left EIU
Left FMS-CDU
Left ILS
Left VOR
Primary trailing edge flap control AC
Standby ignition 1 and 2
Standby ignition engine 3 and 4
Standby instrument lights
Upper EICAS
CAPTAIN'S TRANSFER BUS
Avionics and warning systems status assembly
Center EIU
Left FMC
Left HF
Left ND
Left PFD
FIRST OFFICER'S TRANSFER BUS
Lower EICAS
FMCS autothrottle servo
Right ADC
Right EFIS control
Right EIU
Right FMC
Right FMS-CDU
Right HF
Right ND
Right PFD
Appendix B-3
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Boeing 757 Standby Power
The main AC buses provide power for the EICAS
system. If a single AC bus fails, EICAS automati-
cally displays a listing of bus equipment that is
inoperative. When both main AC buses fail, the
battery is the only source of electrical power. The
following list identifies the buses and significant
equipment that can be powered from the battery.
HOT BATTERY BUS
Fire extinguisher bottles
Spar fuel valves
APU fuel valve
Clock time references
IRS emergency power (L & C continuous,
R for 5 minutes)
RAT manual deployment
Landing gear alternate extension
Fueling system
Parking brake valve
BATTERY BUS
Passenger address system
Interphone systems
Engine, APU and cargo fire detection systems
Fuel crossfeed valve
Generator controls
DC fuel pump
Engine driven hydraulic pump shutoff valves
Hydraulic PTU control
Fuel quantity system
Alternate equipment cooling
RAT automatic deployment system
Anti-skid for inboard wheels
Landing gear air/ground system
Forward cockpit dome lighting
Passenger oxygen deployment system
Standby engine indicating
Engine start controls
Engine fuel control valves
Engine anti-ice
Right pack valve
Right engine T/R control
Wing anti-ice
STANDBY DC BUS
Left aural warnign system
Manual cabin altitude pressure control
Left yaw damper*
Left VHF comm. system
Standby attitude indicator
Stab trim shutoff valves
Left stick shaker
Rudder trim
Captain's clock indications
Left pack valve
Left engine T/R control
Bleed air isolation valve*
STANDBY AO BUS
Cabin altitude/differential pressure indications
Left yaw damper*
Three spoiler pairs
Left navigation system (VOR, Air Data Computer
& RDMI)
Right ADF
Left ADF**
Center ILS system
Standby instrument panel lights
Engine ignition system
Wheelwell fire detection
Main panel flood lights
Bleed air isolation valve*
* Requires both ac and dc power to operate
** As installed
Appendix B-4
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Boeing 767Standby Power
The main AC buses provide power for the EICAS
system. If a single AC bus fails, EICAS automati-
cally displays a listing of bus equipment that is
inoperative. When both main AC buses fail and the
Hydraulic Driven Generator fails, the battery is the
only source of electrical power. The following list
identifies the buses and significant equipment that
can be powered from the battery.
HOT BATTERY BUS
Fire extinguisher bottles
Spar fuel valves
APU fuel valve
Clock time references
IRS emergency power (L & C continuous,
R for 5 minutes)
RAT manual deployment
Fueling system
Parking brake valve
BATTERY BUS
Landing gear alternate extension
Passenger address system
Interphone systems
Engine, APU and cargo fire detection systems
Fuel crossfeed valve
Generator controls
DC fuel pump
Engine driven hydraulic pump shutoff valves
Air driven hydraulic pump control
RAT automatic deployment system
Equipment cooling override system
Anti-skid for inboard wheels
Landing gear air/ground system
Fuel quantity system
Passenger oxygen deployment system
Standby engine indication
Engine start controls
Engine fuel control valves
Right engine R-R control
Right pack valve
Wing anti-ice
Right engine anti-ice
Alternate stabilizer trim
STANDBY DC BUS
Engine fuel heat control
Manual cabin altitude pressure control
Aisle stand flood light
Left yaw damper*
Three spoiler pairs*
Left VHF comm. system
Left stick shaker
Standby attitude indicator
Stab trim shutoff valves
Left aural warning speaker
Left engine T/R control
Left pack valve
Left engine anti-ice
Captains clock indications
Rudder trim
STANDBY AC BUS
Engine ignition system
Cabin altitude/differential pressure indications
Left yaw damper*
Three spoiler pairs*
Main panel flood lights
Left navigation system (VOR, Air Data Computer
& RDMI)
Right ADF
Center ILS system
Wheelwell fire detection
Duct leak detection
Equipment cooling standby mode
Standby instrument panel lights
* Requires both ac and dc power to operate
Appendix B-5
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Return to Service
Cost Breakdowns
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Chapter 21 -Air-Conditioning
ATA
Code Subject
Forward cargo heat
21-44 Aft cargo heat
21-45 Supplement heat
21-51 Air-conditioning pack
21-52 Pack temperature
21-53 Ram air
21-58 Equipment cooling
21-61 Temperature control
Time
(mhr)
Labor
Cost(s)
Material
Cost(s)
Total
Cost(s)
21-00 Air-conditioning - general
21-20 Distribution 5 250 -- 250
21-21 Main manifold 5 250 -- 250
21-22 Flight deck
21-23 Passenger cabin 8 400 -- 400
21-24 Individual air distribution 93 4,650 -- 4,650
21-25 Cabin air recirculation 8 400 -- 400
21-26 Ventilation 10 500 -- 500
21-31 Press control
21-32 Press relief valve
21-33 Press indication/warning
21-43
14 700 -- 700
21-64 Valve position
21-65 Cabin temperature
Appendix C-1
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Chapter 23 - Communications
ATA Time Labor Material Total
Code Subject (mhr) Cost(s) Cost(s) Cost(s)
23-00 Communication - general 20 1,000 -- 1,000
23-10 Speech
23-12
23-21
23-22
23-31
23-32
23-41
23-42
23-43
23-51
23-61
23-71
23-91
Very high frequency (VHF)
system*
Selective calling (SELCAL)*
ARINC communications
addressing and reporting system
(ACARS)*
Passenger address (PA) system 10 500 -- 500
Passenger entertainment 1180 59,000 80,900 139,900
Service interphone
Cabin interphone 5 250 -- 250
Ground crew call
Flight interphone 5 250 250
Static discharge
Voice recorder 6 300 -- 300
Airfone system 4 200 -- 200
See main equipment center information
Appendix C-2
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Chapter 24 - Electrical Power
ATA
Code
24-00
24-10
24-21
Subject
Electrical power
Generator drive
Alternating current (ac)
24-22 AC control
24-23 Fault sensing
24-27 AC annunication
24-28 AC meters
24-31 Batteries*
24-32 Transformer*
24-33 Standby power*
24-34 Direct current (dc) meters
24-41 External power*
24-51 115V-ac distriubtion*
24-53 28V-ac distribution*
24-54 28V-dc distribution*
See main equipment center information
Time
(mhr)
Labor
Cost(s)
Material
Cost(s)
Total
Cost(s)
Appendix C-3
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Chapter 25 -- Equipment/Furnishings
ATA Time Labor Material Total
Code Subject (mhr) Cost(s) Cost(s) Cost(s)
25-21-01 Sidewall panel 224 11,200 -- 11,200
-02
25-21-04 Kickstrip (Sw) 118 5,900 1,400 7,300
25-21-05 Insulation (Sw) 153 7,650 115,400 123,050
25-21-53 Literature pocket
25-22-02 Ceiling 248 12,400 -- 12,400
25-22-03 Insulation (ceiling) 459 22,950 20,750 43,700
25-23-01 Passenger service unit (PSU) 196 9,800 -- 9,800
25-24 Divider/closet 81 4,050 -- 4,050
25-25 Seat assembly 1382
25-27 Floor covering 72
69,100 36,320 105,420
3,600 4,470 8,070
25-28 Overhead bins 236 11,800 -- 11,800
25-29 Cabin power
25-31 Galley 172 8,600 -- 8,600
25-41 Lavatory 156 7,800 -- 7,800
25-50 Insulation (CG) 306 15,300 136,100 151,400
25-51 Electrical-cargo compartment
25-60 Emergency equipment
25-61 Rope-safety
25-62 Life vest 47 2,350 2,350
25-63 Miscellaneous emergency
25-64 Axe
25-65 Escape slide 12 600 -- 600
25-66 Escape slide 12 600 -- 600
25-70 Electrical equipment center*
Electrical equipment center*25-71
* See main equipment center information
Appendix C-4
9o
ATA
Code
33-10
33-11
33-13
33-14
33-16
33-20
33-21
33-22
33-23
33-24
33-25
33-26
33-27
33-31
33-37
33-41
33-42
33-43
33-44
33-51-01
33-51-03
33-51 -O5
33-51 -O6
33-51-07
33-51-08
33-51-09
Chapter 33 - Lights
Time
Subject (mhr)
Flight compartment lights
Flight compartment illumination
Integral panel
Flight compartment
miscellaneous
Master dim/test
Cabin lights
Cabin illumination
Passenger loading
Passenger reading
Passenger signs
Passenger/lavatory call
Lavatory lights
Galley lights
Service lights
Cargo lights
Wing lights
Landing/taxi lights
Position lights
Anti-collision
Exit signs
Floor path lights
Aisle lights
Slide lights
Battery pack
Control panel emergency
Flight deck emergecny
248
62
15
15
5
Labor
Cost(s)
12,400
300
3,100
750
75O
250
150
Material
Cost(s)
74,400
1,800
12,400
1,500
900
Total
Cost(s)
86,800
2,100
15,500
75O
75O
1,750
1,050
2,1006 300 1,800
278 13,900 4,700 18,600
62 3,100 -- 3,100
6 300 600 900
2 100 -- 100
6 300 -- 300
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Chapter 35 - Oxygen
ATA Time Labor Material Total
Code Subject (mhr) Cost(s) Cost(s) Cost(s)
35-11 Crew oxygen
35-21 Passenger oxygen (electric door
unlatch) 93 4,650 -- 4,650
35-31 Portable oxygen
Chapter 51 - Structures
ATA Time Labor Material Total
Code Subject (mhr) Cost(s) Cost(s) Cost(s)
51-21 Structure finishes 48 2,400 -- 2,400
51-24 Corrosion protection 36 1,800 700 2,500
51-31 Seals 32 1,600 -- 1,600
51-41 Airframe drain 16 800 -- 800
51-51 Rub pads
51-61 Lighting protection
Chapter 53 - Fuselage
ATA Time Labor Material Total
Code Subject (mhr) Cost(s) Cost(s) Cost(s)
53-01 Cabin floor 426 21,300 90 21,390
53-12 Nose radome
53-36 Forward fairing
53-66 Aft fairing
53-86 Stab fairing
53-87 Cargo compartment
53-88 Cargo panels 246 12,300 -- 12,300
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Main Equipment Center - E1 Rack
M192, Window HEAT-R
T102, TRU-R
T101, TRU-L
M191, Window HEAT-L
6.Smhrx4units = 26mhr
26 mhrx$50/mhr = $1,300
Main Equipment Center - E2 Rack
MOO139
M00156,
MOO148,
MOO134,
M00100,
M00101
M00150,
M00135
M00158
M00141
MOO157
M00917
M00147
M00140
M00149
M00183
M00161
MOO160,
M00159,
6.5 mhr x 19 units =
123.5 mhr x $50/mhr =
FCC-L
ILS-L
EFIS SYM-GEN-L
FMC-L
ADC-L
ADC-R
EFIS SYM-GEN-R
FMC-R
ILS-R
FCC-R
ILS-C
ILS-PROC-UNIT
FCC-C
EFIS SYM-GEN-C
TMC
IRU-R
IRU-C
IRU-L
123,5 mhr
$6,175
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Main Equipment Center -E3 Rack
K574, Trim Limit SEL-L
M536, Power Supply
M530, Spoiler Control
M528, Rudder Ratio
M531, Spoiler Control
M524, Stab trim aileron-L
M522, Left yaw damper
M532, Spoiler control
M537, Power supply
M168, MCDP
M124, DME-R
M10142, ATC Trans-R
M10141, ATC Trans-L
M123, DME-L
M9124, TCAS
M138, DFDAU
M162, Prox SW Elex Unit
M121, Fuel quantity
6.5 mhr x 18 units = 117 mhr
117 mhr x $50/mhr = $5,850
Main Equipment Center -E4 Rack
M00539
M00535
M00523
M00575
M00534
M00529
M00533
M00538
M10182,
P69,
M10181,
M00132,
M00916,
MOO188,
M00180,
MOO189,
M00108,
MOO177,
Power supply
Spoiler control
Yaw damper-R
Relay trim-R
Spoiler Control
Rudder ratio-R
Spoiler control
Power supply
EICAS-R
EICAS replay pnl
EICAS-L
Engine V/B
Pack flow proc
VHF-L
SELCAL decoder
VHF-R
Audio ACC unit
PA amp
ACARS OAT
VHF-C
VHF-COM XCUR-L
M9117, Main mux
M9116, Audio tape reproducer
6.5 mhr x 25 units = 162.5 mhr
162.5 mhr x $50/mhr = $8,125
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Main Equipment Center -E5 Rack
M00143, GCU APU
M00202, XMTR RAD ALTM REC-L
M10331, Flap/Slat ELEX Unit 1
M00144, GCU-L
M00118, Cabin Press Control Auto 1
M01552, PDIU-L
M10610, ECC MON-L
M00203, XMTR RAD ALTM REC-R
M10611, ECC MON-R
M10553, PDIU-R
M00119, Cabin Press Control Auto 2
M10333, Flap/Slat ELEX Unit 3
M00146, GRU-R
M00102, Anti-Skid Autobrake
M00204, XMTR RAD ALTM REC-C
M10332, Flap/Slat ELEX Unit 2
M00116, BPCU
M00115, Brk Temp Mon
6.5 mhr x 18 units = 117 mhr
117 mhr x $50/mhr = $5,850
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Main Equipment Center - E6 Rack
MOO187,
M00186,
M00215,
M216,
M00207,
MOO127,
M00122,
M00115,
M00102
M00206
M00195,
M00126,
M10389
M10251
M00208
6.5 mhr x
97.5 mhr x $50/mhr
VOR MB-R
VOR MB-L
ADF-L
ADF-R
APU Batt Chgr
Pack Temp-R
Hyd Qty
Brake Temp
Anti-Skid
APU Control
Zont Cont
Pack Temp-L
Stby Pack Temp
Shunt
APU Batt
15 units = 97.5 mhr
$4,875
Main Equipment Center -Panels
P31, P32, P33, P34, P36, P37, P50, P51, P54, P70
25 mhr/panel includes repair and checkout
25 mhr x 10 panels = 250 mhr
250 mhr x $50/mhr = $12,500
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A/C DISTRIBUTION
ATA 21-20
ATA 21-21
ATA 21-24
ATA 21-2_
ATA 21-26
ATA 21-58
Labor 5mhr
Labor Cost (5 x $50)
Labor 5mhr
Labor Cost (5 x $50)
Labor (6+2) 8 mhr
Labor Cost (8 x $50)
INDIV AIR DISTR
Labor (0.5 mhr x 187) 93 mhr
- Labor Cost (93 x $50)
CABIN AIR RECIR
Labor !_mhr
Labor Cost (8 x $50)
Labor lOmhr
Labor Cost (i0 x $50)
K_/12_2,QO/d/_
Labor (2 x 7 mhr) 14 mhr
Labor Cost (14 x $50)
S2SO
S400
S4650
S400
SSO0
STO0
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COMMUNICATION GENERAL
ATA 23-0Q
ATA 23-31
ATA 23-32
- Labor (2 x i0 mhr) 20 mhr
- Labor Cost (20 x $50)
PASYSrEM
Labor (2 x 5 units) I0 mhr
Labor Cost (i0 x $50)
PASS ENTERTAIN SYS
- Labor (0.50 x 2360) 1180 mhr
50% of
EO 6-57746-3 - Labor Cost (1180 x $50)
ATA 23-42
ATA 23-71
ATA 23-91
m
- Material Cost (0.50 x 161,800) -
CABIN INTERPHO_E
Labor (i x 5 units) 5 mhr
Labor Cost (5 x $50)
- Labor (i x 5 units) 5 mhr
- Labor Cost (5 x $50)
Labor 6mhr
Labor Cost (6 x $50)
- Labor 4mhr
- Labor Cost (4 x $50)
AIRFONE $y$
slooo
s5oo
$59.000
S80.900
$250
S300
S200
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ATA 25-21-Q)_ SIDEWALLS (CABIN)
Panel Cost
(Remove & Install)
(Repair)
Labor (6x8) + (6x8+4x16)
48 mhr + 112 mhr - 160 mhr
Labor Cost (160x$50)
Labor (4x16) - 64 nLhr
Labor Cost (64x$50)
ss.0o0
s3.2o0
ATA 25-21-04
(Remove & Install)
(Repair)
SIDEWALL KICKST_I P
Panel Cost
Carpet Cost 31x $45 - $1.400
labor (Panel)(2xS)+(2xS+6)
(Carpet) (2x4)+(4xS)
Labor Cost (78x$50)
Labor (4x10)
Labor Cost (40x$50) - S2.000
- 38 mhr
- 40 mhr
78mhr
- S3.900
- 40 mhr
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(411N4107-7)
( -9)
(411N4101-87)
(Remove & Install)
(Repair)
INSULATION (SIDEWALL_
Insulation Blanket Cost
166 x $215 - $35,700
332 x $240 - $79,700
Labor (8 x 8) + (8 x 8 + 25)
64 + 89 = 153 mhr
Labor Cost (153x$50) S
Labor (Not Applicable)
$115.400
7.650
(411N4101-7)
(411N4101-9)
$215/EA
$215/EA PER PURCHASING DEPT.
(Remove & Install)
(Repair)
CEILING PANELS
Panel Cost
Labor (8x8+4) + (8x8+4+16)
69 mhr + 84 mhr 152 mhr
Labor Cost (152x$50) - $ 7.600
Labor (6x16) - 96 mhr
Labor Cost (96x$50) = $ 4,800
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(411N4301-2/-3)
(411N4421-2/-6)
(Remove & Install)
(Repair)
411N4301-2
411NA301-B
411N4421-2
411N4421-6
_NSUI_TION (CEILING)
Insulation Blanket Cost
83 x (240+230+260+270)
( 4 )
Labor (Sx8x3)+(SxSx3+75)
192 + 267 -
Labor Cost (459x$50)
Labor (Not Applicable)
459 mhr
$240
$230
$260
$270
PER PURCHASING DEPT.
$22.950
(Remove & Install)
(Repair)
ATA 25-24
(Remove & Install)
(Clean/Dry)
?ASSENGER SERVICE UNITS
PSU Component Cost
- Labor 4x8 + 4x8+8
32 + 40
- Labor Cost (72x$50)
- Labor (2x62 units)
- Labor Cost (124 x $50)
- 72 mhr
m
- 124 mhr
Labor (4x4) + (4x4+3) +
(2x2) + (2x2+2)ffi f_
Labor Cost (61 x $50) =
Labor (4x4) + (2x2) - 20 mhr
Labor Cost (20 x $50)
S 3.600
S3.050
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ATA 25-25
(16 x 95.21 +
171 x 82.26)
(Remove & Install)
(Remove & Install)
(19134001, 19133005
(20183002, 20132001) -
(Remove & Install)
(Remove, Install
(Repair/Checkout)
ATA 25-27
(Mat'l & Labor)
(Remove & Install)
Seat Cover (Replacement)
P/N 829948, 829949, 817755, 829625
Cover Cost
Labor (8 + 16)
Labor Cost (24x$50)
Seats - Labor
25 + 24
Labor Cost (49x$50)
= 24mhr
- 49mhr
$15.590
s l._OO
$ 2. 450
Seat Cushions
Material 16 (41.30 + 55.55)
+ 171 (63 + 49.17)
1549.6 + 19,181
Labor 187 (0.5mhr + 0.5 mhr)
- 187 mhr
Labor Cost (187x$50)
$20.730
Passenger Service System
Labor 187 x 2 mhr - 374 mhr
Labor Cost (374x$50) $18.700
Mech. Seat Operation
In-seat Passenger Service System Components Repair
Functional Test of Passenger Service System
Labor 187 x 4 mhr - 748 mhr
Labor Cost (748 x $50) - $37,400
FLOOR COVERINGS
- Carpet (Replacement)
P/N 25-1994-XXXX
Panel Cost $ 4.470
Labor (24 + 48 mhr) =
Labor Cost (72x$50) = s 3.600
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ATA 25-28 OVERHEAD STORAGE UNIT
Bin (Door/Housing) Cost
(Remove & Install)
(Repair)
Labor (4x16)+(4x16+12)
64 + 76
Labor Cost (140x$50)
Labor (6x16)
Labor Cost (96x$50)
140 mhr
96mhr
$ 7.000
S _.800
ATA 25-31
(Remove & Install)
(Repair)
Labor (FWD) (4x2x3)+(4x2x3+8)
24 + 32
- 56 mhr
Labor (REAR)(3xI2)+(3xI2+20)
36 + 56
- 92 mhr
_48 mhr
Labor Cost (148x$50)
Labor (4x6) - 24 mhr
Labor Cost (24 x $50)
$ 7.400
$ I. 200
ATA 25-41
(Remove & Install)
(Repair)
Labor (FWD & MID)
(2x6x2)+(24+8)
24 + 32
- 56 mhr
Labor (REAR)
(2x8x2)+(2xSx2+12)
32 + 44
- 76 mhr
132 mhr
Labor Cost (132x$50)
Labor (4x6) 24mhr
Labor Cost (24 x $50)
$ 6.600
$ 1.200
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ATA25-$0
(411N4851-82/85/437)
(Remove& Install)
ATA 25-62
ATA 25-65
ATA 25-66
ATA 33-21
(Remove & Install)
ATA 33-22
(Remove & Install)
INSULATION (CC)
Insulation Blanket Cost
498 x (260+260 300)
3
Labor (8x16) + (8x16+50)
128 + 178 = 306 mhr
Labor Cost (306 x $50)
LIFE VEST
Labor (0.25 mhr x 187) - 47 mhr
Labor Cost (47 x $50)
KIGA£__ZJJ_
- Labor (4 mhr x 3)
Labor Cost (12 x $50)
- 12mhr
ESCAPE SLIDE
Labor (4 mhr x 3)
Labor Cost (12 x $50)
- 12mhr
CABIN ILLUM
Labor
I mhr x (47x4+15x4) - 248 mhr
Labor Cost (248 x $50)
Material Cost (248 units x $300)
- Labor (I mhr x 6) - 6 mhr
Labor Cost (6 x $50)
- Material Cost (6 x $300)
- $136.100
= $ 15.300
= $ 2.350
- $ 600
= $ _00
$ 12.400
$ 74.400
- $ 300
- $ 1.800
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ATA 33-23
(Remove & Install)
ATA 33-24
(Inspect)
ATA 33-25
(Inspect)
ATA 33-26
(Remove & Install)
ATA 33-27
(Remove & Install)
ATA 33-5_-0_
(Remove & Install)
PASS READING
Labor (i mhr x 187/3) - 62 mhr
Labor Cost (62 x $50)
Material Cost (62 x $200)
PASS SIGNS
Labor (0.25 mhr x 62) - 15 mhr
- Labor Cost (15 x $50)
_k%SAU_i_GAU_
- Labor (0.25 mhr x 62) = 15 mhr
- Labor Cost (15 x $50)
- Labor (I mhr x 5) - 5mhr
- Labor Cost (5 x $50)
- Material Cost (5 x $300)
g&U._glJ&_l_
- Labor (i mhr x 3) m 3 mhr
- Labor Cost (3 x $50)
Material Cost (3 x $300)
EXIT SIGNS
Labor (i mhr x 6) - 6 mhr
Labor Cost (6 x $50)
Material Cost (6 x $300)
s12.400
S 750
750
- S 25O
- S 1.500
- S 150
= S 900
- $ _00
S 1.800
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ATA 33-51-03
(EO 6-53336-3)
ATA 33-51-05
(Inspect)
ATA 33-51-06
(Remove & Install)
ATA 33-_I-07
(Inspect)
ATA 33-51-08
(Inspect)
ATA 35-21
(Inspect)
FLOOR PATH LIGHTS
Labor
Labor Cost (278 x $50)
Material Cost
278 mhr
_L%LK-LI_LT_
Labor (I mhr x 187/3) = 62 mhr
Labor Cost (62 x $50)
SLIDE LIGHTS
- Labor (i mhr x 6) - 6 mhr
Labor Cost (6 mhr x $50)
Material Cost (6 x $500)
BATTERY PACK
Labor
Labor Cost (2 x $50)
-2mhr
CONTROL PANEL EMRG
Labor
Labor Cost (6 x $50)
-6mhr
PASS OXYGEN DOOR
Labor (0.5 mhr x $187) - 93 mhr
Labor Cost (93 x $50)
- $13,900
= $ 4,700
= S 3. 100
= $ 300
= S 600
- $ ioo
- $ 300
- s4_65o
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(Inspect/Water Removal)
ATA 51-24
(Application)
ATA 51-31
(Inspect)
ATA 51-41
(Inspect)
_TRUCTURE FINISHES
- Labor (6x8)
Labor Cost (48 x $50)
- 48_hr
- S 2.400
CORROSION PROTECTION
Labor (6x6) - 36 mhr
Labor Cost (36 x $50)
Material Cost (2x35x10)
- S 1.800
= S 700
SEALS
Labor (4x8)
Labor Cost (32 x $50)
- 32mhr
- S 1.600
A/C DRAINS
Labor (2x8)
Labor Cost (16 x $50) 80O
aTA _3-01
(Remove & Install)
FLOOR PANELS (CABIN)
Panel Cost
Sealer Cost 18x $5 - $ 9Q
Wingbox Rest
Labor (4x2) + (12x16) + (4x2+2) + (12x16+24)
8 + 192 + 10 + 216
- 426 mhr
Labor Cost (426x$50) = $21.300
ATA 53-88
(Remove & Install)
SIDEWALL/FLOOR PANELS (CARGO)
Panel (Floor) Cost
Panel (Side) Cost
Labor - Floor (4x12) + (4x12+I0)
= 106 mhr
Sidewall (4x16) + (4x16+12)
140 mhr
TOTAL 246 mhr
Labor Cost (246x$50) $12.300
MA_N _OUIPHENT CENTER
El, E2. E3. E4, E5. E6 RACKS
(Remove/Install)
(Unit Checkout)
(Sys Checkout)
(Repair)
Labor = 0.5 mhr
Labor = 3 mhr
Labor = i mhr
Labor = 2 mhr
TOTAL - 6.5 mhr
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Subject: Configuration Definition of 757-200 Model 761-650
Configuration Description
The Model 761-650 is a modified four door 757-200 (Standard
Option 1.33a) passenger airplane configured to provide a passenger
cabin water spray system (see reference (b)). The nozzle and
connecting feedline configuration will be a customer variable
installation. The nozzle arrangement used in this study is for a
British Airways interior arrangement LOPS-5724-1656 D (see Figure
6).
The major characteristics of the Model 761-650 (see Figure 1)
include:
• Two non-metallic water reservoir tanks (similar to existing
potable water tanks) of approximately 40 gallons each, in body
section 43 and 46, respectively.
• Water tank maintenance panel adjacent each water tank (see
Figure 4 and 5).
• 3000 psi nitrogen bottle with squib activated pnuematic valve,
adjacent each water tank.
• Water distribution tubing (see figures 2 and 3).
• Four external fire hose connections through the fuselage lower
lobe, two forward and two aft of the wing box.
_:_'_I_._DI_I'>IN_PAGE BLANK" NOT FI_.D_
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• System activation and arming switches at attendant stations
adjacent no. 1L and no. 4L passenger doors.
Structural and system definition are presented as changes to the
reference (a) Basic Airplane:
Paylgad_/Mechanical Svsteras
• Add non-metallic water reservoir tank of 43 gallon capacity,
station 560 to 620, LH outboard of sidewall liner (see figure
11). Add non-metallic reservoir tank of 40 gallon capacity,
station 1650 to 1700 adjacent potable water tank (see figure
10). Tanks are pressurized to 35 psig through nitrogen gas
charging port. In addition, tanks are to have fill, overflow,
discharge, and drain ports.
• Revise cargo sidewall liner to accomodate station 560 reservoir
tank by extending LH doghouse liner aft to approximately
station 635.
• Add 3000 psig nitrogen bottle adjacent each water reservoir
tank.
• Add maintenance panel adjacent each water reservoir tank.
Each panel is to have fill/overflow valve control, drain valve
control, water tank level indicator, fill port, and
drain/overflow port.
• Add four-way valve to fill/overflow lines for each water tank.
Add drain valve to drain lines of each water tank (1" nora.).
• Add 15 psi diaphragm valve, electrically actuated shut off
valve (fail open), and back flow valve for discharge lines of
each water tank (1" nora.).
• Add squib activated pnuematic pressure regulating valve and
pressure relief valve to nitrogen bottle discharge at each water
tank. Add pressure tubing from nitrogen .tanks to each water
tank nitrogen port.
• Add external fire hose connection panels at STA 1670, RBL
and LBL 48 and station 510, RBL and LBL 48. (Four
Appendix 12-2
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connections total, 1-1/2" nominal.)
coupling with check valve is used.
Page 3
Quick disconnect type
• Add 1-1/2" nominal aluminum tube feed lines, tying external
hose connections to fore and aft header lines (see figure 8).
Add I-1/2" nominal aluminum tube hoop lines tying fore and
aft header lines together, stations 510 and 1630. Add
frangible couplings, four places, to each hoop line.
• Add 3/4" nominal aluminum tube fore and aft crown header
lines, three places, station 297 to 1670. Add 1-1/2" aluminum
tube fore and aft header line, stations 510 to 830 and 1190 to
1670, 1" nominal, stations 830 to 1190, LH side below main
deck. Add manifolds (having integral frangible check valve
couplings--see figure 12) to header lines, on 10 foot centers.
Add connecting hoses from manifolds to each nozzle. (See
figures 2 and 3.)
• Add 1" nominal aluminum tube intermediate hoop lines, tying
fore and aft header lines together, stations 830 and 1190. Add
frangible check valve couplings, three places, to each hoop
line. (See figure 7.)
• Add fill, overflow, and drain hoses, connecting each water tank
to respective maintenance panels.
• Water spray nozzles are added to the bull nose of stowage bins
and overhead panels, per figures 6 and 9.
Structures
Body Section 43
• Support structure for forward tank is added to floor beams at
station 580 and 620. New structure is to include four vertical
links, drag links, corresponding machined fittings, floor beam
intercostals, and web reinforcement.
• Support structure for nitrogen bottle is added to frames at
station 600 and 620.
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• Cutout in lower lobe skin station 580 to 600 LBL 45 with skin
doubler reinforcement and built up pressure pan and door
assembly added for water tank maintenance panel.
• Cutouts in lower lobe skin station 510 RBL and LBL 48 with
skin doubler reinforcement and built up pressure pan and
door assembly added for external fire hose connections.
Body Section 46
- Support structure for aft tank is added to floor beams at
station 1661 and 1681.8. New structure to include four
vertical links, drag links, corresponding machined fittings,
floor beam intercostals, and web reinforcement.
• Support structure and intercostals for nitrogen bottle added
between floor beams at station 1640 and 1661.
• Cutout in lower lobe skin station 1640 to 1661 LBL 15 with
skin doubler reinforcement and built up pressure pan and
door assembly added for water tank maintenance panel.
• Cutouts in lower lobe skin station 1670 RBL and LBL 48 with
skin doubler reinforcement and built up pressure pan and
door assembly added for external fire hose connections.
Systems
Flight Deck
• Add a functional test panel (described in electrical section) to
flight deck right side panel.
Electrical
- Add a guarded switch to the cabin attendant panels adjacent
doors #1L and #4L, to activate nitrogen tank pneumatic valve
squibs at forward and aft tanks. Each switch to activate squibs
at both tanks.
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• Add an electrical arming switch adjacent each
activation switch, to control the system solenoid shut
off valves and to arm the firing circuit.
• Add arming circuit between arming switches,
forward and aft solenoid shut off valves, and relay switches in
forward and aft firing circuits. Solenoid shut off valves are to
fail open, with power loss. Firing circuit relay switches are to
fail closed, with power loss.
• Add firing circuits between cabin activation switch, arming
circuit relay switch, dedicated battery, and nitrogen bottle
squib, for forward and aft systems. Forward and aft circuits to
be cross connected to allow either forward or aft switches to
activate both forward and aft squibs. Dedicated nickel
cadmium batteries to be provided for both forward and aft
circuits, with charging provisions.
• Add functional test panel to flight deck and each maintenance
panel to provide check of firing circuit continuity, dedicated
battery charge, forward and aft tank levels, and nitrogen
bottle pressures--with pass verification, and failure indication.
• Safety related electronic boxes, relay panels, and wire
integration centers to have drip shields added against
potential water drippage.
Revision A: Delete arming switch from flight deck. Add arming
switch adjacent each activation switch.
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List of Figures
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Section Sta. 1190 Nozzle & Hoop Line Art.
Model 761-650
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Human Factors-
A Review of Two
Selected Reports
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THE MANCHESTER, ENGLAND, COMMERCIAL AIRPLANE ACCIDENT
On August 22, 1985 at 0612 hours a Boeing 737-236 with 131 passengers and 6 crew onboard began roUout on
the active runway at Manchester, England, UK. Thirty-two seconds into the rollout a compressor ejected from
the No. 2 engine piercing the fuel tank and throwing fuel on the hot engine. The takeoff was immediately
aborted and the airplane turned off the runway (44-seconds). Although rescue arrived very promptly 54 people
died immediately. Subsequently one passenger who was removed from the wreckage 4.5-minutes later sur-
vived but one rescued 34-minutes later died 6 days later. All of the survivors appear to have exited the airplane
within 4-minutes of the flight starting (rollou0. The first paper reviewed below is a medical analysis of this
accident followed by a second paper which draws behavioral conclusions from this and other life-threatening
emergencies.
"AN ANALYSIS OF FACTORS IMPEDING PASSENGER ESCAPE FROM AIRCRAFT FIRES",
I. R. HILL, AVIATION, SPACE AND ENVIRONMENTAL MEDICINE 61:261-265, 1990
THE MANCHESTER ACCIDENT
"The early entry of smoke and flames into the cabin caused panic; some people collapsed, others scrambled
over seats which collapsed. The aisles and exists became blocked; and two passengers refused to leave by the
left front door. The crew did not use their smoke hoods, and the PA system did not work because it was linked
to the failed No. 2 engine."
EVACUATION IN THE MANCHESTER ACCIDENT
Fifty (50) of the survivors said they had trouble getting out of the airplane:
• Due to the crush of panicked passengers;
• Those who were not delayed in escape were seated in first 2 rows or near the right overwing exit;
• Almost all survivors said they had trouble breathing.
Incapacitation of people was caused primarily by:
• Carbon monoxide and cyanide which cause hypoxia (lack of oxygen to tissues of the body) - often
called narcosis;
• Heat and toxic particles which cause visual and respiratory tract irritation and behavioral problems.
CAUSES OF DEATH IN THE MANCHESTER ACCIDENTS
• 0 - from mechanical trauma;
• 9 - heat;
• 4-C0;
• 11 - HCN;
• IO-CO+HCN;
• 20 - combination of toxins plus heat.
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SOME OF THE AUTHOR'S RECOMMENDATIONS
• Provide passenger with upper torso restraint;
* Provide passenger with smoke hoods/masks;
• Floor level lighting should be installed, etc.
This analyst made no mention of a water spray system ('Hill is from Royal Air Force Institute of Pathology in
England, UK), and has since stated his reservations regarding water spray systems ('Reference 3).
"HUMAN FACTORS IN CABIN SAFETY", HELEN C. MUIR AND CLAIRE MORRISON,
CABIN CREW SAFETY/FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION 25(2), MARCH, 1990
"In a situation where an immediate threat to life is perceived, rather than all passengers being moti-
vated to help each other, the main objective that will govern their behavior will be survival for
themselves, and in some instances, members of their family. In this situation, people do not work
collaboratively and evacuation can become very disorganized."
"The scientific literature indicates that where there is a serious threat to life, and only a limited
opportunity for escape, not only is everyone very frightened but it is human nature for individuals
to compete with each other in order to survive--in the Zeebmgge disaster some adults pulled
children off life rafts in order to survive."
Staged evacuation drills and some real worm accidents are usually ordedy. But in most aircraft
accidents the orderly process was not adhered to, and confusion resulted in blockages in the aisles
and exits, often with a consequent loss of life;
- Some passengers do not exit by their nearest exit but travel for considerable distances, i.e., from
front to back. Why do they choose to do this?
- Some passengers near exits do not survive. Do they panic, freeze up, give up, get crushed by
other people, etc.?
- Blockages have occurred in the aisles and exits in some actual accidents----this does not occur in
evacuation demonstrations staged for certification
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